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Member countries of the World Bank Group (WBG) increasingly turn to public-private 
partnerships (PPPs) to finance their transportation infrastructure projects due to the financial 
burden of undertaking big projects on their own. The World Bank coordinates the PPPs between 
investors and recipient countries. PPPs are expected to produce positive outcomes that respond to 
policy objectives. However, the outcomes and benefits of PPPs not only depend on several 
factors, but more importantly on how those factors interact with one another to yield the 
expected outcomes. This dissertation has identified good governance, PPP governance, and PPP 
outcome as the key concepts in the examination of the value that PPPs bring to countries that 
receive transportation PPP contracts. Using secondary data, the study explores the relationships 
between the three major concepts and assesses the possible mediating role of the internationally 
recognized PPP practices on the relationship between good governance and PPP outcome. The 
relationships are also examined for groups of countries based on their income level. The 
dissertation uses the overarching theory of good governance to explore these relationships. The 
dissertation analyzes the relationships using multivariate regression in the generalized structural 
equation modeling (GSEM) in the STATA package. Most of the hypotheses set in the study were 
supported. Recommendations are made to the World Bank and member countries to conduct 
effective transportation PPP contracts. The contribution to theory and practice is discussed. A 
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GLOSSARY, ABBREVIATIONS, AND ACRONYMS 
 
 
PPPs: Public-private partnerships 
PPP governance: The governance of PPPs comprises the stages of the PPP process including the 
preparation stage, the procurement stage, and the contract management stage. 
PPP governance main categories: The main categories include PPP preparation, PPP 
procurement, and PPP contract management. 
PPP preparation subcategories: The practices at the preparation stage 
PPP procurement subcategories: The practices at the procurement stage 
PPP contract management subcategories: The practices at the contract management stage 
Country governance: Good governance at the country level 
PPP outcome: The outcomes of the transportation PPP projects 
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 Public-private partnerships (PPPs) are perceived as an effective tool to support 
governments’ efforts in major infrastructure development (Flinders, 2005; Bojović, 2006; 
Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff, 2011). Central to this dissertation is the understanding of three 
major concepts with regards to the study of transportation PPPs in the context of the World Bank 
Group: country governance, PPP governance, and PPP outcome. The purpose of the dissertation 
is to study the relationships between the three concepts and examine whether PPP governance 
mediates the relationship between country governance and PPP outcome. The relationships are 
further examined by income level groups respective of the classification of countries by income 
level. To conceptually ground this research, a PPP is defined as a form of cooperation between 
public and private parties in the planning, construction, and exploitation of infrastructural 
facilities in which the parties share or reallocate risks, costs, benefits, resources, and 
responsibilities (Koppenjan, 2005). Good governance refers to the strengths of the institutions in 
a country with regards to government actions and concerns for accountability, political stability, 
effectiveness, the rule of law, and corruption. PPP governance refers to the application of 
practices at the different stages of PPP contracts to maximize the likelihood of successful PPP 
project outcomes. PPP outcome refers to how well PPP projects are executed with regards to the 
established objectives, tasks, and responsibilities.  
PPPs are contracts, agreements, or arrangements between governments and the private 
sector for the construction of roads, highways, bridges, schools, and major facilities (Koppenjan, 
2005; Bojović, 2006). Entering a partnership means that governments and private sector 
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contractors share responsibility for the design, building, financing, maintenance, and operation of 
the projects (Custos and Reitz, 2010; Greve and Hodge, 2013) on the principle of value for 
money (VFM). The potential of VFM allows governments to achieve public infrastructure 
development and relieves governments from budget and financial burden (Custos and Reitz, 
2010; Siemiatycki and Farooqi, 2012; Siemiatycki, 2013; Soomro and Zhang, 2013; Forrer, Kee, 
and Boyer, 2014; Soomro and Zhang, 2016). Partnerships are based on agreements and 
arrangements on the various aspects of a PPP project. For, example, in transportation PPPs, the 
private sector expects to recover the cost of investments through the institution of tolls and 
payments (Custos and Reitz, 2010; Queiroz, Vajdic, and Mladenovic, 2013). Theoretically, the 
use of partnerships in public service provision was advanced by the birth of ideas leading to the 
new public management (NPM) movement in the 1990s (Osborne and Gaebler, 1993; Broadbent 
and Laughlin, 2003). Governments in developed economies as well as in less developed 
economies and international financial institutions then viewed PPPs as an alternative to 
government financing.    
Practically, while individual countries engage in PPPs at the national level, the World 
Bank coordinates the public-private initiatives between stakeholders at the international level. As 
a financial institution with expertise in financing and investment, the World Bank coordinates 
and mediates the partnerships between donors and recipient countries. The World Bank is a 
cooperative of 189 member-countries that connects private investments to the needs of 
developing countries (The World Bank, 2018d). It provides financial and technical assistance in 
the form of loans and grants and innovative knowledge sharing to developing countries. Over the 
past few years, the assistance to PPP projects has substantially increased. The report of the 
Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) showed that private investments through the World 
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Bank in energy, transport, information and communication technologies (ICT) backbone, and 
water infrastructure in low- and middle-income countries in 2018 reached US$43.5 billion for 
the financing of 164 projects (The World Bank; 2019a). Transportation which includes airports, 
ports, railways, and roads, accounted for 57 percent of total investments (The World Bank; 
2019). The larger investment in transportation showed the eagerness of developing economies to 
improve their transportation capacity by embracing the PPP approach led by the World Bank. It 
is important to note that some countries received larger investments than others. For example, the 
BRICS which include Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa received the bigger piece of 
the cake in the 2018’s assistance.  
With growing investments in PPPs, standards and internationally recognized practices 
were developed to guide recipient countries in the PPP process. Donors and the World Bank 
expect certain conditions and standards to be met by recipient countries those conditions are 
viewed as prerequisites for effective management and for the recovery of investment cost in the 
transportation infrastructure. Part of the World Bank’s responsibilities is to set standards and 
define practices from the preparation to the closing of PPP contracts. The enforcement of 
standards and practices is viewed as the ability of governments and their agencies to adhere to 
the principles of transparency, accountability and participation, fairness, and orientation towards 
the public interest (Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff, 2011; Torchia and Calabrò, 2018) when PPPs 
are prepared, procured, and managed. Governments are expected to show that the conditions and 
standards are met or that prescribed steps are taken to create such conditions. For example, 
effective PPP governance enhances the risk assessment, which in turn diminishes the likelihood 
of negative political behaviors (Johnston and Gudergan, 2007). In other words, countries are 
expected to adopt governance with regards to the stages and practices of PPPs. Such governance 
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is referred to as PPP governance. PPP governance encompasses three stages in the PPP lifecycle: 
the preparation stage, the procurement stage, and the management stage (Hueskes, Verhoest, and 
Block, 2017). There are good practices associated with each of the three stages of the PPP 
process. Thus, PPP governance is the government capacity to properly implement internationally 
recognized PPP good practices (The World Bank, 2018a) by creating and empowering agencies 
to assume the responsibilities. Therefore, the examination of the effect of PPP governance on 
PPP outcome is of utmost importance in this dissertation. 
More studied than PPP governance is good governance which became the necessary 
condition for giving assistance to countries in need. Countries that request the assistance of the 
World Bank are required to show some commitments to good governance. The probability of 
risks and losses are minimized when good governance factors are met. It is believed that 
countries with good governance are more likely to facilitate the participation of the private sector 
in the PPP process. This also means that market principles are considered and integrated in the 
decision-making and planning process of those countries. The World Bank in the 1990s defined 
good governance as “…the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a county’s 
economic and social resources for development” (IBRD, 1992). The approach of national 
government to the use of economic and social resources becomes the measure of conditions that 
the World Bank and its financial stakeholders consider when making decisions on the PPP 
contracts (IBRD, 1992; IBRD, 1994). The most frequently used indicators of good governance 
include voice and accountability, rule of law, control of corruption, political stability and lack 
terrorism, government effectiveness, and regulatory quality.  
Good governance is necessary for PPPs because strong democratic institutions create the 
necessary conditions for partnerships (Agnafors, 2013; Casady, Eriksson, Levitt, and Scott, 
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2019). Countries with strong institutions tend to be more effective in PPP projects because of 
their ability to create the conditions that facilitate the private sector growth (Cheung, Chan, and 
Kajewski, 2012; Matos, Dewulf, and Mahalingam, 2012; Percoco, 2014; Reynaers, 2014; 
Panayides, Parola and Lam, 2015; Pusok, 2016; Osei-Kyei and Chan, 2017; The World Bank, 
2018b). These countries are more effective in PPP projects because their institutional structure 
allows them to make reforms or create specialized units to govern the entire PPP process (Unit, 
2011) and therefore lead to better outcome of the PPP investment projects (Anonymous, 2000; 
Anonymous, 2015; Galilea and Medda, 2009; Sultana, 2012; Agnafors, 2013; Osei-Kyei and 
Chan, 2017; Keping, 2018). Because of the strong focus on good governance as a prerequisite for 
investments, this dissertation examines its influence on the outcome of transportation PPP 
projects. 
In this study,  PPP outcome refers to how effectively the objectives of the PPP projects 
are achieved, how effectively the World Bank assumes its share of responsibilities throughout 
the contract lifecycle, and how effectively the borrowing country governments and their 
implementing agencies perform or comply with practices (Greve and Hodge, 2013; IEG, 2019).  
In short, this dissertation focuses on transportation PPP contracts awarded by the World 
Bank to its member countries. The purpose is to examine the relationships between country 
governance factors and the outcome of transportation PPP projects outcome. In doing so, the 
dissertation seeks to address the role of PPP governance in the relationships. Comprehensively, 
the dissertation explores the relationship between country governance, PPP governance, and PPP 
outcome. The study of the relationships is important because it adds a new dimension to the 
literature on PPPs. More specifically, the dissertation examines the relationship between PPP 
outcome and the standards or practices that the World Bank encourages its member countries to 
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adhere to. It also examines the relationship between country governance and PPP governance. 
Using new data, the dissertation examines the relationships between good governance, PPP 
governance and PPP outcome. By using more reliable data, this dissertation establishes more 
reliable relationships. 
Governance Indicator Data 
 The World Bank values measurable results and tracks governance and project outcome 
scores to evaluate the success, failures, and lessons learned (The World Bank, 2018b). This 
tracking includes collecting information from government compliance to good practices scores. 
Independent groups collect data on the World Bank’s operations. This dissertation uses data from 
the Procuring Infrastructure Public-Private Partnerships Report 2018 jointly produced by the 
World Bank’s Infrastructure, PPPs and Guarantees (IPG) Group, and the Global Indicators 
Group at the World Bank (The World Bank, 2018a). The report was designed both to help 
governments improve their PPP regulatory quality based on internationally recognized good 
practices for procuring PPPs and informing the policy debate and decision making (The World 
Bank, 2018a). The report contains scores of PPP stages, scores of good practices at each stage, 
and gross national income (GNI) scores for each country. No previous studies used the database 
because no concise data on PPP governance existed until 2017. 
The dissertation also uses data from Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) 
reported by the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG, 2019a). The report contains outcome 
ratings in sectors such as agriculture and rural development, global information or 
communications technology, energy and mining, financial and private sector development, 
transport, health, nutrition and population, social protection, environment, water, and financial 
and private sector development. As stated earlier, the study focuses only on the outcome of 
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transportation projects. The PPI data were widely used in previous studies (see Kirkpatrick et al., 
2006; Durakoğlu, 2011; Estache and Iimi, 2011; Chou, Tserng, Lin, and Yeh, 2012; Chen, 
Wang, and Fang, 2014; Pérez-D’Oleo, Castro, Herraiz and Carpintero, 2015; Moszoro, Araya, 
Ruiz Nunez, and Schwartz, 2015; Baker, 2016; Somma and Rubino, 2016).  
Another source used in the dissertation is the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). 
The database contains estimates of six governance indicators including voice and accountability, 
political stability, government effectiveness, control of corruption, rule of law, and regulatory 
quality (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 2010). The WGI database was used in several studies 
(See Pérez-D’Oleo et al., 2015; Wang, Liu, Xiong, and Song; 2019). The score of democracy 
(political liberties and civil rights scores) from Freedom House (Freedom House, 2018) are used. 
Research Questions 
The research questions are based on two main takeaways from the extant literature. First, 
the dissertation re-examines the influence of governance on PPP outcome because such 
relationship was mischaracterized in the previous studies. For example, studies by Bota-Avram 
(2014), D’Oleo et al. (2015), Sabry (2015), and Osei-Kyei and Chan (2017) found that good 
governance indicators had a positive effect on the level of investment in PPP projects and 
investment growth. While the studies found significant results, they referred to outcome as the 
level or the number of PPP investments that countries received. Second, the extant literature does 
not address PPP governance. Very few studies evaluated the relevance of PPP governance to the 
success of PPP contracts. The lack of effective PPP governance was the reason for the report on 
the capacity of countries on the PPP practices (The World Bank, 2018a). Thus, this dissertation 
not only addresses the mischaracterized relationship between country governance and PPP 
outcome, but also examines the relationship between PPP governance and PPP outcome. The 
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dissertation claims that there exist some relationships between country governance, PPP 
governance, PPP outcome. The overarching question is: Are there any relationships between 
country governance, PPP governance, and PPP outcome? The relationships are expected to be 
positive and statistically significant. Five main research questions are examined in the 
dissertation:  
Research question 1: Is there any relationship between country governance and the PPP 
outcome in that country? The PPP outcome data used in the extant literature are not 
reliable for examining such relationship because the number of projects was used as 
outcomes. Contrary to the number of projects, the dissertation used outcome data that 
measure different aspects or factors of PPP projects.  
Research question 2: Is there any relationship between country governance and PPP 
governance in that country? This relationship has not been explored in the literature. This 
dissertation expects a positive relationship as one would expect effective country 
governance to lead to effective governance of PPP projects. 
Research question 3: Is there any relationship between PPP governance and PPP 
outcome in that same country? The relationship between PPP governance with PPP 
outcome is unexplored because of the lack of studies on PPP governance.  
Research question 4: Does PPP governance mediate the relationship between country 
governance and PPP governance? The exploration of the first three questions will allow 
determining the mediating role of PPP governance.  
Research question 5: What differences or similarities exist for countries based on 
income-level considering the four previous research questions? 
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This dissertation involves a mediation analysis and is the first to use PPP governance in 
that context (See Figure 1). That is, given X the exogenous variable, M the mediator, and Y the 
endogenous variable; X in this study refers to country governance, M refers to PPP governance, 
and Y refers to outcome (Kenny, 2018). In the mediation analysis (Baron and Kenny, 1986), the 
effect of the exogenous variable (X) directly on the endogenous variable (Y) becomes 
significantly smaller in size relative to the effective size of the mediator on the endogenous 
variable (Iacobucci, 2008). 















Figure 1 is set up to show the relationships to be explored. It is an adaptation from the 
mediation studies (see Baron and Kenny, 1986; Iacobucci, 2008; and Kenny, 2018). It shows the 
four main relationships that this dissertation examines. First, it examines the relationship 
between country governance and PPP outcome. Second, it examines the relationship between 














PPP outcome. Fourth, it examines the mediating role of PPP governance on the relationship 
between country governance and PPP outcome. The four main relationships are explored for 
each of the income level groups.  
Dissertation Preview 
The remainder of the dissertation presents the literature review pertaining to the three 
main concepts including good governance, PPP governance, and PPP outcome. The dissertation 
breaks down the factors relevant to each of the three major concepts. The methods section which 
follows the literature review describes the process used in the mediation analysis as well as the 
multivariate regression used along with generalized structural equation modeling (GSEM). The 
methods section also provides insights on data and the hypotheses that arise from the research 
questions. In the third chapter, the dissertation presents the results and evaluates their statistical 
and substantive significance. In the final chapter, the dissertation discusses the conclusion and 






Chapter II is a review of the literature from three major perspectives. First, it presents a 
review of good governance theory and its implications on developed and developing countries. 
Second, the three stages of PPP process including the preparation, the procurement, and the 
contract management are reviewed along with their impact on PPP outcomes. Third and lastly, 
the six indicators of good governance are reviewed along with their impact on PPP outcome. 
Governance, Good Governance, and Definitions 
Governance, according to the Institute on Governance, is the way “…society or groups 
within it organize to make decisions.” In other words, it is about how traditions, institutions, and 
processes determine the exercise of power, how citizens are given a voice, and how decisions 
take into account the public interest (Institute on Governance; Lynn Jr, Heinrich, and Hill 
(2001)).  For Lynn Jr, Heinrich, and Hill (2001), governance is “the means for achieving 
direction, control and coordination of wholly or partially autonomous individuals or 
organizational units on behalf of interests to which they jointly contribute’’ (p. 6). When it comes 
to the relationship between the World Bank and recipient countries, the relationship can be 
described as hierarchical from the perspective of governance. Governance is conceived at the 
global and national levels whereby it is defined and contextualized. Politics then influences the 
rules, regulations, and processes that define governance, which in turn determine the 
management strategies used to achieve policy objectives (see Figure 2). From management 
emerges the primary work, the outputs and results such as availability, quality, and cost of public 
goods or services (see Figure 2). Last, the political assessment determines the motivation and 
political support to achieving results.  
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At the country level, good governance is determined by the economic, social, political, and 
institutional conditions in that country. Kaufmann et al. (2010) defined governance as the 
tradition and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. They reveal three instances 
that fall under this definition. First, they view governance as the process by which governments 
are selected, monitored, and replaced (Kaufmann et al., 2010). Second, governance is the 
capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies (Kaufmann et 
al., 2010). Governance also includes the creation, execution, and implementation of activities 
backed by the shared goals of citizens and organizations, which may or may not have formal 
authority or policing power (Rosenau, 1992). Byman (2018) defines good governance as an 
effective way of formulating and implementing state policies, including law and order and 
programs designed to encourage popular welfare. As such, good governance at its core includes 
the exercise of the rule of law, popular participation, and government accountability involving 
both the state and civil society. Third, governance refers to the respect of citizens and the state 
for the institutions that govern the economic and social interactions among them (Kaufmann et 
al., 2010). Countries with systems that meet the definition are thought to exercise good 
governance. Those countries are not only capable of maximizing their outcomes, but they are 
more dynamic in coping with economic and financial crises (Gamberger and Smuc, 2013).  
The good governance concept is built around effectiveness and efficiency, accountability and 
transparency, equity, rule of law, and voice legitimacy, performance, fairness, and direction 
(Graham et al., 2003). The players at the national level include the government, the private 
sector, civil society, and media (Graham et al., 2003). The IRBD (1992) defines governance as 
the way power is exercised in the management of a county’s economic and social resources 
towards development. The World Bank 1992’s report identifies four major components of 
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governance including the public sector management, accountability, legal framework for 
development, and transparency and information (IRBD, 1994). In the newer report of 1994, the 
World Bank added participatory approaches to policy, program, and project design and 
implementation to its definition of governance. The Ex-UN Secretary-General Koffi Annan 
referred to good governance as the respect for human rights and the rule of law, strengthening 
democratization, and promoting transparency and capability in public administration. 
Keping (2018) defined good governance as the public administration process that maximizes 
public interest. Good governance in that sense is a type of collaborative management of public 
life performed by the state and the citizens. It is a new relationship between political state and 
civil society. Keping (2018) argued that good governance theory should be composed of 
legitimacy, transparency, accountability, rule of law, responsiveness, and effectiveness. Adrian 
and Mabel (2016) argued that good governance means the presence of the rule of law and market 
efficiency. The rule of law, of which depend peace and order, is the bedrock to achieving 
economic growth as it improves trade and investment activities. Agnafors (2013) argued that an 
acceptable definition of the quality of governance or good governance must be consistent with 
the demands of a public ethos, the virtues of good decision making and reason giving, the rule of 
law, efficiency, stability, and a principle of beneficence. For Rothstein (2014), the quality of 
governance should be the opposite of corruption, which is impartiality. The lack of impartiality 
means poor governance or favoritism in the system. 
The good governance theory implies that a governance system can be poor. Poor governance 
occurs when government officials fail to make a clear separation between what is public and 
what is private but tend to divert public resources for private gain (IRBD, 1994). In other words, 
corruption and bribery are examples of poor governance. Poor governance also occurs when a 
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government fails to establish a predictable framework of law and government behavior 
conducive to development (IRBD, 1994). Poor governance is linked to civil wars, corruption and 
a lack of economic development (Byman, 2018). There is also poor governance when the 
government arbitrarily applies the rules and laws by abusing the powers. Excessive rules, 
regulations, and licensing requirements are poor governance policies that can impede the 
functioning of markets and encourage rent-seeking. When the priorities are inconsistent with 
development, this indicates that there is a misallocation of resources. The use of extremely 
narrow and non-transparent decision-making process is also an indicator of poor governance 
(IRBD, 1994).  
Good governance theory stipulates that a country’s development rests on how well the 
institutional and legal framework allows for fair and transparent processes of decision making 
conducive to effectiveness and efficiency in government operations. The relevance of good 
governance becomes clear for PPPs which are being favored as a mechanism for infrastructure 
development. In other words, the institutional environment considerably influences PPP 
processes and project outcomes (Matos et al., 2012). Considering PPPs, governance is good 
when a country government can make social, economic, and financial changes to integrate and 
promote PPP initiatives. Institutional processes must be considerate of principles of private 
investments into the government-led projects. The relationship between good governance and 




























 The model in Figure 2 shows that there is a hierarchical approach to governance. This is 
conceivable in the present study where the global context or the World Bank decisions on PPPs 
surpasses those of national governments. The politics of those national governments and the 
subsequent decision-making process such as rules, strategies, and outcomes are influenced by the 
World Bank’s decisions. 
Public-Private Partnerships: Merits and Challenges 
The rationale for entering a PPP and procuring large infrastructure projects is VFM 






Primary work and its results, outcomes 
Political assessment  
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defines VFM as the “optimization of whole-life costs and quality needed to meet the user’s 
requirements, while taking into consideration potential risk factors and resources available” 
(Doing Business with the United Nations, 2015; p. 2). In general, the rationale is that 
governments can achieve economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in their spending (NAO, 2017). 
By economy, governments seek to minimize the cost of resources used in projects. Efficiency 
means that the governments can achieve the objectives given a certain level of spending. By 
effectiveness, the government assesses whether it is spending wisely according to expected 
outcomes and actual outcomes (NAO, 2017). The rationale for PPPs is based on the idea that the 
criteria of economy, efficiency, and effectiveness can be best achieved if the public and private 
sector collaborate. Vining and Boardman (2008) states that the appropriate test of a successful 
PPP project is whether the project has lower total costs, including production costs and all the 
transaction costs and externalities associated with the project. 
Given the rationale for VFM, PPPs have been defined in various ways to capture all the 
aspects that would potentially lead to VFM. PPPs have been defined by the World Bank as a 
“long-term agreement between the contracting authority and the private partner, for providing a 
public asset or service, in which the private partner bears significant risk and management 
responsibility, and remuneration is linked to performance” (The World Bank, 2017; p. 2). 
Koppenjan (2005) defined PPPs as “a form of structured cooperation between public and private 
partners in the planning or construction and exploitation of infrastructural facilities in which they 
share or reallocate risks, costs, benefits, resources, and responsibilities” (p. 4). PPPs have been 
defined as arrangements between governments and private sector entities for the purpose of 
providing public infrastructure, community facilities, and related services (Bojović, 2006); or 
any arrangement between the government and the private sector in which partially or 
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traditionally public activities are performed by the private sector (Bansal, 2003). PPPs can lead 
to management reform, problem conversion, moral regeneration, risk shifting, and power sharing 
(McQuaid, 2000; Scharle, 2002) to achieve VFM.  
These definitions have some implications for the rationale behind PPPs. First, in the 
context of the World Bank, it implies that developing countries that do not have the financial 
resources, the expertise, the capital, and the technological know-how will have access to them 
through the private sector involvement. It further invokes the responsibilities and role of the 
financial institutions including the World Bank in accompanying those countries. Jandhyala 
(2016) argues that the involvement of multilateral development banks (MDBs) can lower PPP 
project risks. They can do so through operational assistance to ensure well-reviewed project 
contracts and by encouraging a greater level of supervision of a project implementation. Policy 
dialogue is another channel to positively influence negotiations and help resolve project disputes 
between client governments and their private sector partners. The participation of MDBs lowers 
project risks and reduces the probability of cancelling projects. Jandhyala’s (2016) study of 
2,117 infrastructure PPP projects in 45 developing countries from 1995 to 2009 shows that the 
odds of project distress when MDBs participate is 50% lower than for projects without their 
participation. Lee et al (2018) found that the involvement of MDBs can significantly increase the 
success of projects in developing Asia. MDBs can play an important role in reducing funding 
gaps for infrastructure and can facilitate regional cooperation for the provision of public goods 
among neighboring countries. Nose (2014) argued that the involvement of international financial 
institutions could significantly reduce the breach of contract risk as governments try to avoid 
losing the reputation with the international community. In other words, yielding satisfactory 
performance becomes an outcome measure of PPP projects. IEG (2019) measures the World 
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Bank’s performance as “the extent to which the services provided by the Bank ensured quality at 
entry of the project and supported effective implementation through appropriate supervision 
towards the achievement of development outcomes” ( IEG, 2019; p.17). 
In terms of performance, the borrower country is also expected to be on top of the whole 
PPP process (Lee et al, 2018). IEG (2019) measured the borrower country performance as the 
extent to which the borrower, including the government and implementing agency or agencies, 
ensured quality of preparation and implementation, and complied with covenants and agreements 
towards the achievement of development outcomes (See Table 1). The performance of country 
government is key to PPP success. For example, the World Bank (2007) found that the efficiency 
of a PPP unit was highly correlated with the success of a country’s PPP program. That is because 
specialized units and separation of roles and responsibilities are put in place to ensure the respect 
of the principles of transparency, efficiency, economy, and competition (PNDES, 2016). Lee et 
al. (2018) confirmed that the presence of at least one PPP unit and direct government subsidies 
and indirect support through guarantees can help PPP projects become more viable. 
Governments can bear some project risks by providing capital and revenue subsidies or in-kind 
contributions, such as land; favorable government policies to investment; or incentives, such as 
loan guarantees for sub-sovereign and non-sovereign borrowing (Lee et al., 2018).  
Second, the risk, cost, and resources associated with major infrastructure projects are 
shared by the public and private partners. The sharing can be problematic and conflictual. 
McQuaid (2000) and Axelrod (1984) argued that partnerships imply solving conflicts and 
interests of the public and private partners involved. At the early stages, the relationship between 
the public and the private is complex as game theory always plays out in that relationship 
scenario. The best outcome for a partnership is to reach an agreement for cooperation. The 
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prisoner’s dilemma theory (McQuaid, 2000) helps explain the relationship. While the parties do 
not have full confidence in their partners, parties become convinced that any type of confession 
or decision except cooperation by one of the parties can be costlier. The fear of loss creates the 
incentives for greater cooperation and abandoning self-interest behavior. With cooperation, 
conflicting goals and interests are managed through negotiations on risk shifting and power 
sharing (Linder, 1999). 
Wang et al (2019) discussed the relevance of prospect theory in the stakeholders’ 
decision to pursue or curtail investments. PPPs are a way for government to share or reallocate 
risks, costs, benefits, resources, and responsibilities (Koppenjan, 2005) and characterized by the 
sharing of investment, risk, responsibility, and reward between the partners. They induce strong 
incentives to invest in cost reductions (Hoppe et al., 2013) and reduce operating costs that benefit 
both sectors (Hart, 2003). Stakeholders expect gains to outweigh losses. More specifically, PPP 
outcomes are defined in terms of achieved objectives and the success of PPPs is based on clear 
and shared objectives (McQuaid, 2000; Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff, 2011). IEG (2019) defined 
achieved objectives as “…the extent to which the operation’s major relevant objectives were 
achieved, or are expected to be achieved, efficiently” (IEG, 2019). The measure includes the 
relevance of the project’s objectives and design, efficacy, and efficiency (IEG, 2019). Success is 
also conceived as the lack of cost overruns, the lack of time delays, the ex-post level of traffic, 
and generated revenues (Trujillo et al., 2018). The definition of PPP outcome is presented in 






Table 1: Outcome of Public-Private Partnership Projects 
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Third, partnership is a win-win scenario. Via partnership, governments alleviate the 
burden on the budget as they no longer carry the full cost of projects. Reyes-Tagle and Garbacik 
(2016) argued that PPPs can be an immediate remedy for fiscal constraints because of private 
sector financing. The benefits of PPP become more visible as the private sector brings in 
additional funding, more efficient management, and better public services (Lee et al, 2018) or 
governance, legitimacy and credibility, capacity building, and role model actions (Maktabi, 
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2014). Enough policies, regulations, frameworks, fiscal and non-fiscal support, communication, 
and government engagement that originate from PPPs hold partners accountable and minimize 
risks (Maktabi, 2014). Percoco (2014) examined the quality of institutions and private 
participation in transport infrastructure investment in developing countries using the Private 
Participation in Infrastructure database. Percoco (2014) found that that greater participation by 
private parties in PPP contracts is associated with better institutions in terms of lower corruption, 
civil freedom, and a better regulatory framework. Reynaers (2014) examined the impact of 
design-build-finance-maintain-operate (DBFMO) PPP projects on public values using PPI data. 
Reynaers (2014) found that accountability, responsiveness, transparency, and responsibility had 
increased. The private sector gains from the partnership as it recovers cost by collecting user fees 
and a priori agreed-upon payments.  
Structurally, the success of PPPs depends on jointly determined goals, collaborative and 
consensus-based decision making, non-hierarchical and horizontal structures and processes trust-
based relationships, synergistic interactions, and shared accountability for outcomes and results 
(Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2011). The success of partnerships also depends on the clarity of 
objectives, the agreement on the operation of the partnership, resources, responsibility over day-
to-day management, clear lines of communication and decision-making, clear exit routes, a 
supportive institutional infrastructure, and a suitable system of incentives (McQuaid, 2000). 
Koppenjan (2005) argued that well-formed partnerships, interaction in the planning phase, and 
joint market planning lead to successful project results. Bhattacharya (2002) found that resource 
dependency, commitment and common goals, good communication and cooperation between 
partners, and cultures play a role in the success of PPPs. Using case studies from Bangladesh, 
Nepal, Tanzania, and Uganda, Maktabi (2014) found that the role and involvement of the 
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government, robust communication streams, building a sense of ownership and trust between 
partners in the project, and sustainable funding systems appear critical to minimizing risks. Osei-
Kyei and Chan (2016) argued that strong government commitment and will, constant public 
consultations on toll increments, selection of right private partner, clear contractual agreement, 
appropriate risk allocation, and agreement were key to positive PPP project outcomes. Countries 
vary in their level of development and institutional governance. This variation also implies that 
the success or outcomes of PPP will vary accordingly.  
State of Public-Private Partnerships in Developed Economies  
Developed countries have fewer difficulties than developing countries meeting the 
necessary conditions for PPPs success due to their predisposition to good governance 
institutions. Countries with high level of institutional sophistication including the United 
Kingdom, Australia, Spain, and Ireland have effective partnership relationships (Siemiatycki, 
2013). In those countries, new innovative models are refined; more creative, flexible approaches 
are applied to the roles of public and private sector; more sophisticated risk models are used; and 
a greater focus on total lifecycle of project in rationale for PPPs is considered. Cheung et al. 
(2012) examined the success factors of PPPs in Hong-Kong, the United Kingdom, and Australia. 
They found that favorable legal framework, commitment and responsibility of public and private 
sectors, strong and good private consortium, stable macro-economic condition, and appropriate 
risk allocation and risk sharing were critical. Furthermore, private sector methods of operation 
and management are adopted by public sector institutions in response to greater competition 
(Siemiatycki, 2013). Governments look for innovative models to monetize assets while 
organizational skills are enhanced in government to support greater role of PPPs (Siemiatycki, 
2013). In other words, those countries have strong PPP policy expertise, supportive civil society, 
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and PPP policy consensus (Siemiatycki, 2013). Unit’s (2011) evaluated the environment for 
PPPs in Asia Pacific using PPI data. The findings showed that countries such as Australia, South 
Korea, India, United Kingdom have strong and effective central and local policies and 
institutions, detailed guidance-based PPPs framework, strong local PPP regulations, training and 
oversight, rapid growth, and prudent economic management. They also focus on cost-benefit 
analysis and VFM consideration. As a result, those countries that created a reliable environment 
attract investments and have high ranking scores in regulatory framework, institutional 
framework, investment climate, financial facilities, and subnational adjustment.  
More importantly, they consider effective project preparation and risk assessment as 
preventive measures to dispute resolution. Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) countries 
that improved in regulatory framework had improved their regulation and implementation of new 
PPP laws, enhanced the fairness of contracting processes, and strengthened the dispute resolution 
mechanisms (Unit, 2014). Those countries have also included mandatory cost-benefit and VFM 
analysis for the selection of PPP projects (Unit, 2014). The positive view of PPP in developed 
countries makes them a model for infrastructure development for developing countries. 
However, the challenges are complex for developing countries because of different internal 
conditions and unequal development status. 
State of Public-Private Partnerships in Developing Economies  
While PPPs have become a praised mechanism for infrastructure development in 
developed countries, their application in developing countries faces a myriad of challenges due 
to pre-existing institutional weaknesses. In developing countries that experience governance 
shortcomings, the ability of the partnership to produce desired outcomes is put at risk 
(Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2011). Private participation is viewed as inappropriate for 
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developing countries because of weak technical capacities and imperfect information, inability or 
unwillingness to pay the cost-covering tariffs, higher subsidies, high capital cost and risks in 
developing countries, low and uncertain revenues, cherry picking favoring lucrative sectors, and 
misdirected regulatory capacities (Tan, 2011). Furthermore, high contracting costs due to 
opportunism, high construction complexity, high revenue uncertainty, and poor contract 
management can lead to failure in PPP projects in developing countries (Vining and Boardman, 
2008). Lee et al. (2018) found that about 41.8% of transportation PPP projects between 1991 and 
2015 in low-and middle-income Asian countries failed for similar reasons. 
There are also challenges in the distribution of PPP awards and funding across countries 
and regions. Most PPPs are concentrated in a small number of developed countries and emerging 
markets (Siemiatycki, 2013) and executed by a small number of highly globalized construction 
contractors, engineering firms, financiers, accountancies, and consultants from developed 
countries (Siemiatycki, 2013). Of 34 countries that received investments in 2018 through the 
World Bank, China, Turkey, Vietnam, India, and Brazil accounted for 66 percent of the global 
total investments in infrastructure (The World Bank, 2019).  The level of investments for LAC 
and South Asia Region (SAR) declined. The increase was 3% for Sub-Saharan African (SSA), 
with most of the investments awarded to South Africa (The World Bank, 2019). Galilea and 
Medda (2009) found that the location or region of the project influenced the success of PPPs. 
The failure of PPP projects is often linked to the failure to abide by the principles and 
good practices of PPPs contracts. Sanni and Hashim (2014) showed that challenges for 
infrastructure development through PPP arrangements in South Africa included low competition, 
lack of policy direction among the political leaders, lack of clarity in the minds of the 
implementing agencies and the private sector in the delivery of PPP projects, no technical know-
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how, lack of resources and authority, and use of ineffective procurement measures. Lee et al 
(2018) showed that failures in Asian countries were due to the lack of project preparation, 
competitive systematic project awarding method, poor governance, misaligned priorities, the 
underrepresentation of the public sector in decision making, and the lack of coordination and 
cooperation between partners. Unit (2014) found that Asia Pacific countries including Georgia, 
Indonesia, China, Armenia, Kyrgyz Republic, Mongolia, Tajikistan, Philippines, Papua New 
Guinea, Thailand, Pakistan, and Vietnam lacked clear central guidance on the roles and 
responsibilities and experience. Those countries had inadequate concession law, weak 
coordination, and oversight among agencies in charge of PPP regulations, limited transparency in 
procurement, uncertain conditions for investment or operating environment, institutional conflict 
and shortages, and weak bidding and resolution regulations. Unsurprisingly, they had lower 
ranking scores. Unit (2014) also noted that the dispute-resolution mechanisms remained the 
weakest component of the regulatory framework across LAC countries.  
In short, the performance in PPP governance influences the success of PPP projects. PPP 
governance encompasses actions at different stages of the process as well as key practices at 
each stage. The next section explains PPP governance and hypothesizes its relationship with PPP 
outcome. 
The Stages of PPP Process 
The governance of PPP projects generally comprises the main stages of the PPP lifecycle 
including the identification phase, the preparation stage, the procurement stage, as well as 
contract management, the contract administration phase, and the transfer phase. Some scholars 
consider the identification phase and the preparation phase as a single phase. Other studies 
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separate the contract administration phase from the contract management phase. This dissertation 
considers three main stages: preparation, procurement, and management.  
PPP governance includes steps taken by national governments to ensure that they act 
according to and implement the standard practices and principles at each stage that they agreed 
to. The practices address economic, environmental, and financial assessment and guide partners 
to ensure transparency and fairness in the procurement process as well as satisfactory dispute 
resolution and managing change during the implementation process. Lee et al (2018) cited the 
choice of the type of PPP including private participation level, contract, award method, 
government support or guarantee. They also noted that sponsor, government, private, and foreign 
funding are project level factors that can influence PPP project outcome. The significant success 
factors include government support, proper project planning, good coordination between parties, 
trust, good tendering system, proper information dissemination and communication system and 
high managerial capabilities (Abednego and Ogunlana, 2006). Those factors are being 
considered in countries and regions around the world. For example, Francophone West African 
countries took the initiatives to implement national development goals using PPPs. The countries 
have created PPP legislative, regulatory, and institutional framework to ensure universally 
accepted principles in public procurement are achieved, including freedom of access, equal 
treatment of bidders, competition, objectivity of procedures and transparency (PNDES, 2016). 
This includes the planning, design and preparation of bids, awards, assessment and negotiation of 
bids, and execution.  
While the goal in this section is to address each stage, studies on PPP have combined and 
mixed stages and practices and drawn cross-stage conclusions. For example, from their review of 
PPP literature from 1996 to 2016, Bao et al. (2018) found that 92 of 282 publications in PPP 
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governance were indivisible topics. The studies simultaneously covered topics of the 
identification, preparation, procurement, and management phases.  
Preparation of PPPs and Influence on PPP Outcomes 
The practices at the preparation stage of PPPs requires risk, fiscal, economic, financial, and 
environmental, and market assessments (Siemonsma et al., 2012; El-Sawalhi and Mansour, 
2014; Jacob et al., 2014; Kashi, 2015; Soomro and Zhang, 2015; Opawole and Jagboro, 2017; 
The World Bank, 2018a; Lee et al, 2018; Osei-Kyei and Chan, 2019). Bao et al. (2018) found 
that from 1996 to 2016, 63 of 282 publications on PPP dealt with the preparation phase. The 
studies highlighted the management structure including the PPP team formation, the constitution 
of the public, and early briefing. They also highlighted detailed PPP design including the 
concession period, government guarantee, financing structure, pricing, and contract design. Of 
the 282 publications on PPP, 35 dealt with the project identification. Those studies focused on 
risk allocation including risk identification and risk analysis. They also addressed project 
selection including feasibility, suitability, and attractiveness. Government capacity and 
compliance to those practices influence investment decisions and project outcome. 
EIU’s (2015) benchmarking of PPP projects for Asia and the Pacific showed that weak 
legal and regulatory frameworks, poorly prepared or structured projects, lack of capacity to carry 
projects out in the public and private sectors, and weak financial markets undermined PPP 
projects. Galilea and Medda (2009) found that a country’s experience in PPP agreements in 
transport, its gross domestic product (GDP) growth, and the current account balance influenced 
the success of PPPs. El-Sawalhi and Mansour (2014) found that the critical success factors of 
PPP projects included stability of the political situation, clear and detailed contract, existence of 
a sound economic policy, reliable delivery of service, analysis and allocation of risks, suitable 
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legal framework, experienced private sector, profitability to the private sector, and accepted level 
of toll or tariff for a project. Wibowo and Alfen (2015) found that the top five greatest gaps in 
PPPs were as follows: (1) the lack of sufficient project integration with national and local 
planning processes, (2) the lack of clearly defined mechanisms to coordinate needs, (3) the 
lack of competent, independent, and efficient regulators, (4) the lack of adequate awareness 
of legal, technical, and financial aspects of the public sector (see also Parry and Hughes, 
2018), and (5)the lack of strong political support. Loxley (2013) found that governments in 
South Africa in particular, and Africa in general provided no detailed information on value, risk, 
contracts, financial agreements, and schedules. This means that key elements in the PPP contract 
are not painstakingly addressed for lack of appropriate governance structures.  
Unit (2014) shows that LAC countries that improved the institutional framework 
including the creation of new units and centralization of planning and promotion attracted better 
investments (Unit, 2014; The World Bank, 2018a). All PPP contracts must be approved by the 
central authority and priorities must be consistent with public investments priorities (Unit, 2014; 
Wibowo and Alfen, 2015; The World Bank, 2018a). All contract drafts are expected to be 
included in the requests for proposals (Liu et al., 2015, The World Bank, 2018a). Kotze et al. 
(1999) found that the lack of detailed draft contracts lengthened the negotiation process even 
after a bid was awarded. Standardized contract models should be available for orientation to 
better and more efficient agreements (Kotze et al., 1999; The World Bank, 2018a). An 
appropriate allocation of risks is a necessary condition for successful contracts (Marques and 
Berg, 2010; Marques and Berg, 2011; Soomro and Zhang, 2015; Wang et al., 2019). Panayides 
et al. (2015) found that market openness, ease to start a business, and enforcing contracts were 
important institutional determinants of port PPP success that attract private bidders and the 
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market competitiveness of ports. Using PPI data, Chou et al. (2012) found that the size of the 
market or large size markets and inflation attracted more PPP projects in developing economies. 
In short, from Table 2, this study hypothesizes that effectiveness in the practices at the 
preparation stage leads to better PPP outcomes. Table 2 presents the variables used to 





















Table 2: Practices of the Preparation Stage 
Stages Practices/guidelines Authors/sources 
Preparation 
of PPPs 
- Central Budgetary Authority’s 
approval  
The World Bank, 2018a; Unit, 2014; Wibowo and 
Alfen, 2015; 
- Fiscal treatment of PPPs The World Bank, 2018a; Siemonsma et al., 2012; El-
Sawalhi and Mansour, 2014; Jacob et al., 2014; Kashi, 
2015; Soomro and Zhang, 2015; Opawole and Jagboro, 
2017; The World Bank, 2018a; Lee et al, 2018; Osei-
Kyei and Chan, 2019 
- PPP’s prioritization consistent 
with public investment 
prioritization  
- The World Bank, 2018a 
- Economic analysis assessment  The World Bank, 2018a; El-Sawalhi and Mansour, 
2014; Siemonsma et al., 2012; El-Sawalhi and 
Mansour, 2014; Jacob et al., 2014; Kashi, 2015; 
Soomro and Zhang, 2015; Opawole and Jagboro, 2017; 
The World Bank, 2018a; Lee et al, 2018; Osei-Kyei 
and Chan, 2019 
- Fiscal affordability assessment  The World Bank, 2018a 
- Risk identification  The World Bank, 2018a; El-Sawalhi and Mansour, 
2014; Loxley, 2013; Marques and Berg, 2010; 
Marques and Berg, 2011; Soomro and Zhang, 2015; 
Wang et al., 2019 
- Financial viability assessment  The World Bank, 2018a; Wibowo and Alfen, 2015; 
Loxley, 2013; Siemonsma et al., 2012; El-Sawalhi and 
Mansour, 2014; Jacob et al., 2014; Kashi, 2015; 
Soomro and Zhang, 2015; Opawole and Jagboro, 2017; 
The World Bank, 2018a; Lee et al, 2018; Osei-Kyei 
and Chan, 2019 
- PPP vs. Public Procurement 
comparative assessment 
The World Bank, 2018a 
- Market Sounding analysis The World Bank, 2018a; EIU, 2015; Panayides et al., 
2015; Chou et al., 2012 
- Environment impact 
assessment 
The World Bank, 2018a; 
- Assessments included in the 
RFP and/or tender documents 
The World Bank, 2018a; Liu et al., 2015 
- Draft PPP contract included in 
the request for proposals 
The World Bank, 2018a El-Sawalhi and Mansour, 
2014; Loxley, 2013; Kotze et al., 1999 
- Standardized PPP model 
contracts and/or transaction 
documents 
The World Bank, 2018a; Kotze et al., 1999; Panayides 





Procurement of PPPs and Influence on PPP Outcomes 
The practices at the procurement stage can influence the outcome of PPP projects. In the 
procurement phase, required principles include freedom of access, equal treatment of bidders, 
competition, objectivity of procedures, and transparency in the process (PNDES, 2016). Desired 
practices at this stage also include qualified evaluation committee members, issuance of a 
procurement notice by the procuring authority, a minimum time of 30 days for bid submissions, 
available procurement procedures, and permission for foreign companies to participate in the 
bidding (Soomro and Zhang, 2015). Bao et al. (2018) found that from 1996 to 2016, 42 of 282 
publications on PPP addressed the PPP procurement phase. The studies focused on the bidding 
process including concessionary selection, negotiation, critical success factors for bidding 
process, and incentive creation. They also focused on bidders’ concerns such as financial 
viability, risk assessment, and bid-winning strategies.  
Osei-Kyei and Chan (2015) reviewed studies on the critical success factors for PPP projects 
from 1990 to 2013. The top five influential factors were risk allocation and sharing, strong 
private consortium, political support, community or public support, and transparent procurement. 
Direct negotiation, presence of details of the procurement stages and prequalification criteria, 
and openness to clarification questions on RFPs are necessary for a successful PPP project (El-
Sawalhi and Mansour, 2014; Liu et al., 2015). Furthermore, pre-bidding conference, evaluation 
of proposals based on published criteria, simultaneous submission of financial models and 
proposals, public of award notice and of contract, negotiation before contract signing, and 
notification of the results of the procurement process are key practices to be observed. The lack 
of attention to those practices can lead to failure (The World Bank, 2018a). Soomro and Zhang 
(2015) found that among 27 failure mechanisms initiated by the public sector partners, 14 
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failures occurred during the procurement process. This converts to twice more than the failures 
in the preparation stage and three times more than the management stage. Complex issues of 
procedures at this stage impede competition and cost-effective PPP bidding (Carrillo et al., 2008; 
Chen and Doloi, 2008; De Clerck and Demeulemeester, 2014). Osei-Kyei and Chan (2016) 
argued that the lack of competition and transparency in SSA projects led to project failure. 
Eberhard and Gratwick (2013) discussed success stories of independent power projects (IPPs) in 
African countries including South Africa, Kenya, and Nigeria. They found that success factors 
included competitive bids for renewable energy, well-designed procurement process, expertise, 
and the flexibility in the design of subsequent bid rounds. In short, this study hypothesizes that 
effectiveness in the practices at the procurement stage leads to better PPP outcomes. Table 3 
















Table 3: Practices of the Procurement Stage 
Stages - Practices/Guidelines  Authors/sources 
Procurement 
of PPPs 
- Evaluation committee members required to meet 
specific qualifications  
The World Bank, 2018a 
- Public procurement notice of the PPP issued by 
procuring authority  
The World Bank, 2018a 
Foreign companies permitted to participate in PPP 
bidding 
The World Bank, 2018a; Soomro 
and Zhang, 2015 
- Minimum period of time to submit the bids (>=30 
days)  
The World Bank, 2018 
Availability of various procurement procedures for 
PPPs 
The World Bank, 2018a; Eberhard 
and Gratwick, 2013 
Direct negotiation not discretionary The World Bank, 2018a; El-
Sawalhi and Mansour, 2014; Liu 
et al., 2015 
- Tender documents detail the stages of the 
procurement process  
The World Bank, 2018a; Eberhard 
and Gratwick, 2013 
- Tender documents specify prequalification criteria The World Bank, 2018a; El-
Sawalhi and Mansour, 2014; Liu 
et al., 2015 
- Clarification questions for procurement notice 
and/or the request for proposals  
The World Bank, 2018a; El-
Sawalhi and Mansour, 2014; Liu 
et al., 2015 
- Pre-bidding conference The World Bank, 2018a; 
- Financial model submitted with proposal The World Bank, 2018a; 
- Proposals strictly and solely evaluated in 
accordance with published evaluation criteria  
The World Bank, 2018a; El-
Sawalhi and Mansour, 2014; Liu 
et al., 2015 
- Treatment when only one proposal is received The World Bank, 2018a; 
- Publication of award notice  The World Bank, 2018a; 
- Notification of the results of the PPP procurement 
process to all bidders 
The World Bank, 2018a 
- Negotiations with the selected bidder before 
contract signing 
The World Bank, 2018a; El-
Sawalhi and Mansour, 2014; Liu 
et al., 2015; Bao et al., 2018 
- Standstill period The World Bank, 2018a 







PPP Contract Management and Influence on PPP Outcomes 
Good practices in the contract management stage include among others the systems for 
managing the implementation, the system for tracking the progress of the contract work, and the 
monitoring and evaluating system (Soomro and Zhang, 2015). Bao et al. (2018) found that from 
1996 to 2016, 47 of 282 publications on PPP dealt with the implementation phase. The studies 
focused on risk management including risk mitigation strategies; the stakeholder management 
including the relationship between stakeholders; the implementation performance including 
monitoring performance, overruns, and technological innovation; and change management 
including the renegotiation, sharing excess resources, and dispute resolution.  
For project success, it is necessary that precautions be taken for change in the structure in the 
private partner, modification or renegotiation of contract, and unforeseen circumstances during 
the contract (Marques and Berg, 2010, The World Bank, 2018a). Cruz et al. (2014) examined 
road PPP contracts in Portugal. They found that unilateral changes by the government, changes 
in design due to environmental reasons, delays in expropriation, and traffic below expectations 
were among the main causes of renegotiation of contracts. Guasch et al.’s (2016) renegotiation 
study in Latin America showed that causes of renegotiation included economic crises, elections 
and change in administration, breach of contract obligation by governments, lack of preparation, 
bidding errors, and opportunistic behavior. Important considerations include dispute resolution 
mechanisms (Liu, et al., 2015); protection from expropriation, arbitration procedures, respect for 
contract agreements, processes for recovering of costs, and making profits proportional to project 
risk (Jamali, 2004); and lender step-in right, ground for termination, and permission for foreign 
companies to repatriate income (Soomro and Zhang, 2015).  
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Moszoro et al. (2014) argued that PPP investment in infrastructure is highly sensitive to the 
number of disputes in a sector. Contractual disputes between the public and private sector 
partners is costly as the renegotiation and termination of PPP contracts impede infrastructure 
development, disrupt public services, discourage private investments, and increase risk 
premiums (Lee et al, 2018). Soomro and Zhang (2013) examined the factors hindering transport 
PPPs. They found that poor economic and financial assessments for feasibility studies, 
inappropriate risk allocation between partners at the procurement stage, delayed land acquisitions 
at the construction stage, and lower user demand at the operation stage led to project failures. 
Osei-Kyei and Chan (2016) argued that high toll-fee charges, high cost of construction, poor 
public-user relationship, and negative public perception on PPP toll roads in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA) led to project failure. Ismail and Harris (2014) found that the lack of government 
guidelines and procedures, lengthy delays in negotiations, high user charges, project delays 
caused by political debate, and confusion over government objectives and evaluation criteria for 
projects, mostly affected project implementation in Malaysia. In short, this study hypothesized 
that effectiveness in the practices at the contract management stage leads to better PPP outcomes. 
















Table 4: Practices of the Management Stage 
Stages - Practices/Guidelines Authors/sources 
PPP contract 
management 
- System to manage the implementation of the PPP 
contract  
The World Bank, 
2018a; Bao et al., 2018; 
Soomro and Zhang, 
2015 
- System for tracking progress and completion of 
construction works 
The World Bank, 
2018a; Soomro and 
Zhang, 2015 
- Monitoring and evaluation system  The World Bank, 
2018a; Bao et al., 2018; 
Soomro and Zhang, 
2015 
- Foreign companies permitted to repatriate income The World Bank, 
2018a 
Change in the structure of the private partner The World Bank, 
2018a; Bao et al., 2018; 
Marques and Berg, 
2010 
Modification/renegotiation of the PPP contract regulated The World Bank, 
2018a; Bao et al., 2018; 
Marques and Berg, 
2010 
Circumstances that may occur during the life of the PPP 
contract regulated 
The World Bank, 
2018a; Marques and 
Berg, 2010 
- Dispute resolution mechanisms  The World Bank, 
2018a; Bao et al., 2018 
- Lenders step-in right  The World Bank, 
2018a 




Table 4 shows the studies and authors that found support for the influence of the 10 
contract management practices on the indicators of PPP outcome. The practices become the 
variables in the analysis section of this dissertation. The idea that PPP governance (preparation, 
procurement, and management) has an influence on PPP outcome is showed in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3 is set up for the purpose of this research to show the relationships between PPP 
governance and PPP outcome. It is a representation of the relationship between PPP governance 
and PPP outcome. PPP governance is expected to have a positive influence on PPP outcome.  
Governance Theory and its Relation to PPP Governance and PPP Outcome 
Past studies that used good governance have focused on the six indicators developed by 
(Kaufmann et al., 2010). Two of the six indicators belong to political governance and include 
political stability and voice and accountability. Two others pertain to economic governance and 
encompass government effectiveness and regulation quality. The last two belong to institutional 
governance and entail corruption control and the rule of law (Asongu and Nwachukwu, 2017). 
This dissertation uses the six indicators, which become the variables of good governance. This 
section defines and explains each of the indicators. Findings from past studies on the indicators 
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Figure 4 is set up for the purpose of this research to show the relationships between 
country governance, PPP governance, and PPP outcome. In Figure 4, the relationship between 
country governance factors and PPP governance is represented by the shorter arrow. The longer 
arrow represents the relationship between country governance factors and PPP outcome. The 
purpose is to identify significant relationships between the two sets of factors. 
Voice and Accountability: Influence on PPP Governance and Outcome 
The indicator “Voice and accountability” is defined as “…the extent to which a country’s 
citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, 
freedom of association, and free media (Kaufmann et al., 2010, p. 4 ). Accountability is 
important for progress when governments answer to people on the use of resources. Holding 
these lines helps prevent mismanagement of resources and opportunistic behaviors. The lack of 
accountability in financial management in developing countries such as Mali, Mozambique, Peru 
and Uganda, constitutes greater obstacle to progress than the lack of resources that developing 
countries themselves experience (OECD, 2014). Domestic accountability, considering horizontal 
Country governance  
• Voice and accountability 
• Political stability 
• Government effectiveness 
• Regulatory quality 
• Rule of law 
• Control of corruption 
PPP Governance 
• Project preparation 
• Project procurement 




PPP Outcome  
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accountability and vertical accountability, in the entire government system and structure can 
mean greater commitment to good governance practices. Bureaucratic accountability can mean 
accountability to the internal hierarchy, accountability to the legislature, accountability to the 
judiciary, accountability to the citizens and accountability to the media (Sultana, 2012). Effective 
domestic accountability means that there is transparency whereby citizens have access to 
information about government commitments and action taken to meet them (OECD, 2014). It 
also entails answerability in the sense that citizens can ask for explanations and justifications 
(OECD, 2014). Enforceability must also prevail for citizens to be able to sanction the 
government if the government fails to meet certain standards (OECD, 2014).   
Domestic accountability is an important consideration for international donors who want to 
cooperate with national governments. A government in good terms with its citizens and 
institutions presents a favorable climate of investment, of citizens’ participation and acceptance 
of investment outputs, and use of the final products. Actions taken by a government that is 
illegitimate can be suspected or boycotted by citizens. OECD (2014) suggests that international 
organizations can contribute to improving domestic accountability by understanding the political 
context, power, and incentives; considering accountability as a whole; and ensuring that 
development assistance does not undermine domestic accountability. Brown-Shafii and ProQuest 
(2011) argued that the World Trade Organization agreement can be used to promote 
accountability because countries agree to participate based on legal accountability that they have 
or are willing to build the institutional and human capacity necessary. However, the countries 
must be given to necessary timelines to meet the conditions. The definition and description of 
accountability and the findings implied that the strength of voice and accountability in a country 
leads to better outcomes in that country in general.  
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From the perspective of PPP projects, greater accountability is related to better PPP 
investments and outcome (Lee et al., 2018; Galilea and Medda, 2009). Focusing on developing 
countries, Wang et al. (2019) examined the relationship between risk allocation and private 
investment in PPP market using PPI, WGI, and WDI data. They found that better governance in 
developing countries led to less risk assumed by private partners. Wang et al. (2019) 
recommended that transport and information, communication, and technology (ICT) sectors pay 
greater attention to improving regulation quality and voice or accountability to reduce the 
negative impact of risk allocation in private investments. Using PPIs, WGI, and World Bank’s 
World Development indicators, Pérez-D’Oleo et al. (2015) analyzed the influence of institutional 
environment on the investment carried out through public-private partnerships in 80 middle-and-
low income countries for the period 1996–2011. They found that countries with better 
institutional environment tend to have a higher level of investment in PPP projects. This 
influence was more significant for the indicator voice and accountability. Hayllar (2010) argued 
that mechanisms that supported PPPs included democratic mechanisms to prevent inequitable 
concentrations of power. Politicians should be responsible and accountable through regular and 
fair elections. A parliament in such context should promote participation and transparency and 
plays its role of oversight (Hayllar, 2010). Thus, this study tests for the positive influence of 
voice and accountability on PPP governance and PPP outcome. 
Political Stability: Influence on PPP Governance and Outcome 
Political stability is defined as “…the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or 
overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically‐motivated violence and 
terrorism” (Kaufmann et al., 2010; p.4). Alemu (2018) found that controlling corruption and 
maintaining political stability reduced the illicit financial outflow in 32 African countries. Aisen 
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and Veiga’s (2013) research on 169 countries showed that political instability reduced economic 
growth because of its adverse effects on productivity growth and physical and human capital 
accumulation. In their study of 157 countries from 1964 to 2014, Karnane and Quinn (2019) 
found that ethnic fragmentation and corruption caused political instability, which in turn had a 
negative impact on economic growth. Houdhary and Reksulak (2019) argued that ethnic 
divisions may have a negative impact on economic whereas strong economic institutions and 
policies that provide for the needs of people may mitigate ethnic tensions. Easterly and Levine 
(1997) believed that ethnic diversity led to polarization of interest groups in countries with high 
numbers of ethnic groups and therefore accounted for rent-seeking behavior and lack of 
consensus for public goods. The lack of social cohesion issues and social constraints make it 
difficult to build quality institutions that can support growth and long-term economic policies. As 
Easterly, Ritzen, and Woolcock (2006) puts it, opportunistic politicians take advantage of ethnic 
differences to seek political power, a process that can exacerbate division as groups are 
politically mobilized along ethnic lines. Asongu and Nwachukwu (2017) examined the impact of 
terrorism on governance in Africa. They found that domestic, transnational, unclear, and total 
terrorism negatively impact political governance and its constituents. Second, evidence of a 
negative relationship is sparingly apparent in economic governance and its components. More 
than domestic terrorism, transnational terrorism negatively affects political, economic, and 
general governances. 
The literature shows that there is a positive relationship between political stability and PPP 
investments and outcome. Eberhard and Gratwick (2013) noted the political uncertainty for 
investments in countries such as in Nigeria because of interruptions and changing in political 
administrations. Lee et al (2018) found that internal conflict had an impact on PPP outcome. 
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Osei-Kyei and Chan (2017) found that political support and acceptability for PPPs, government 
positive attitude towards private sector investments, and political stability were the most 
impactful factors attracting investments in developing countries. Chou et al. (2012) examined the 
determining factors in attracting the private partners for infrastructure projects using World Bank 
PPI data. They found that political stability was one of the important factors. Thus, this study 
tests for the positive influence of political stability and lack of terrorism on PPP governance and 
PPP outcome. 
Government Effectiveness: Influence on PPP Governance and Outcome 
Government effectiveness refers to “…the quality of public services, the quality of the 
civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such 
policies” (Kaufmann et al, 2010; p. 4). Alam, Kiterage, and Bizuayehu (2017) examined the 
impact of government effectiveness on economic growth in 81 countries. They found that 
government effectiveness had a significantly positive effect on economic growth. Their finding 
is key as international organizations and multilateral development banks and developed countries 
evaluate government effectiveness when allocating foreign aid (Alam, et al, 2017). Kaufmann 
(2009) argued that government effectiveness in terms of improved governance and anti-
corruption will lead to aid effectiveness in developing countries. Stakeholders must work on 
solutions that address or include governance and political corruption, IT revolution, free media, 
innovations in public-private partnerships, private donors (Kaufmann (2009). When African 
countries met for the first Public Procurement Conference in November 30- December 4, 1998 
held in Abidjan, Cote d’ Ivoire, they agreed with donors on a consensus document which called 
for building support for reform, political commitment, resources for reform, strategy for reforms, 
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steps in developing a strategy, and changes to support reform (International Trade Centre, 1999). 
The 2008 Accra Agenda for Action, a continuation of the 2005 Paris Declaration called for 
strengthening country ownership over development, building more effective and inclusive 
partnerships for development, delivering, and accounting for development results, and looking 
forward (OECD, 2019). Developed countries required recipient countries to build procurement 
capacities and meet requisite standards on efficiency and probity as preconditions for disbursing 
aid (OECD, 2019).  
The literature showed that there is a positive relationship between government 
effectiveness and PPP investments and outcome. Lee et al (2018) found that the quality of 
bureaucracy had an impact on PPP outcome and higher government effectiveness in a 
developing country reduces the negative relationship between risk allocation and private 
investment. Pérez-D’Oleo et al. (2015) found that countries with better institutional environment 
tended to have a higher level of investment in PPP projects. Though less influential, they found 
that government effectiveness had an impact in level of investments. Sabry (2015) and Bota-
Avram (2014) found that good governance institutions with bureaucratic efficiency and 
independence increased PPP performance because of their positive effect on investment growth. 
Osei-Kyei and Chan (2017) found that the top five important factors attracting private 
investments included political support and acceptability for PPPs, government positive attitude 
towards private sector investments, political stability, favorable existing legal framework and 
policy and well-organized and committed contracting authority. Unit (2014) showed that Latin 
America and the Caribbean countries that built institutional knowledge through repetitive PPPs 
project implementation, international and domestic training had improved their operational 
maturity. Operational maturity allows the public sector to improve its project management 
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capacity, planning, and oversight. Furthermore, countries perform better when they are effective 
in balancing technical and economic criteria in project selection and efficient risk allocation laws 
(Unit, 2014). Countries that demonstrate the connection between political support for PPPs and 
performance in the regulatory and institutional frameworks improve their performance. They 
develop national development plans that support PPPs had the best investment climate (Unit, 
2014).  Strong political will strengthens PPPs (Pebble, 2015) while deteriorated political support 
is harmful to investment. Furthermore, countries with effective financial facilities such as strong 
capital markets, effective government finances, and use of subsidies improved their capacity of 
government to meet their obligation to private partners (Unit, 2014). The IEG report includes the 
bank and the borrower country performance as well as the project outcome (IEG, 2019). Thus, 
this study tests for the positive influence of government effectiveness on PPP governance and 
PPP outcome. 
Regulatory Quality: Influence on PPP Governance and Outcome 
 “Regulatory quality” is defined as “…the ability of the government to formulate and 
implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development” 
(Kaufmann et al., 2010; p. 4). The quality of institutions matters to economic growth. Mudassaar, 
Khan, and Aziz (2019) found that ineffective institutions and weaker governance reduced the 
impact of investment on economic growth because of the lack of property rights, lack of 
protection to investment in human capital and physical capital. Acemoglu and Robinson (2010) 
argued that institutions play a major role in growth and development of countries as they are 
responsible for good practices such as in property rights protection. While institutions are 
different across countries because of social and political forces that determine the quality of the 
institutions, improving poor institutions will lead to be better growth and development. Das and 
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Quirk (2016) examined which institutions promote economic growth. They found that market-
creating institutions played a very significant role in the promotion of economic growth. Market-
stabilizing institutions and human capital also had an impact on growth. Furthermore, market-
creating and market-stabilizing institutions were more relevant for lower income countries. 
However, they argued that democratic institutions did not necessarily mean growth for poor 
countries. 
The literature showed that there is a positive relationship between regulatory quality and 
PPP investments and outcome. Moszoro et al. (2014) argued that that PPP investment in 
infrastructure is highly sensitive to the quality of regulations. Regulatory quality in a developing 
country reduces the negative relationship between risk allocation and private investment (Wang 
et al., 2019). Baker (2016) found from a sample of 83 developing countries for the period 1999–
2011 that regulatory quality had a positive impact in attracting private investors to PPP markets 
regardless of the degree of uncertainty in the exchange environment. Panayides et al. (2015) 
found that regulatory quality was an important institutional determinant of port PPP success that 
attracted private bidders and the market competitiveness of the ports. Using Private Participation 
in Infrastructure (PPI) data, Moszoro et al. (2015) showed that countries that significantly 
improve the quality of regulation could gain 3% increase in infrastructure investments. Chou et 
al. (2012) found that quality of regulation and governance were some of the important factors. 
Pérez-D’Oleo et al. (2015) concluded that countries that improved in regulatory quality attracted 
a higher level of investment through PPP projects. Sabry (2015) and Bota-Avram (2014) found 
that good governance institutions with good regulatory quality help PPPs in performing well. 




Rule of Law: Influence on PPP Governance and Outcome 
“Rule of law” is “…the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules 
of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and 
the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence” (Kaufmann et al., 2010; p. 4). The 
rule of law is also considered as a legal order consisting of predictable, enforceable and efficient 
rules required for a market economy to flourish (Santos, 2012). The World Development Report 
(WDR) issued in 2017 referred to the rule of law as the impersonal and systematic application of 
known rules to government actors and citizens alike which is needed for a country to realize its 
full social and economic potential (Chalmers and Pahuja (2019) or the guiding principle of 
legitimate governance (Allan, 2003). The institutionalization of a legal system that is capable of 
both authorizing and enforcing the new developmental state protects foreign investment. Salevao 
(2005) emphasized the rule of law in its demands for the equality of all citizens, fairness in the 
way government treats its citizens, the absence of arbitrary rule, responsibility and accountability 
of government to the governed, equity, respect for human dignity, the protection of rights and 
liberties (Salevao, 2005). The rule of law is the instrument that provides some guarantee that 
government will be conducted justly, fairly, honestly, and openly for the benefit of all citizens of 
the state (Salevao, 2005). Many aid projects in developing economies set the improvement and 
strengthening of the rule of law as a condition. They support their decision with the argument 
that a stronger rule of law leads to success in projects. Ranasinghe and Restuccia (2018) argued 
that weak rule-of-law institutions substantially amplify the negative impact of financial frictions 




The literature showed that there is a positive relationship between the rule of law and PPP 
investments and outcome. Moszoro et al.’ (2014) findings also showed that that PPP investment 
in infrastructure is highly sensitive to the rule of law. Lee et al (2018) found that law and order 
had an impact on PPP outcome. The rule of law in a developing country reduces the negative 
relationship between risk allocation and private investment (Wang et al., 2019). Baker (2016) 
also showed that regulatory quality had a positive impact in attracting private investors to PPP 
markets. Moszoro et al. (2015) showed that the private sector is more likely to invest 4% more in 
infrastructure if countries significantly improve the enforcement of the rule of law. Thus, this 
study tests for the positive influence of rule of law on PPP governance and PPP outcome. 
Control of Corruption: Influence on PPP Governance and Outcome 
The control of corruption captures “…the extent to which public power is exercised for 
private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the state 
by elites and private interests” (Kaufmann et al., 2010; p. 4). Gberevbie et al. (2014) observe the 
manifestation of unethical behavior amongst public officials as the major challenge hindering 
development in the country. They recommended among others the need for the government to 
strengthen the existing anti-corruption agencies to enable them to enforce proper ethical 
standards. Mudassaar et al. (2019) found that corruption had a negative effect on economic 
growth in developed and West Asian economies as corruption meant diversion of resources and 
human talent and imposition of taxes which increases the cost of doing business. Ahmad, Ullah, 
and Arfeen (2012) argued that while corruption may not reduce growth if other conducive factors 
are in place, highs level of corruption of bureaucratic inefficiency erode domestic and foreign 
direct investments and investments in education, health and infrastructure project. Anoruo and 
Braha (2005) argued that corruption in Africa has a negative direct impact on economic growth 
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as it lowers productivity. Indirectly, it impacts economic growth by hampering investments. 
Dridi (2013) argued that corruption was most likely to reduce growth through its effects on 
human capital and political instability. Freckleton, Wright, and Craigwell (2012) found that 
corruption in the long run had no impact on growth as investors are usually driven by prospects 
of profitability, government directed incentives, and local institutional and human capital 
effectiveness. 
The literature showed that there is a positive relationship between control of corruption 
and PPP project operations. Lee et al (2018) found that the level of corruption had an impact on 
PPP outcome and greater transparency and less corruption can significantly reduce a project’s 
hazard rate. Moszoro et al. (2014) argued that PPP investment in infrastructure is highly sensitive 
to freedom from corruption. Osei-Kyei and Chan (2016) studied transportation projects across 
Nigeria, Mozambique, and South Africa. They found that allegations of corruption were one of 
the failure factors of projects. Controlling corruption in a developing country reduces the 
negative relationship between risk allocation and private investment (Wang et al., 2019). Pusok 
(2016) examined PPP and corruption in the water and sanitation sectors in developing countries. 
Pusok (2016) found that high corruption influenced the private actors to pursue profit 
maximization over public needs, leading to inadequate water sanitation. Moszoro et al. (2015) 
showed that the private sector is more likely to invest 7% more in a country that successfully 
controls corruption. In the same study, they concluded that corruption in transport would not be 
improved despite progress. Pérez-D’Oleo et al. (2015) concluded that countries that improved in 
control of corruption attracted a higher level of investment through PPP projects. Galilea and 
Medda (2009) found that the perception of a country’s level of corruption influenced the success 
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of PPPs. Thus, this study tests for the positive influence of control of corruption on PPP 
governance and PPP outcome. 
 
Table 5: Sources, Factors, and Outcome 
Governance Factors  Sources of 
Factors 
Sources of outcome 
Voice and accountability Kaufmann et 
al., 2010; WGI 
2018; Sultana ; 
2012 
Lee et al., 2018; Galilea and Medda, 2009; 
Wang et al., 2019; Pérez-D’Oleo et al., 2015 ; 
Hayllar , 2010 
Political stability  
 
Kaufmann et 
al., 2010; WGI 
2018 
Eberhard and Gratwick, 2013; Lee et al., 2018; 




al., 2010; WGI 
2018 
Lee et al., 2018; D’Oleo et al., 2015; Sabry, 
2015; Bota-Avram, 2014; Osei-Kyei and Chan, 
2017; Unit, 2014; Pebble, 2015; IEG, 2019 
Regulatory quality  
 
Kaufmann et 
al., 2010; WGI 
2018 
Moszoro et al., 2014; Wang et al., 2019; Baker, 
2016; Panayides et al., 2015 ; Chou et al., 
2012; Pérez-D’Oleo et al., 2015; Sabry, 2015; 
Bota-Avram, 2014; IEG, 2019 
Rule of law Kaufmann et 
al., 2010; WGI 
2018 
Moszoro et al., 2014; Lee et al., 2018; Wang et 
al., 2019 ; Baker, 2016; IEG, 2019 
Control of corruption 
 
Kaufmann et 




Lee et al., 2018; Moszoro et al., 2014; Osei-
Kyei and Chan, 2016; Pusok, 2016; Pérez-




Table 5 summarized the authors and sources that studied governance factors. The authors 
and sources for each factor are summarized. Table 5 then grouped the authors and sources that 
found significant relationship between the governance factors and PPP outcome. The authors and 
sources are grouped by factor.  
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From the literature review, it was clear that the mediating role of PPP governance or the 
practices of PPPs was not examined. The relationships between good governance and PPP 
outcome, between PPP governance and PPP outcome, and between country governance and PPP 
governance were ambiguously studied in previous research. This study fills the gap and address 
the ambiguity in previous studies.  The methods section shows how the relationships are studied 





The methods section presents the main concepts, indicators and measures used in the 
study. The endogenous, the endogenous mediator, the exogenous variables, and the control 
variables are explained along with their measures. The methods section also presents the data 
collection including the sample and the procedures for data collection; missing data, data 
transformation, and the limitations of the data; and the methods of analysis including a 
discussion of the use of the mediation analysis and multivariate regression.  
Concepts, Indicators, and Measures 
Country governance, PPP governance, and PPP outcome are the main concepts examined 
in the dissertation. Country governance is composed of six indicators: voice and accountability, 
political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of 
corruption. The indicators were measured by a score of (-2.5) to (2.5). PPP governance is 
composed of three main indicators composed of the three PPP stages: PPP preparation, PPP 
procurement, and PPP contract management. They were measured by a score of 0 to 100. PPP 
governance is also composed of 41 binary indicators measured by 1 for yes and 0 for no (See 
Table 10 for binary indicators). PPP outcome is composed of seven indicators:  achieved 
objectives, quality at entry, quality of supervision, Bank overall performance, government 
compliance, implementing agency, and borrowing government performance. The concepts, 
indicators and measures were explored for a sample of 100 countries. The exogenous, mediator-
endogenous, and endogenous variables were drawn from these concepts, indicators, and 










































Source: Figure 5 was adapted from Adcock and Collier (2001). 
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The endogenous variable also known as independent variable is PPP outcome. The 
outcome indicators were extracted from the PPP database collected by the Independent 
Evaluation Group (IEG) on the World Bank lending projects that closed between the fiscal years 
2001 and 2017 (IEG, 2019). The PPP outcome reported by the IEG included the following 
indicators: sustainability scores, borrower preparation scores, institutional development impact 
scores, achieved objective score, quality of entry, quality of supervision, overall bank 
performance score, government compliance, implementing agency performance, and overall 
borrower performance scores (IEG, 2019; IEG, 2019a). The IEG rated the projects based on the 
satisfaction level and so were the indicators that measured the outcomes of the projects. A 6-
point Likert ordinal scale was used to rate the performance of each project. More specifically, the 
indicators are rated as “highly satisfactory, satisfactory, moderately satisfactory, moderately 
unsatisfactory, and unsatisfactory, highly unsatisfactory.” From the scale, it is understood that 
projects are rated as “highly satisfactory” when they perform very well and “highly 
unsatisfactory” when they perform very poorly. Therefore, numerical values from “6” to “1” 
were assigned to the different scale items; “6” being “highly satisfactory” and “1” being “highly 
unsatisfactory.” The levels of satisfaction “satisfactory”, “moderately satisfactory”, “moderately 
unsatisfactory”, and “unsatisfactory” were rated 4, 3, 2 and 1 respectively. The numerical values 
are used in the statistical analysis. The rating scales and definitions from the IEG report (See 
IEG, 2019a) are as follows: 
Highly Satisfactory: There were no shortcomings in the operation’s achievement of its 
objectives, in its efficiency, or in its relevance.  
 
Satisfactory: There were minor shortcomings in the operation’s achievement of its 




Moderately Satisfactory: There were moderate shortcomings in the operation’s 
achievement of its objectives, in its efficiency, or in its relevance.  
 
Moderately Unsatisfactory: There were significant shortcomings in the operation’s 
achievement of its objectives, in its efficiency, or in its relevance.  
 
Unsatisfactory: There were major shortcomings in the operation’s achievement of its 
objectives, in its efficiency, or in its relevance.  
 
Highly Unsatisfactory: There were severe shortcomings in the operation’s achievement 
of its objectives, in its efficiency, or in its relevance. 
 
Not all the indicators were considered in the study. Only the indicators achieved 
objectives, the quality of entry, the quality of supervision, government compliance, 
implementing agency performance, and overall borrower performance scores were considered. 
These indicators were retained because data were available. In addition, these indicators were 
relevant for evaluating the outcome of the PPP projects from both the recipient country 
perspective and the donor organization (World Bank) perspective.  
Indicators such as sustainability scores, borrower preparation scores, institutional 
development impact scores that were discontinued because of improvements in the rating system 
were left out (IEG, 2019). For most of the countries, those indicators did not have any ratings 
and were simply marked “Not Rated.”  Indicators such as risk to development outcome (RDO) 
and the quality of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) did not have any ratings and were left blank 
in the database. These indicators were excluded from further consideration in the research. The 
exclusion of the indicators has no impact on the conclusions of the research because these 
indicators were independent from the indicators retained in the study.  
Table 6 displays the frequencies for the seven PPP outcome variables composed of 
achieved objectives (Obj), quality at entry (QAE), quality of supervision (QOS), bank overall 
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performance (BOP), implementing agency performance (ImpAg), government performance 
(GovPerf), and Borrower overall performance (BorOp). For example, there are no data for the 
scale moderately unsatisfactory for the variable achieved objectives (Obj). For quality at entry 
(QAE), there are no data for highly unsatisfactory and moderately unsatisfactory. For all the 
variables, between 31% and 42 % of countries reported moderately satisfactory results. Between 
24% and 40% of countries reported satisfactory results. Between 0% and 3% of countries 
reported highly satisfactory results. The frequencies showed that there are few countries that 
achieved highly satisfactory results whereas most countries have moderate or satisfactory results. 
This implied that the results and conclusions are expected to be more applicable to developing 
economies than developed economies. 
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Freq Perct Freq Perct Freq Perct Freq Perct Freq Perct Freq Perct Freq Perct 
Highly 
Satisfactory 
3 3 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 0 0 
Satisfactory 31 31 31 31 40 40 28 28 31 31 24 24 27 27 
Moderately 
Satisfactory 
36 36 31 31 34 34 42 42 32 32 40 40 33 33 
Moderately 
Unsatisfactory 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Unsatisfactory 29 29 36 36 23 23 27 27 34 34 33 33 35 35 
Highly 
Unsatisfactory 
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 3 
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The Endogenous Mediator Variable 
The endogenous mediator variable is PPP governance. According to Acock (2013), 
the endogenous mediator variable is independent with respect to some variables in the model 
and dependent with respect to other variables. In other words, the endogenous mediator 
variable plays a role between an exogenous variable and an endogenous variable and 
therefore the mediator endogenous is situated in the middle. As it will be shown later in the 
models, in a regression, the mediator endogenous variable behaves as an endogenous variable 
with regards to the exogenous variable. With regards to the known endogenous variable, in a 
regression, the mediator endogenous variable behaves as an exogenous variable.  For this 
research, PPP governance is the endogenous mediator variable, which means that it is 
hypothesized to mediate the relationship between country governance and PPP outcome. The 
mediator was extracted from the Procuring Infrastructure Public-Private Partnerships 2018 
report (The World Bank, 2018a). The report is designed to help governments improve their 
PPP regulatory quality.  
The report reported on two components of PPP governance. The first component is 
the scores of the stages of the PPP process including PPP preparation, PPP procurement, PPP 
contract management, and unsolicited proposals. The four stages were rated 0 to 100. Higher 
scores signify that an economy’s regulatory framework is in greater compliance with 
internationally recognized good practices in an area. Lower scores indicate that there is 
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considerable room for improvement because of less adherence to international good practices 
considered in the report (The World Bank, 2018a). 
 The second component comprises the subcategories of the three categories including 
PPP preparation scores, PPP procurement scores, and PPP contract management scores. 
There are thirteen subcategories for PPP preparation, 13 for PPP procurement, ten for PPP 
contract management, and five for unsolicited proposals (The World Bank, 2018a). The 
indicators excluding those of the unsolicited proposals are provided in Tables 2, 3 and 4.  
The rating of the subcategories was complex. For example, for the indicator, fiscal 
treatment of PPPs, there were four different scores even after a country stated that such 
indicator was enforced. For the example of fiscal treatment of PPPs, a score of 0.5 was given 
if there was a specific budgetary treatment of PPPs based on a regulatory provision. A score 
of 0.25 was given if yes based on a recognized practice. A score of 0.5 was given if there was 
a specific accounting system for PPPs based on a regulatory provision. A score of 0.25 was 
given if the answer was based on a recognized practice. There were about 10 different scores 
for the indicator, mechanisms inclusion in the PPP contract’s monitoring and evaluation 
system (The World Bank, 2018a). To avoid this complexity and ensure reliability in the data, 
the subcategories are recoded simply yes when a practice was enforced and no when it was 
not. The binary values of 1 and 0 were assigned to the responses, 1 for yes, and 0 for no. 
Not all the binary indicators were used in the study. The unsolicited proposals (USP) 
scores were not considered in the research because there were no ratings across several 
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countries. Traditionally, the USP is not also considered a step or stage in the PPP project 
process. The Procuring Infrastructure Public-Private Partnerships 2018 report which report 
data on the USP referred to the USP as a special module (The World Bank, 2018a). Other 
binary variables were excluded for measurement validity considerations (See measurement 
validity section). The retained variables are displayed in Table 8. The PPP governance exists 
for the year 2017. 
The year 2017 was retained to ensure that an acceptable sample was used in the 
dissertation. A total of 135 countries were assessed in 2017. Before 2017, there were two 
previous reports on PPP governance in 2015 and 2016 which respectively reported on 10 and 
82 countries. The 2015 report focused on two main thematic areas which included the 
procurement process and the public procurement complaint review mechanisms. The 2015 
report covered a total of eight indicators. The indicators comprised needs assessment, call for 
tender, and bid preparation; bid submission phase; bid opening, evaluation, and awarding 
phase; content and management of the procurement contract; performance guarantee; 
payment of suppliers; complaints submitted to the first-tier review body during the pre-award 
stage; and complaints submitted to the second-tier review body before the awarding of the 
contract. The data for 2015 could not be used because the data was limited to only eight 
countries. The 2016 report used a more descriptive approach and did not provide detailed 
information that could be used in the dissertation. 
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Even though the objectives of the reports were to help government improve their PPP 
contract process, the 2015, 2016, and 2017 reports measured different indicators. Table 7 is 
an example of the comparison of appraisal scores of 10 countries for 2015, 2016, and 2017. 
The ten countries are compared using the following indicators: the socio-economic impact, 
financial viability or bankability, affordability assessment, comparative assessment, market 
assessment, risk identification, assessment, and allocation among the countries.  
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Table 7: PPP Appraisal Scores for 10 Countries Over Three Years 
Country Year Socio-economic 
impact 







Cameroun 2015 ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓   
2016       
2017 ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  
Colombia 2015 ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  x ✓  
2016       
2017 ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  
Egypt 2015 ✓  ✓         x ✓  ✓  ✓  
2016       
2017 ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  
Ghana 2015        x ✓  ✓  ✓         x ✓  
2016       
2017 ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  
Kenya 2015 ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  
2016       
2017 ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  
Nigeria 2015 ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  
2016       
2017 ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  
Peru 2015 ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓         x ✓  
2016       
2017 ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  
South Africa 2015 ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  
2016       
2017 ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  
Tanzania 2015 ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓         x ✓  
2016       
2017 ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓         x ✓  
Tunisia 2015        x        x        x        x        x        x 
2016       
2017 ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓         x        x 
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Table 7 shows that all countries enforced all the indicators except that Tanzania, Peru, 
Ghana, and Columbia did not conduct market assessment. Egypt did not conduct any 
affordability assessment. Ghana did not conduct any socio-economic impact (IBRD, 2015). 
Tunisia is the only country that did not conduct any assessment for the year 2015. Overall, 
there is consistency in the scores of those countries based on the indicators. It was important 
to show this consistency because of the lack of available data for all three years for a 
considerable number of countries. Furthermore, it shows that PPP governance is considered 
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Table 8: Frequency of Binary Variables  
 
Variables Frequency Percent 
 Yes No Yes No 
Central Budgetary Authority 88 12 88 12 
Fiscal treatment 37 63 37 63 
PPP prioritization 86 14 86 14 
Economic assessment 92 8 92 8 
Fiscal affordability assessment 85 15 85 15 
Risk identification 82 18 82 18 
Financial viability assessment 81 19 81 19 
Market Sounding analysis 49 51 49 51 
Environment impact assessment 81 19 81 19 
Assessments included in the RFP 42 58 42 58 
Draft PPP contract included in the RFP 77 23 77 23 
Standardized PPP model contracts 34 66 34 66 
Publication of contract 53 47 53 47 
System to manage implementation 86 14 86 14 
System for tracking progress 77 23 77 23 
Monitoring and evaluation system 91 9 91 9 
Foreign companies to repatriate income 98 2 98 2 
Evaluation committee qualifications 74 26 74 26 
Public procurement notice of the PPP issued 99 1 99 1 
Foreign companies participate in PPP bidding 97 3 97 3 
Minimum period/time to submit bid (>=60 days) 93 7 93 7 
Tender documents detail the stages of the process 94 6 94 6 
Clarification questions for procurement notice 95 5 95 5 
Pre-bidding conference 50 50 50 50 
Financial model submitted with proposal 49 51 49 51 
Treatment when only one proposal is received 61 39 61 39 
Negotiations with the selected bidder 58 42 58 42 
Circumstances during the life of the PPP contract regulated 96 4 96 4 
Dispute resolution mechanisms 99 1 99 1 
Lenders step-in right 46 54 46 54 
Ground for termination 90 10 90 10 
Publication of award notice 91 9 91 9 
Standstill period 39 61 39 61 
Modification of the PPP contract regulated 84 16 84 16 
Change in the structure of the private partner 67 33 67 33 
 
 
Table 8 displays the frequencies of the binary variables. Table 8 showed how many 
times countries answered yes and no to each of the practices. The frequencies are important 
because they help understand how frequently countries enforce the internationally recognized 
PPP practices. For instance, less than 50 countries did not implement seven practices, 
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meaning that the frequencies for those seven practices is less than 50. In other words, at least 
50 countries have implemented the rest of the practices. 99% of the countries enforced the 
dispute resolution mechanisms, meaning that 99 countries out of the 100 answered “yes.” The 
implementation of the practice pre-bid conference is split at 50% for those that implemented 
it and those that did not.  
Exogenous Variable 
Country governance is the exogenous variable and is characterized by six indicators 
including voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory 
quality, rule of law, and control of corruption (Kaufmann, et al., 2010; The World Bank, 
2019a). The indicators were extracted from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) 
dataset (The World Bank, 2019a). The WGI project constructs aggregate indicators of six 
broad dimensions of governance from 1996 to 2017. The data are gathered from several 
survey institutions, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, international organizations, 
and private sector firms (The World Bank, 2019a). The aggregate of data from these entities 
yielded the scores on the good governance indicators. The estimates of governance 
performance for each variable range from approximately (-2.5) equal weak to (2.5) equal 
strong. For this dissertation, the data for the year 2017 were used because data for the same 
year were used for the endogenous and endogenous mediator variables. The data were used to 
examine the impact of governance for various regional and income-based entities. For 
example, Pérez-D’Oleo et al. (2015) and Wang, Liu, Xiong, and Song (2019) used the data to 
examine the influence of institutional environment on the investment carried out through 
PPPs in 80 middle-and-low income countries for the period 1996–2011. The exogenous 
variables are described in Table 9. 
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Control Variables 
Two control variables are used in the study. The first is the gross national income per 
capita (GNI) referred to as GNI in the rest of the text. The GNI is used by international 
organizations such as the World Bank to classify countries into groups based on the income 
level. The GNI is used is used a control variable because the level of development including 
the economic and financial conditions of people influence not only the PPP governance but 
also the outcome of PPPs. In other words, people in a developed economy are more likely to 
ask for accountability than people in a less developed economy. However, there are some 
weaknesses associated with the use of the GNI. According to the World Bank, the GNI is 
often underestimated in lower-income countries that rely on informal and subsistence 
activities. In addition, the GNI does not reflect income inequalities in a country (The World 
Bank Group, 2020). This research tests whether the GNI influences the outcome of the PPP 
projects. The fact that the GNI is collected and reported in U.S. dollars alongside the PPP 
governance scores is another reason why its influence is tested (The World Bank, 2018a). 
The second control variable is democracy. Democracy is seen as a system of strong 
institutions that guarantees freedom of expression, human rights, and transparency and 
fairness. The policies and programs of development are more likely to lead to more efficient 
and effective outcomes than in a non-democracy. Das and Kirk (2016) for example found the 
lower income countries with market-creating and market-stabilizing institutions had positive 
economic growth. That means countries that can improve their democratic governance 
including openness, transparency, and deliberative decision-making model will improve 
infrastructure investments (Hudon, 2011). Galilea and Medda (2009) linked democratic 
accountability to success in PPP projects. The consideration of democratic mechanisms is 
seen as necessary to prevent inequitable concentrations of power (Hayllar, 2010). Strong 
democratic institutions lead to political stability as all voices are allowed and considered. 
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Easterly and Levine (1997) and Easterly et al. (2006) argued that the lack of political stability 
due to ethnic divisions and wars had negative impact on development. Thus, it is necessary to 
test whether the overall democratic strength in countries affect their PPP outcome.  
The data were extracted from Freedom House, which reported on the freedom scores. 
Freedom depends on the degree of democratic climate of countries. The democratic climate is 
assessed using the political liberties component and the civil rights component. The political 
liberties component comprises the electoral process, political pluralism and participation, and 
functioning of government (Freedom House, 2017). The civil rights comprise the freedom of 
expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal 
autonomy and individual rights (Freedom House, 2017). The dissertation uses the aggregate 
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Table 9: List of Variable, Measures, and Sources  
Group  Variable Measures Data type Source Countries/Years 




IPPP Report 2018 Selected countries, 2017 




IPPP Report 2018 Selected countries, 2017 
Contract management 
(Subcategories) 





IPPP Report 2018 
Selected countries, 2017 
Endogenous 
variables 
Outcome rating  “Highly Satisfactory” = 6 to 
“Highly unsatisfactory” =1 
Ordinal TPPI Report  project scores 
Bank perf. Quality of entry  Ordinal The PPI Report project scores  
Quality of supervision Ordinal The PPI Report project scores 
Overall bank perf. Ordinal The PPI Report project scores 
Borr perf. Govt compliance Ordinal The PPI Report project scores 
Implementing agency Ordinal The PPI Report project scores 
Overall Borr. perf Ordinal The PPI Report project scores 
Exogenous 
Variables 
Voice and accountability  Interval WGI 2018  2017 estimate 
Political stability 
 
-2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) Interval WGI 2018  2017 estimate 
Government effectiveness -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) Interval WGI 2018  2017 estimate 
Regulatory quality 
 
-2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) Interval WGI 2018  2017 estimate 
Rule of law 
 
-2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) Interval WGI 2018  2017 estimate 
Control of corruption -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) Interval WGI 2018  2017 estimate 
Control Variables Gross National Income GNI per capital (USD) continuous WGI 2018  2017 estimate 
 Freedom/Democracy      0-100 
 
continuous Freedom House 2017 scores 
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Table 9 presents the groups of mediators, endogenous, exogenous, and control variables. The 
mediator, composed of the three categories of PPP governance, is a continuous variable rated 
out of 100 for the year 2017. The mediator variable is also composed of 41 subcategories. 
Details of those factors are presented in Table 10. The endogenous variable is composed 
achieved objectives, the Bank overall performance, and borrower country performance. The 
World Bank performance and the borrower country performance have each three sub-
elements. They have ordinal data for the year 2017 rated “Highly Satisfactory” equal 6 to 
“Highly unsatisfactory” equal 1. The exogenous variable, country governance, is composed 
of six interval data variables rated (-2.5 equal week) to (2.5 equal strong). The data exist for 
2017. The control variables include the gross national income (GNI) and the aggregate 
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Table 10: PPP Governance Subcategories 
 
Categories Subcategories Measure Data Type Source, Country, year  
Preparation 
 of PPPs (13) 
Central Budgetary Authority’s approval 
Fiscal treatment of PPPs 
PPP’s prioritization consistent with public investment prioritization 
Economic analysis assessment 
Fiscal affordability assessment 
Risk identification 
Financial viability assessment 
PPP vs. Public Procurement comparative assessment 
Market Sounding analysis 
Environment impact assessment 
Assessments included in the RFP 
Draft PPP contract included in the RFP 
Standardized PPP model contracts  
Yes (1) or No (0)  Binary IPPP Report 2018 
 
Selected countries, 2017 
Procurement  
of PPPs (18) 
Evaluation committee members’ qualifications 
Public procurement notice of the PPP issued  
Foreign companies participate in PPP bidding 
Minimum period/time to submit bid (>=60 days) 
Availability of various procurement procedures  
Direct negotiation not discretionary 
Tender documents detail the stages of the process 
Tender documents specify prequalification criteria 
Clarification questions for procurement notice and/or the RFP 
Pre-bidding conference 
Financial model submitted with proposal 
Proposals evaluated in accordance with published evaluation criteria 
Treatment when only one proposal is received 
Publication of award notice 
Notification of the results of the PPP procurement process to all bidders 
Negotiations with the selected bidder before contract signing 
Standstill period 
Publication of contract  
Yes (1) or No (0)  Binary  
IPPP Report 2018 
 
Selected countries, 2017 
 
   70 
 
Table 10 Continued 
Contract  
management (10) 
System to manage the implementation of the PPP contract 
System for tracking progress and completion of construction works 
Monitoring and evaluation system 
Foreign companies permitted to repatriate income 
Change in the structure of the private partner 
Modification/renegotiation of the PPP contract regulated 
Circumstances that may occur during the life of the PPP contract regulated 
Dispute resolution mechanisms 
Lenders step-in rights 
Grounds for termination of a PPP contract 
Yes (1) or No (0)  Binary  
IPPP Report 2018 
 
Selected countries, 2017 
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Table 10 listed the subcategories for the categories of PPP governance. The dichotomous data 
exist for 2017. The data were coded 1 for “yes” answers and 0 for “no” answers. The 
subcategories were extracted from the Procuring Infrastructure Public-Private Partnerships 
2018 (The World Bank, 2018a).  
Data Collection 
Sample 
 The unit of analysis is the country. The population of the study comprises 189 
member countries of the World Bank (The World Bank, 2018b). For PPP governance, the 
sampling population for which data were collected consisted of 135 countries in the 
Procuring Infrastructure Public-Private Partnerships 2018 (The World Bank, 2018a). Not all 
135 countries had available or usable data. Countries with significant missing data were 
removed from the analysis. The final sample for this study is limited to 100 countries or 
observations. Of the 100 countries, 32 are sub-Saharan African, 21 are in Europe and central 
Asia, 16 in Latin America and Caribbean, 10 in East Asia and Pacific, 8 in Middle East and 
North Africa, 7 in OECD high income countries, and 6 in South Asia. For the exogenous 
variable (country governance), data exist from 1996 to 2017 for a total of 214 countries or 
authorities. The data were extracted from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) (The 
World Bank, 2019a). The estimates of good governance indicators for the year 2017 were 
used because the data on the PPP governance are also available for the year 2017 only. The 
PPP governance had data for the years 2015 and 2016 but these data were not used because 
they existed for only a few countries. In addition, for the year 2016, not only were the 
indicators used different from the indicators for 2015 and 2017 but the process for data 
collection was not elaborated. For example, the indicators used in 2015 and 2017 were not 
used in 2016, which explained the empty cells in Table 7 where the appraisal scores are 
displayed.  
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For the exogenous variable, PPP outcome, the collection years go back to the 1960s 
on individual projects from various sectors for each country (IEG, 2019). Scores of PPI exist 
for countries around the world. Countries have benefited from several PPP transportation 
projects from the World Bank since the 1960s. Some countries have benefited from projects 
as recently as 2017. The scores of the last project for each country were considered as they 
are more likely to represent the country’s current performance on PPP. The dataset contains 
the project approval date when the World Bank approved the project and the deactivation 
date when the project was completed and formally closed. The countries for which data are 
available are listed in Table 11.  
The sample of 100 countries is debatable. Scholars have debated and proposed the 
sample size that is ideal for the structural equation modeling method. This discussion is 
relevant for this study that uses the generalized structural modeling (GSEM). The minimum 
sample size that must be used is at least 10 times the number of parameters that can be 
estimated in the model (Jayaram, Kannan, and Tan, 2004). Ramirez stated that the traditional 
approach is 10 subjects per parameter, not per variable (Chapter 17). Ramirez recommended 
a minimum of 100 subjects even if there are only a few parameters. However, if there are far 
more than 10 subjects per parameter, this may lead to a statistically significant chi-square 
even if the model fits relatively well (Chapter 17). Some suggested the minimum sample size 
for structural equation modeling at 150 (Bentler and Chou, 1987). Other put it at 200-500 or 
at least 200 (Celik and Yılmaz, 2013). Huber (2014) stated that the rule of thumb is to have 
more than 200 observations but added that 100 observations can be adequate.  The ratios of 
observations to free parameters frequently encountered are 5:1 up to 20:1.  
Scholars used different sample sizes in studies where countries were the unit of 
analysis. Langbein and Knack (2010) used a sample of 216 countries to validate the indexes 
of worldwide governance indicators (WGI) using path, factor, and confirmatory factor 
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analyses. Wang, Liu, Xiong, and Song (2019) used a sample of 138 countries to study the 
moderating role of governance environment on the relationship between risk allocation and 
private investment. Nokelainen showed that smaller numbers of (n=108) randomized were 
acceptable. Subsamples of approximately 20% of cases can also be used in structural 
equation modeling (SEM). In the study on the the contribution of public libraries to 
countries’ economic productivity, Liu (2004) used 61 countries in the path analysis study. 
Muchdie (2017) studied economic growth and happiness using a cross-nation path analysis 
model. Data on the happiness index were from 156 countries, data on economic growth from 
178 countries, and data on human development indexes were from 155 countries. They 
solved the problems of missing data by deleting countries with incomplete data. The final 
sample on happiness, economic growth, and human development had 124 countries. They 
reported the results by grouping the countries into low, medium, and high-income categories. 
There were groups of 9, 11, 12, 14, 15, 17, 20, and 41 countries. Diaz (2007) used a sample 
of 73 countries to analyze the effect of remittances on economic growth using path analysis. 
Kock and Gaskins (2014) used 24 Latin American and 23 sub-Saharan African countries in 
their study on the mediating role of voice and accountability in the relationship between 
internet diffusion and government corruption in those regions from 2006-2010. They 
multiplied the 47 countries by 5 to get a sample size of 235 data points. Thus, the sample of 
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($1,025 or less) 
 Lower-Middle-
Income Economies 
($1,026 to $4,035) 
Upper-Middle-Income 





Countries  1. Afghanistan 
2. Benin  
3. Burkina 
Faso  
4. Burundi  
5. Chad  
6. Congo, 
Dem. Rep.  
7. Eritrea  
8. Ethiopia  
9. Guinea  
10. Haiti  
11. Madagascar  
12. Malawi  
13. Mali  
14. Mozambique  
15. Niger 
16. Rwanda  
17. Senegal  
18. Sierra Leone  
19. Somalia  
20. Tanzania  
21. Togo  
22. Uganda 
23. Zimbabwe  
1. Armenia  
2. Bangladesh  
3. Cambodia  
4. Cameroon  
5. Côte d´Ivoire  
6. Djibouti  
7. Egypt, Arab 
Rep.  
8. Ghana  
9. Guatemala  
10. Honduras  
11. India  
12. Indonesia  
13. Kenya  
14. Kosovo  
15. Kyrgyz 
Republic  
16. Lao PDR  
17. Moldova  
18. Mongolia  
19. Morocco  
20. Myanmar  
21. Nicaragua  
22. Nigeria  
23. Pakistan  
24. Papua New 
Guinea  
25. Philippines  
26. Sri Lanka  
27. Sudan  
28. Tajikistan  
29. Tunisia  
30. Ukraine  
31. Vietnam  
32. Zambia  
 
1. Albania  
2. Algeria  
3. Angola  
4. Argentina  
5. Azerbaijan  
6. Bosnia & 
Herzegovina  
7. Belarus  
8. Botswana  
9. Brazil  
10. Bulgaria  
11. China  
12. Colombia  
13. Costa Rica  
14. Dominican 
Republic 
15. Ecuador  
16. Gabon  
17. Georgia  
18. Iraq  
19. Jamaica 
20. Jordan  
21. Kazakhstan  
22. Lebanon  
23. Macedonia, FYR  
24. Malaysia  
25. Mauritius  
26. Mexico 
27. Montenegro  
28. Panama  
29. Paraguay  
30. Peru  
31. Romania  
32. Russian Federation  
33. Serbia  
34. Thailand  
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Table 11 shows the list of countries based on income level for the year 2017. 
Countries are classified into four main groups: low-income economies, lower-middle-income 
economies, upper-middle-income economies, and high-income economies. Of the 102 
economies, 23 countries are low-income economies; 32 are lower-middle-income economies; 
35 are upper-middle income economies; and 10 are high-income economies. The income 
level represents the gross national income (GNI) per capita. The lowest GNI in Table 11 is 
$570 for Afghanistan. The highest GNI is $27,000 for South Korea. Except South Korea, no 
other country has $20,000 GNI. The GNI for the 10 high-income countries in Table 11 is 
slightly above the threshold.  
Procedures 
The dissertation examines multiple relationships between three sets of factors: 
Country governance factors, PPP governance factors, and PPP outcome factors. PPP 
governance data are gathered from the Procuring Infrastructure Public-Private Partnerships 
2018 report, downloaded from the World Bank website (See the World Bank, 2018a). Three 
types of data are extracted from the report. First, the data for the main stages of PPP 
governance including PPP preparation, PPP procurement, and contract management were 
collected. The report rates each of the stages 0 to 100 per country. Second, each of the main 
stages has subcategories that are rated in the reports. There is a total of 41 subcategories. 
Scores of 1, 0.5, and 0.25 are assigned to each of the subcategories. The system of rating is 
too specific, but the details are irrelevant for this study. For example, a subcategory may be 
rated 0.5 because a country does not fully enforce the practice or subcategory. Furthermore, 
no specific method was used to show how the sub-scores sum up to an aggregate score in the 
main stages. Therefore, when collecting the data for the subcategories, any “Yes” answer is 
recoded 1 and any “No” answer is recoded 0. Third, the gross national income per capita 
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(GNI) per country is also extracted from the report. The data are reported in thousands of 
dollars. The three types of data are copied and pasted in an excel spreadsheet. 
PPP outcome data were extracted from the independent evaluators group (IEG). The 
excel version of the project performance ratings data was downloaded from the IEG website 
(see IEG, 2019a). The IEG World Bank Project Performance Ratings Codebook was also 
downloaded and served as a guide for understanding the data (IEG, 2019a). The data were 
filtered to isolate transportation projects. For each country, there were several projects that 
were executed over several years. The study focused on projects that were more recently 
executed for each country. That is because the projects were awarded at different times. Thus, 
projects for countries were identified by the closing date of the project, which is usually the 
most recent date and year. Once the project for each country was identified, values were 
assigned to the Likert scale items. The responses on the performance on each project were 
“highly satisfactory, satisfactory, moderately satisfactory, moderately unsatisfactory, and 
unsatisfactory, highly unsatisfactory.” Each of the scale items were then assigned the 
corresponding value from 6 to 1; 6 being the highest score and 1 being the lowest score. 
Countries that did not contain data on transportation projects were excluded. 
Country governance data were extracted from the worldwide governance indicators 
file. The data were downloaded in excel version from the World Bank data catalog (See the 
World Bank, 2019b). The file contained estimates of six good governance indicators for all 
countries over several decades. The indicators were rated (-2.50 to 2.5). The 2017 estimates 
were reported in the excel spreadsheet along with the PPP governance and PPP outcome data. 
Only countries that had PPP governance data, PPP outcome data, and country governance 
data were retained.  
Two control variables were included in the dataset: The GNI and democracy. The 
GNI was reported from the 2018 procuring infrastructure public-private partnerships. The 
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democracy score is obtained from the Freedom House, which reported the freedom scores for 
countries (Freedom House, 2017). The score is an aggregate of the political liberties scores 
and civil liberties scores. 
Missing Data 
Of 135 countries for which data on PPP governance were collected, 35 countries were 
removed from the study because those countries had missing data when matched with the 
PPP outcome dataset from which the endogenous variables were drawn. Thus, some countries 
that had PPP governance scores had no data on PPP outcome for transportation projects. 
When no data existed for those countries, they were noted as “Not rated.” Thus, while 
country governance and PPP governance had larger available observations, the number of 
observations was reduced to correspond to the number of countries which had available PPP 
outcome data. In short, the number of observations was narrowed as a result of matching 
across all three types of datasets.  
Data Transformation 
For the mediator, the study used three main categories which were rated 0 to 100. The 
subcategories were dichotomous, with “yes or no” questions. These elements were recorded 
in the study as 1 for “yes” and 0 for “no.” For the country governance scores, no changes 
were made to the scores which initially ranged from (-2.5) to (+2.5). As for the PPP outcome, 
the data were rated from “highly satisfactory” to “highly unsatisfactory” with a maximum of 
6 rating in the scale. The data were recoded 6 for “highly satisfactory” and 1 for “highly 
unsatisfactory.”  
Limitation of Data 
There are some limitations to the use of data. For the mediator variable, PPP 
governance, data exist for 135 countries collected for the year 2017, which limits the number 
of countries that could be used in the study. Furthermore, not all the 135 countries had data 
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reported across both the exogenous and endogenous variables. The sample is finally 
narrowed down to 100 countries. Thus, the number of observations is relatively low. 
However, considering that the total number of countries is 189, and that the data on the 
mediator were collected for 135 countries, the sample size of 100 is reasonable.  
A second limitation is that the data for the mediator is available for only the year 
2017. That is because the data collection for PPP governance started in 2015 with a pilot 
study of 10 countries followed by a 2016 assessment on 82 countries (The World Bank, 
2018a). The 2017 assessment covered 135 countries. The 2017 assessment of 135 countries 
has the largest number of countries ever covered on PPP governance. The newness of the 
collection of data on PPP practices explains the limited number of countries covered. 
Methods of Analysis 
Mediation Analysis 
A mediation analysis is an analysis where an exogenous variable affects an 
endogenous variable, not directly but rather through an intervening process captured by the 
endogenous mediator variable (Iacobucci, 2008). Baron and Kenny (1986), Iacobucci (2008), 
and Kenny (2018) argued that four steps or conditions must be met. The researcher must be 
able to show that 
1. the causal variable is correlated with the outcome 
2. the causal variable is correlated with the mediator 
3. the mediator affects the outcome variable 
4. M (mediator) completely mediates the X-Y relationship.  
Acock (2013) argued that contrary to early requirements, recent models of mediation 
do not require the existence of correlations. Iacobucci (2008) added that only partial 
mediation is reached if only the first three steps are supported. In addition, the effect of the 
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exogenous variable (X) directly on the endogenous variable (Y) becomes significantly 
smaller in size relative to the effect size in the second equation (Iacobucci, 2008).  
According to Kenny (2018), the effects of the mediational model can be estimated 
using multiple regressions, ordinary least squares (OLS), logistic regression, multilevel 
modeling, and structural equal modeling (Kenny, 2018). Baron and Kenny (1986) and Acock 
(2013) suggest estimating three regression equations for testing the mediating role of a 
variable. First, one should regress the mediator on the exogenous variable. Second, one 
should regress the endogenous variable on the exogenous variable. Third, one should regress 
the endogenous variable on both the exogenous variable and on the mediator (Baron and 
Kenny, 1986).  
Kenny’s (2018) approach is relevant for this dissertation because it shows that one 
does not need to necessarily run a single mediation model with SEM. Kenny’s (2018) 
approach showed that by running the correct models using the correct variables, one is able to 
determine the effect of a mediator. As stated earlier, the variables used in this dissertation are 
ordinal, dichotomous, interval, and continuous. The data therefore violate the assumptions of 
normality required for structural equation modeling with an endogenous variable, a mediator, 
and an exogenous variable. Again, multivariate regression appeared as the correct methods to 
test the data. However, when one is faced with the challenge of running a multivariate ordinal 
logistic regression, the alternative is to use the generalized version of structural equation 
model known as GSEM. GSEM is useful to run sets of equations with variables including any 
data type. The study uses a GSEM because the endogenous variable outcome is composed of 
ordinal variables. The GSEM method allows the use of ordinal, continuous, categorical and 
interval data. Several exogenous variables can be entered simultaneously. 
Following Kenny’s (2018) approach, this dissertation explores the mediating role of 
PPP governance on the relationship between country governance and PPP outcome using 
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regression. The mediation claim is reached by comparing its results with sequential analyses. 
It is required to identify the direct relationship between country governance and PPP 
outcome. Following Kenny’s approach means that three main models will be run. First, the 
influence of country governance on PPP outcome is tested. The main hypothesis is: 
H1: Country governance has a positive influence on PPP outcome.  
Equation 1: PPP outcome = f ((voice and accountability, political stability, 
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, control of corruption) + 
(GNI, democracy)). 
 
Second, the relationship between country governance, and the mediator, PPP 
governance is tested. The main hypothesis tested is: 
H2: Country governance has a positive influence on PPP governance. The following sub-
hypotheses are tested using the GSEM regression.   
H2a) Country governance has a positive influence on PPP governance (main variables) 
H2b) Country governance has a positive influence on PPP preparation (subcategories) 
H2c) Country governance has a positive influence on PPP procurement (subcategories) 
H2d) Country governance has a positive influence on contract management (subcategories) 
Equation 2: PPP governance = f ((voice and accountability, political stability and 
absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, control 
of corruption) + (GNI, democracy)). 
 
Equation 3: PPP governance (PPP preparation, PPP procurement, contract 
management) = f ((voice and accountability, political stability and absence of 
violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, control of 
corruption) + (GNI, democracy)). 
 
Equation 3a: PPP governance (subcategories of PPP preparation) = f ((voice and 
accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, 
regulatory quality, rule of law, control of corruption) + (GNI, democracy)). 
 
Equation 3b: PPP governance (subcategories of PPP procurement) = f ((voice and 
accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, 
regulatory quality, rule of law, control of corruption) + (GNI, democracy)). 
 
Equation 3c: PPP governance (subcategories of PPP contract management) = f 
((voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government 
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effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, control of corruption) + (GNI, 
democracy)). 
 
Third, the relationship between PPP governance and PPP outcome is tested. The main 
hypothesis is: 
H3: PPP governance has a positive influence on PPP outcome.  
The following sub-hypotheses are tested using the GSEM regression.   
H3a: PPP governance has a positive influence on PPP outcome (Main variables) 
H3b) PPP preparation has a positive influence on PPP outcome. 
H3c) PPP procurement has a positive influence on PPP outcome. 
H3d) Contract management has a positive influence on PPP outcome.  
The end goal was to evaluate whether PPP governance mediates the relationship 
between country governance and PPP outcome. Thus, the role of the mediator PPP 
governance on the relationship between country governance and PPP outcome was 
determined using the results from the three previous models. The complex models run in 
STATA (See Table 12) yielded some results that allow for the analysis of the multiple 
relationships between the endogenous, exogenous, and mediator variables. The goal was to 
determine the mediating role of PPP governance, hence:  
H4: PPP governance mediates the relationship between PPP country governance and PPP 
outcome. 
To determine the mediating role, it becomes necessary to set the following sub-hypotheses.  
H4a: PPP governance mediates the relationship between PPP country governance and PPP 
outcome (Main variables). 
H4b) PPP preparation mediates the relationship between PPP country governance and PPP 
outcome. 
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H4c) PPP procurement mediates the relationship between PPP country governance and PPP 
outcome. 
H4d) Contract management mediates the relationship between PPP country governance and 
PPP outcome.  
 Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3 are examined for each of the income level groups. The fourth 
hypothesis is not tested within the income level groups because of limited sample for 
examining the mediating role of PPP governance.  
Multivariate Regression 
 The multivariate regression is “a kind of structural model in which each member of a 
set of observed endogenous variables is a function of the same set of observed exogenous 
variables and a unique random disturbance term” (StataCorp,  2019, p. 653). In a multivariate 
regression, the disturbances are correlated.  It is important to note that multivariate is 
different from multilevel structural equation modeling.  In effect, multilevel structural 
equation modeling refers to “the simultaneous handling of group-level effects, which can be 
nested or crossed” (StataCorp, 2019, p. 313). With the multilevel modeling, the researcher 
used subjects are nested in subgroup, and that subgroup itself is nested in a larger group. An 
example of a multilevel modeling would be study where the researcher considers students as 
subjects nested into classrooms, classrooms nested into schools, and stated nested into states.  
Because different measurements including binary and ordinal variables are used, only 
the generalized structural equation modeling (GSEM) could be used to test the relationship 
between the exogenous, mediator endogenous, and endogenous variables. A total of four 
models were tested. The models are displayed in Table 12. With GSEM, the measurements 
can be continuous, binary, count, categorical, ordered, fractional, and survival times 
(StataCorp, 2019). Generalized linear response variables allow fitting logistic, probit, 
Poisson, multinomial logistic, ordered logit, ordered probit, beta, and other models 
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(StataCorp, 2019). The multivariate ordinal logit regression was used to test Model 1 and 
Model 3 because the endogenous variables (see Table 12) were ordinal. The subcategories of 
the mediator variable were binary variables, which called for the use of the Bernoulli (logit) 
distribution. Two continuous control variables, including democracy and GNI, were included 
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Table 12: Models for Testing Hypotheses  
 
Models Model 1 Model 2(a, b, c, d) Model 3 (a, b, c, d) Model 4 (a, b, c, d) 
Purpose  Influence of country governance 
on PPP outcomes 
Influence of country governance 
on PPP governance 
Influence of PPP governance 
on PPP outcome  
Mediating role of PPP 
governance 
Hypotheses H1 H2 H3 H4 
Endogenous variables  - Achieved objectives 
- Quality at entry 
- Quality of supervision 
- Bank overall performance 
- Implementing agency 
performance 
- Government compliance 
- Borrowing government 
performance 
- PPP preparation, PPP 
procurement, PPP contract 
management 
- Subcategories of PPP 
preparation 
- Subcategories of PPP 
procurement 
- Subcategories of contract 
management 
- Achieved objectives 
- Quality at entry 
- Quality of supervision 
- Bank overall performance 
- Implementing agency performance 
- Government compliance 
- Borrowing government performance 
- PPP outcome  
and PPP governance (see 





Mediating variables NA NA NA PPP governance 
Exogenous variables - Voice and accountability 
- Political stability 
- Government effectiveness 
- Regulatory quality 
- Rule of law 
- Control of corruption  
- Voice and accountability 
- Political stability 
- Government effectiveness 
- Regulatory quality 
- Rule of law 
- Control of corruption  
- PPP preparation, procurement, 
contract management 
- Subcategories of PPP preparation 
- Subcategories of PPP procurement 
- Subcategories of contract 
management 
- Country governance and 
PPP governance (See 
Model 1, 2, and 3). 
 
Control variables  - Score of democracy Score of democracy Score of democracy - Score of democracy 
 - Gross National Income per 
capita (GNI) 
- Gross National Income per 
capita (GNI) 
- Gross National Income per capita 
(GNI) 
- Gross National Income 
per capita (GNI) 
Analysis method - Multivariate ordinal logistic 
regression (GSEM) 
- Multivariate multiple 
regression 
- Multivariate logistic regression 
(logit).  
- Multivariate ordinal logistic 
regression (Bernouli, logit) 
- Multivariate multiple    
regression 
- Multivariate ordinal 
logistic regression (logit). 
Sample size  100 100 100 100 
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Table 12 displayed the models and the corresponding endogenous, exogenous, mediator 
variables, and the control variables. Table 12 also showed the methods that are used to 
analyze the data. The sample size is also provided. 
Data Summary 
The exogenous variable, country governance, comprised the observed variables 
“voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, control of corruption, 
rule of law, and regulatory quality”. “PPP governance” comprises the observed variables 
“preparation (Prep), procurement (Proc), and contract management (Mgt).” The PPP 
governance comprises 34 binary variables. The summary of the 34 binary variables is 
provided in Table 14 and have the value 0 and 1. “PPP outcome” comprises the observed 
variables “achieved objectives (Obj), quality at entry (QAE), quality of supervision (QOS), 
the world bank overall performance (BOP), implementing agency performance (ImpAg), 
government compliance (GovPerf), borrowing government overall performance (BorOp”. 
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Table 13: Data Summary 
Variable        Obs             Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Levels  100 2.32 .9415225 1 4 
PPP preparation 100 47.87 21.13433 8 92 
PPP procurement 100 61.06 18.24791 7 95 
PPP contract management 100 53.82 16.51041 9 88 
Voice and accountability  100 -.3485287 .7970292 -2.165193 1.213141 
Political stability 100 -.4235517 .8517651 -2.780772 1.585588 
Government effectiveness 100 -.2712166 .7486493 -2.055587 2.205368 
Regulatory quality 100 -.2151143 .7438809 -2.195756 2.115007 
Rule of law  100 -.3552316 .6946736 -1.689727 1.822819 
Control of corruption  100 -.4275446 .6723603 -1.544762 2.133488 
Achieved objectives 100 3.76 1.280152 1 6 
Quality at entry  100 3.63 1.307747 2 6 
Quality of supervision 100 4 1.206045 2 6 
Overall Bank performance  100 3.8 1.206045 2 6 
Implementing agency  100 3.69 1.308056 2 6 
Government performance 100 3.52 1.344499 1 6 
Overall borrower performance 100 3.59 1.256056 1 6 
Gross national income 100 4964.23 5047.841 280 27600 
Democracy score 100 52.32 24.91719 3 97 
Central budgetary authority  100 .88 .3265986 0 1 
Fiscal treatment  100 .37 .4852366 0 1 
PPP prioritization  100 .86 .3487351 0 1 
Economic assessment  100 .92 .2726599 0 1 
Fiscal assessment 100 .85 .3588703 0 1 
Risk identification 100 .82 .3861229 0 1 
Financial viability 100 .81 .3942772 0 1 
Market sounding analysis 100 .49 .5024184 0 1 
Environment assessment  100 .81 .3942772 0 1 
Assessment of the RFP 100 .42 .496045 0 1 
Draft PPP contracts 100 .77 .4229526 0 1 
Standard PPP models  100 .34 .4760952 0 1 
Evaluation committee  100 .74 .440844 0 1 
Public procurement notice  100 .99 .1 0 1 
Foreign companies’ participation 100 .97 .1714466 0 1 
Minimum period 100 .93 .2564324 0 1 
Tender documents  100 .94 .2386833 0 1 
Clarification question  100 .95 .2190429 0 1 
Prebid conference  100 .5 .5025189 0 1 
Financial model 100 .49 .5024184 0 1 
Treatment of sole proposal  100 .61 .4902071 0 1 
Public of award notice 100 .91 .2876235 0 1 
Standstill period 100 .39 .4902071 0 1 
Negotiation with selected bidder 100 .58 .496045 0 1 
System for implementation  100 .86 .3487351 0 1 
System for tracking progress  100 .77 .4229526 0 1 
Monitoring and evaluation 100 .91 .2876235 0 1 
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Table 13 Continued 
Foreign companies’ income 100 .98 .1407053 0 1 
Change in structure 100 .67 .4725816 0 1 
Modification/ renegotiation 100 .84 .3684529 0 1 
Circumstances regulations  100 .96 .1969464 0 1 
Dispute resolution   100 .99 .1 0 1 
Lender’s rights  100 .46 .5009083 0 1 
Ground for termination   100 .9 .3015113 0 1 
 
 
Table 13 shows the number of observations, the mean, the standard deviation, the 
minimum and maximum of each observation for each variable. The sample size comprises 
100 observations or countries. The mean and the standard deviation of all the variables are 
presented for visualization purposes. There are six interval exogenous variables, seven 
ordinal endogenous variables, and three continuous mediator variables composed of 34 
binary mediator variables. Considering the minimum and maximum for the mediator 
variables PPP preparation (Prep), PPP procurement (Proc), and PPP contract management 
(Mgt), the values vary greatly. Out of 100 possible points, the smallest value for PPP 
preparation is 8 compared to 92. The smallest for PPP procurement is seven compared to 95, 
and the smallest for PPP contract management is nine compared to 88 (See Table 13). For the 
exogenous variable, the smallest for four of the six interval variables including voice and 
accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, and regulatory quality is at least 
(-2) and the highest ranges from 1 to 2 (See Table 13). The large differences mean that there 
is a large deviation between the observations in the dataset, which may have caused the 
kurtosis and skewness in the normality results. In effect, a test of normality was run for 
country governance which has interval data and PPP governance which has continuous data. 
The results of the skewness and kurtosis test are displayed in Table 14. A non-significant 
Prob>chi2 at the 95 % confidence level means that the variable is normally distributed.  
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Table 14: Test of Normality Results  
Variable Obs Pr (Skewness) Pr (Kurtosis) adj chi2(2)    Prob>chi2 
Voice and 
accountability 
100 0.7223 0.0133 5.96 0.0509 
Political stability 100 0.0824         0.6118         3.37          0.1858 
Government 
effectiveness 
100 0.1062         0.3805                  3.47 0.1761 
Regulatory 
quality 
100 0.0970         0.2544         4.17       0.1244 
Rule of law 100 0.0110         0.3107         6.91          0.0317 
Control of 
corruption 
100 0.0003         0.0287        14.48          0.0007 
PPP preparation  100 0.8917         0.0175         5.49          0.0641 
PPP 
procurement 
100 0.0207         0.7814         5.31          0.0703 
 PPP contract 
management 
100 0.2419         0.9495         1.41          0.4953 
 
 
 Looking at the Prob>chi2 at the 95 % confidence level (See D’ Agostino et al., 1990), 
Table 15 showed that four variables of country governance including voice and 
accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, and regulatory quality are 
normally distributed (p>0.05). Rule of law and control of corruption are not normally 
distributed. The three variables of PPP governance including PPP preparation, PPP 
procurement, and PPP contract management were normally distributed. Normality is required 
for the multivariate multiple regression, which is used to test Model 2. Despite the skewness 
of rule of law and control of corruption, no transformation was applied to the two variables. 
Instead, the robust estimation is used to remedy the violation of normality and ensure that the 
results are more accurate.  
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Measurement Validity 
According to Cronbach and Meehl (1955) and Adcock and Collier (2001), 
measurement validity occurs when the operationalization and the scoring of cases adequately 
reflect the concept the researcher seeks to measure. It is an examination of the relation among 
scores, indicators, and the systematized concept (Adcock and Collier, 2001). One of the types 
of validity is content validity or the adequacy of content (Adcock and Collier, 2001), which is 
to ensure that the indicator adequately capture the full content of the systematized concept. 
On the one hand, the researcher asks whether key elements were omitted from the indicator. 
As far as this is concerned, no key element is omitted from this dissertation research. There 
were no omissions from the country governance indicators. On the other hand, the researcher 
asks whether certain elements are inappropriately included in the indicators. For the PPP 
governance, the unsolicited proposals section was omitted because the section is not 
considered a stage of the PPP process. For the subcategories, it appears that it would be 
inappropriate to include some practices in the models either because they were repetitive, or 
they were vague. The interpretation of the results of these variables would not point to clear 
concluding points. The evaluation of proposals according to criteria (Propls) was 
automatically omitted by STATA and was removed because of collinearity. The availability 
of various procedures (AvailProc) is not included because the question is not specific about 
the type of procedures. Even if the variable is significant, its relevance to the conclusions 
would still be vague. The practice on the specification of prequalification/shortlisting criteria 
of the tender documents available to all the bidders was excluded because it was not expected 
to be enforced by all countries. The notification of all bidders (Notfictio) is not included 
because there was a previous question on the publication of award notice. The direct 
negotiation (not discretionary) and the publication of contract (Pblctio) were removed from 
the data because they were repetitive. On the PPP preparation subcategories, the comparative 
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assessment even though important, was removed because it was less relevant to the PPP 
governance. It was unrelated to the rest of the subcategories. This may be related to the fact 
that the practice was newly added.  
 
   91 
 
























1.0000         
Political 
stability  
0.5065 1.0000        
Government 
effectiveness 
0.5824 0.6760 1.0000       
Regulatory 
quality  
0.6787 0.6618 0.9197 1.0000      
Rule of law 0.6339 0.6949 0.9257 0.9005 1.000
0 
    
Control of 
corruption 
0.5715 0.6475 0.8798 0.8445 0.925
8 
1.0000    
PPP 
preparation 
0.3003 0.1350 0.2594 0.2585 0.235
5 
0.2093 1.0000   
PPP 
procurement   
0.4047 0.2269 0.3921 0.3995 0.399
7 
0.3728 0.5202 1.0000  
PPP 
management  
0.1703   0.1142 0.1799 0.1838 0.179
9 
0.1914 0.5297 0.4364 1.000 
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One of the most important tests of the measurement validity is correlation (Cronbach 
and Meehl, 1955). Therefore, a correlation test was run to determine the construct validity of 
the six exogenous variable of country governance (See Table 15). To determine the 
measurement validity, the convergent validity must be tested first. There is convergent 
validity when the scores of the systematized concept produced by the indicators of that same 
concept are empirically associated (Adcock and Collier, 2001). In other words, the six 
variables that compose country governance including voice and accountability, political 
stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption 
are included in the correlation test. Stronger associations between those variables constitute 
evidence that the six variables are convergent and measure country governance. The results 
of the correlation matrix are displayed in Table 15. The relationships between the six 
exogenous variables in Table 15 range moderately correlated (r=0.51) to highly correlated 
(r=0.92). This means that that there is a good convergent validity and the variables are a good 
measure of country governance. The convergent validity for the three variables of PPP 
governance was also tested. The results are displayed in Table 15. The relationship ranged 
from weakly correlated (r=0.44) to moderately correlated (r=0.53). This means that the 
evidence of convergent validity is weak, and the variables do not adequately measure PPP 
governance.  However, the data summary showed there were larger differences between the 
observations. The difference may have contributed to the weak correlation between the 
variables.  
Furthermore, discriminant validation is used to determine the construct validity. 
Discriminant validation is when the indicators of a systematized concept have a weaker 
association with the indicators of a second or different systematized concept, thus 
discriminating the second group of indicators from the first group (Cronbach and Meehl, 
1955; Adcock and Collier, 2001). Weaker associations mean that there is discriminant 
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validity between the two concepts. To test for discriminant validity, the correlation between 
the six variables of country governance and the three variables of PPP governance were 
compared. The results in Table 15 showed that the relationships between the variables are 
weak, which confirmed the strength of discriminant validity.  
A Spearman's correlation test was run to assess the relationship between the 
endogenous variables (PPP outcome variables). There was a strong relationship (from r=0.5 
to r=0.8) between the variables, hence the monotonic relationship required for the use of 
Spearman's correlation was met. Overall, the results of the measurement validity showed that 
the operationalized variables could be used to test the hypotheses set in the study. The 
convergent validity was moderately strong. The discriminant validity appeared very strong as 
well. The operationalized variables were run using the multivariate regression. The results are 
presented and analyzed in Chapter IV.
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
This “results and analysis” section presents the data description and data summary as 
well as the measurement validity of the data. The results of the hypotheses and models are 
presented and analyzed in four different steps followed by a summary of the key results. This 
was done for the entire sample of 100 countries and for the different income level groups.  
Analysis: Country Governance on PPP Outcome 
The first step in the mediation analysis process using regression is to test the influence 
of the exogenous variables on the endogenous variables. In this step, the study answered the 
first research question: Is there any positive relationship between country governance and 
PPP outcome? Thus, Model 1 tested the influence of country governance on PPP outcomes. 
In other words, Model 1 tested the effect of the six country governance variables on the seven 
variables of PPP outcome. The exogenous variables include voice and accountability, 
political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of 
corruption. The exogenous variables are interval because they are rated from (-2.5) to (2.5). 
The endogenous variables include achieved objectives, quality of entry, quality of 
supervision, overall Bank performance score, government compliance, implementing agency 
performance, and overall borrower performance. Because the endogenous variables are 
ordinal, the multivariate ordinal logistic regression (logit) is used to test Model 1. For Model 
1, the assumptions of the multivariate ordinal logistic regression include the requirement that 
the dependent variable must be ordinal (i.e. Likert scale data) (Statistics Solutions, 2020). In 
addition, the assumption that the observations must be independent from one another was met 
because the observations were individual countries (Statistics Solutions, 2020). The 
assumption that the exogenous variable must have no multicollinearity is also met as the 
exogenous variables as shown earlier are not too highly correlated (r=0.5 to r=0.92). Another 
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assumption is the use of large sample. The size of the sample was discussed earlier as being 
acceptable even though a larger sample would be preferred.  
The results of Model 1 are reported in exponentiated coefficients and are displayed in 
Table 16. The exponentiated coefficients are interpreted as odds ratios (See StataCorp, 2019). 
An exponentiated coefficient or odd ratios (OR) of more than 1 (OR>1) means the outcome is 
more likely to occur whereas an odd ratio less than 1 (OR<1) means that the outcome is less 
likely to occur. The exogenous variables are interval (data) and the results are analyzed and 
interpreted accordingly. 
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Table 16: Results of Model 1-Country Governance on PPP Outcome 
Country governance On PPP outcome  
















Voice & Accountability 0.3748911* 
(0.1627215) 
   0.4310826+ 
(0.170481) 
  









2.900966*    
(0.9555848) 
  2.648148* 
(0.8490881) 
Regulatory quality 0.1689821* 
(3.866768) 





      
Rule of Law        
Control of corruption        
*indicates significant at the 95% confidence level. + indicates robust error significance.  
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The statistical significance was determined using both the default standard errors 
estimation and the robust estimation. The standard errors estimation test showed that country 
governance factors had a significant effect on the factors of PPP outcome (See Table 16). The 
exponentiated coefficients of political stability (OR= 2.46, 95% CI: 1.30-4.64, p=0.005) and 
government effectiveness (OR=5.05, 95% CI: 1.12-22.65, p=0.034) had a significant positive 
effect on achieved objectives. This means that an increase in the scores for political stability 
and regulatory quality increases the probability of highly satisfactory achieved objectives. 
Political stability also had a positive effect on quality at entry (OR=2.91, 95% CI: 1.526-5.55, 
p=0.001), quality of supervision (OR=2.064, 95% CI: 1.11-3.84, p=0.022), Bank overall 
performance (OR=2.51, 95% CI: 1.34-4.70, p=0.004), implementing agency performance 
(OR= 2.90, 95% CI: 1.52-5.53, p=0.001), and borrowing country overall performance 
(OR=2.64, 95% CI: 1.41-4.96, p=0.002). That means that the increase in the political stability 
in a country increases the probability that the scores of most of the PPP outcome factors will 
be highly satisfactory for quality at entry, quality of supervision, the Bank overall 
performance, and the borrowing country overall performance. Voice and accountability (OR= 
0.374, 95% CI: 0.16-0.87, p=0.024) and government effectiveness (OR=0.1689821, 95% CI: 
0.03-0.86, p=0.033) had a negative effect on achieved objectives. This means that an increase 
in the scores of voice and accountability and government effectiveness decreases the 
probability of achieving highly satisfactory results.  
With the robust test, the effect of voice and accountability (OR=0.43, 95% CI: 0.19-
0.93, p=0.033) on the implementing agency performance (ImpAg) became significant. 
However, its effect was negative, meaning that an increase in the scores of voice and 
accountability decreases the probability of increasing the scores of the implementing agency 
performance. The control variable, gross national income per capita (GNI) had a weak 
positive relationship with quality of supervision, government effectiveness, and borrowing 
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country overall performance with an OR= 1.00, 95% CI: 1.00-1.00, p=0.007 for all the 
significant effects.  
Thus, country governance had a significant effect on PPP outcome via political 
stability, regulatory quality, voice and accountability and government effectiveness. 
Hypothesis 1 was supported by the variable of political stability via its positive effects on 
quality at entry, the quality of supervision, the Bank overall performance, and the borrowing 
country overall performance and by regulatory quality via its positive effect on achieved 
objectives. In other words, two country governance variables had a positive effect on five 
PPP outcome variables, which is a significant result.  
In terms of substantive significance, the World Bank and member countries should 
focus on improving the political stability and the quality of regulations in the recipient 
countries to increase the outcome of PPP projects. Hypothesis 1 was not supported for voice 
and accountability and government effectiveness because of the negative direction of the 
effects, which is contrary to the expectations. This also means that too much focus on voice 
and accountability and government effectiveness may produce the opposite effect.  
Another key remark is that political stability had the most recurrent influence on the 
outcome of PPP governance from the perspective of both the World Bank and the recipient 
countries. Political stability facilitates the effective execution of the tasks that fall under the 
Bank’s responsibilities. Furthermore, political stability improves the performance of recipient 
countries in PPP projects. Surprisingly, voice and accountability, which refers to freedom of 
expression, of association and of the media not only negatively impact the performance of the 
implementing agencies in recipient countries but also the objectives of PPP projects. Another 
surprising result is the lack of significant impact of control of corruption on the outcome of 
PPP.  While step 1 consisted of testing the H1, the results will be compared with the results in 
step 2 and step 3 presented in later sections.  
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Analysis: Country Governance on PPP Governance 
Step 2 of the mediation analysis consists in assessing the effect of the exogenous 
variable on the endogenous mediator variable. In this step, the study answered the second 
research question: Is there any positive relationship between country governance and PPP 
governance? Step 2 includes Model 2a, which tested the effect of country governance 
variables on the three continuous mediator endogenous variables. The continuous variables 
are considered endogenous in Model 2. Therefore, the multivariate multiple regression is 
used, and the normality of data is assumed. The Prob>chi2 showed that the three main 
endogenous mediator variables PPP preparation, PPP procurement, and PPP contract 
management are normally distributed. The Prob>chi2 showed that the six exogenous 
variables except the rule of law (RuleL) and control of corruption (Concor) were normally 
distributed. The skewness and kurtosis became worse when the two variables were log-
transformed. The violation of the normality assumption was in part due to the large 
disparities between the scores since some countries scored very high while others scored 
extremely low. Nonetheless, the multivariate regression using the initial normality results.  
In addition, Model 2b, Model 2c, and Model 2d assess the effect of country 
governance on the subcategories of PPP preparation, PPP procurement, and contract 
management, respectively. Since all the variables in Model 2b, Model 2bc, and Model 2d are 
binary, the multivariate Bernouli (logit) regression is used to test all three models. For Model 
2b, Model 2bc, and Model 2d, certain assumptions had to be met. The endogenous variables 
in these models are binary (i.e. 1=yes and 0=no). In addition, the assumption that the 
observations must be independent from one another was met because the observations were 
individual countries. The assumption that the exogenous variable must have no 
multicollinearity is also met as the exogenous variables as shown earlier are not too highly 
correlated (r=0.5 to r=0.92). Another assumption is the use of large sample. Again, the size of 
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the sample was discussed earlier as being acceptable even though a larger sample would be 
preferred.  
  Considering the sample size, GSEM does not allow fitting more than 12 variables at 
a time in addition to the two control variables. As a result, the binary subcategory variables 
were divided into three groups or models.  
Country Governance of PPP Governance: Main Categories. 
When the multivariate regression was run for Model 2a, none of the six country 
governance variables had a significant effect on the three continuous PPP governance 
variables (Model 2a). Only the control variable democracy had a significant effect on PPP 
preparation, PPP procurement, and PPP contract management at P<0.05, and negatively 
affected all three variables. Therefore, the hypothesis (H2a) that country governance had a 
positive influence on the three continuous PPP governance variables was not supported. This 
is a surprising finding since countries with good governance are expected to yield better 
outcomes. The higher the scores of the PPP preparation, PPP procurement, and contract 
management, the better the outcome is expected to be. Their lack of significance or opposite 
effects may mean that rating the stages of PPP do not matter. Model 2b, 2c, and 2d were run 
to check if country governance had a positive influence on the subcategories of the PPP 
governance.  
Country Governance on the Subcategories of PPP Preparation 
For the Bernoulli logit regression (See Model 2b), government effectiveness (OR= 
16.44, 95% CI:0.97-278.76, p=0.052) had a positive significant effect on PPP prioritization, 
meaning that for a 1-point increase in the score of government effectiveness, the probability 
of ensuring consistency in the PPP prioritization gets higher. Voice and accountability had a 
significant effect on risk identification (OR=0.24, 95%CI: 0.056-1.01, p=0.052) and 
economic analysis assessment (OR=0.10, 95% CI: 0.01-1.03, p=0.054) and affected the two 
   101 
 
variables negatively (See Table 17). In other words, a 1-point increase in the score of voice 
and accountability reduces the likelihood that the score of risk identification and economic 
analysis will be enforced. When the score of political stability (OR=0.26, 95% CI: 0.07-0.88, 
p=0.031) increases by a 1-point, the likelihood that the PPP prioritization will not be enforced 
becomes higher. With the robust test, voice and accountability (OR=0.33, 95% CI: 0.12-0.86, 
p=0.024) and political stability (OR=0.50, 95%CI: 0.26-0.95, p=0.036) became statistically 
significant, affecting negatively the assessment of RFP and the environmental impact 
assessment respectively (See Table 17). In other words, the probability that a 1-point increase 
in voice and accountability and political stability will lead to assessment of RFP and the 
assessment of environmental impact gets lower respectively. The GNI per capita had a 
significant positive effect when the draft PPP contract was included in the RFP. Democracy 
had a significant positive on economic analysis, risk identification, and assessment of RFP. 
Overall, the hypothesis (H2b) that country governance has a positive influence on the PPP 
preparation variables is supported by the relationship between government effectiveness and 
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Table 17: Results of Model 2b-Country Governance on PPP Preparation Subcategories 
Country 
governance  






































    
Rule of law 
 
     
Control of 
corruption 
     
*indicates significant at the 95% confidence level. + indicates robust error significance.  
 
Practically, effective governments are more likely to consider the consistency between 
their PPP prioritization and their investment prioritization. However, having one positive 
result out of 12 possible variables means weak results for Model 2b. In fact, most of the 
significant effects were negative, and therefore produced the opposite direction. For example, 
increasing the voice and accountability and political stability and lack of terrorism reduce the 
probability that countries will conduct risk identification, economic assessment, environment 
impact assessment, assessment of RFP, and ensure PPP prioritization. This calls for a lot of 
caution when trying to focus on the good governance factors to enforce the practices of PPP 
governance. It was also surprising to note that good governance features such as voice and 
accountability, political stability and lack of terrorism, government effectiveness, regulatory 
quality, rule of law and control of corruption did not influence the enforcement of PPP 
practices. In other words, a country with political stability may not conduct market sounding 
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analysis. One explanation is that market sounding analysis is already being done or it is a far-
fetched demand from the reality of PPPs or the PPP process does not allow the necessary 
time for such assessment to take place.   
Country Governance on the Subcategories of PPP Procurement 
For Model 2c, voice and accountability had a significant positive effect on the 
minimum period to submit bid (OR=196.32, 95%CI:2.33-16512.32, p=0.020) and the 
issuance of procurement notice (OR=7.69e+13, 95%CI: 9.40e+11-6.30e+15, p=0.000), 
meaning that a 1-point increase in the scores of voice and accountability and government 
effectiveness increases the probability of respecting the 60-day minimum period to submit 
bids. Government effectiveness had a significant positive effect on the minimum period to 
submit bid (OR=3892.88, 95%CI:6.09-2485958, p=0.012) and the issuance of procurement 
notice (OR=2.32e+42, 95%CI:= 2.11e+39-2.55e+45, P=0.000). This means that countries 
increase their score of government effectiveness by 1 point were more likely to meet the 60-
day minimum period to submit bids. The rule of law (OR=7.95e+16, 95% CI: 4.27e+11-
1.48e+22, p=0.000) became statistically significant and positively affected the issuance of 
procurement notice. This means that a 1-point increase in the score of the rule of law reduces 
the probability that procurement notice will be issued. In terms of practical significance, 
countries that want to meet the minimum period of 60 days and publish the procurement 
notice should seek to improve the scores in voice and accountability, government 
effectiveness, and rule of law. 
On the opposite hand, countries that increase their scores by 1 point in political 
stability (OR=0.10, 95%CI: 0.01-0.972, p=0.047) and regulatory quality (OR=0.00, 95%CI: 
1.04e-06-0.24, p=0.016) were less likely to meet the 60-day minimum period to submit bids. 
In addition, when countries increase their score by 1 point in political stability (OR=6.67e-21, 
95% CI: 9.38e-23-4.74e-19, p=0.000) and regulatory quality (OR=1.78e-51, 95% CI: 4.55e-
   104 
 
55-6.99e-48, p=0.000), the probability that a procurement notice will not be issued gets 
higher (See Table 18). Political stability (OR=0.1322608, 95% CI: 0.02-0.72, p=0.020) also 
had a significant negative effect on the publication of award notice, meaning that a 1point 
increase in political stability reduces the probability that the award notice will be published. 
With the robust estimation, political stability (OR=0.07, 95% CI: 0.00-0.77, p=0.030) and 
voice and accountability (OR=0.34, 95% CI: 0.13-0.92, p=0.033) became statistically 
significant, meaning that a 1-point increase in the scores of political stability and voice and 
accountability is less likely to lead to the elaboration of PPP stages in bid documents and an 
effective treatment in the case of the reception of one proposal respectively (See Table 18).   
 
Table 18: Results of Model 2c-Country Governance on PPP Procurement 
Country 
governance  
PPP procurement (Practices) 












7.69e+13 +  
(1.73e+14)+ 
196.3266*    
(443.955) 
 0.3464216+   
(0.1727235) 
 




0.070068+   
(0.0858838) 








   
Government 
effectiveness 
2.32e+42+   
(8.29e+42) 
3892.888*   
(12829.41) 
   
Rule of law 7.95e+16+   
(4.92e+17) 
    
*indicates significant at the 95% confidence level. + indicates robust error significance.  
 
Practically, focusing on improving the scores of political stability, regulatory quality, 
voice and accountability does not necessarily guarantee that the 60-day minimum period to 
submit bids will be met, that a procurement notice will be issued, that award notice will be 
published, that the elaboration of PPP stages will be included in bid documents and that sole 
bids will be effectively treated.  
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GNI had a significant positive effect on the 60-day minimum period and the 
negotiation with the selected bidders and a significant negative effect on the publication of 
award notice. Democracy had a significant positive effect on the detailing of the PPP stages 
in bid documents and foreign companies’ participation and a significant negative effect on 
the publication of the procurement notice.  
Country Governance on the Subcategories of PPP Contract Management 
No significant results were found when Model 2d was tested using the standard error 
default in STATA. However, when the robust error test was applied, political stability 
(OR=10.32, 95% CI: 2.87-37.10, p=0.000) and rule of law (OR=531.06, 95% CI: 14.26-
19772.88, p=0.001) became significant, positively affecting permission of foreign companies 
to repatriate income whereas voice and accountability (OR=0.33, 95% CI: 0.132-0.84, 
p=0.020) and control of corruption (OR=0.00, 95% CI: 2.68e-07- 0.93, p=0.48) became 
significant but negatively affecting permission of foreign companies to repatriate income 
(See Table 19). Put otherwise, an increase in the score of political stability and rule of law 
means that foreign companies will be permitted to repatriate income whereas an increase in 
the score of voice and accountability and control of corruption means that they will not. 
Voice and accountability (OR=3.58e+13, 4.37e+11 -2.93e+15,p=0.000), government 
effectiveness (OR= 2.08e+41, 95% CI: 1.89e+38-2.28e+44, p=0.000), and rule of law 
(2.69e+16, 95% CI: 1.44e+11-5.01e+21, p=0.000) became statistically significant and 
affected the dispute resolution mechanisms positively whereas political stability (OR=2.22e-
20, 95% CI: 3.12e-22-1.58e-18,p=0.000) and regulatory quality (OR= 3.15e-50, 95% 
CI:8.05e-54-1.24e-46), p=0.000) negatively affected the dispute resolution mechanisms. This 
means that an increase in the score of voice and accountability, government effectiveness, 
and rule of law increase the performance on the dispute resolution mechanisms whereas such 
performance is reduced when there is an increase in the score of political stability and 
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regulatory quality. Regulatory quality (OR=0.05, 95% CI: 0.00-0.92, p=0.044) became 
significant and negatively affecting monitoring and evaluation, meaning that an increase in 
the score of regulatory quality reduces the performance on monitoring and evaluation. GNI 
per capita had a significant positive effect on ground for termination of a PPP contract and on 
change in the structure of the private partner (See Table 19). Democracy had a significant 
positive effect on monitoring and evaluation, and modification. Democracy and the GNI per 
capita became significant, affecting circumstances that may occur and dispute resolution 
mechanisms when the robust estimation was used.  
 
Table 19: Results of Model 2d-Country Governance on PPP Contract Management 
 
Country governance  PPP contract management (Practices) 
 Monitoring 
&evaluation 




 0.3347652+ (0.1580238) 0.58e+13+   (8.04e+13) 
    
Political stability  10.32645+ (6.738766) 2.22e-20+(4.82e-20) 
    
Regulatory quality 0.0520081+  
(0.0762758) 
 3.15e-50+(1.33e-49) 
    
Government 
effectiveness 
  2.08e+41+   (7.42e+41) 
    
Rule of law  531.0617+ (980.0946) 2.69e+16+   (1.67e+17) 
    
Control of corruption  0.0005009+ (0.0019248)  




In short, the hypothesis (H2d) that country governance had a positive influence on 
contract management subcategories was supported by the variables including political 
stability, rule of law, voice and accountability, and government effectiveness due to their 
positive effects on the permission of foreign companies to repatriate income and the dispute 
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resolution mechanisms. Practically, countries that are eager to guarantee permission to 
foreign companies to repatriate income and improve the dispute resolution mechanisms 
should focus on improving their score on political stability, rule of law, voice and 
accountability, and government effectiveness. Caution should be exercised when using voice 
and accountability and control of corruption to guarantee the permission to foreign companies 
to repatriate income and political stability. There needs to be caution when regulatory quality 
is used to increase the dispute resolution mechanisms.  
Analysis: PPP Governance on PPP Outcome 
The third step in the mediation analysis is to assess the influence of the PPP 
governance on PPP outcome. In this step, the study answered the third research question: Is 
there any positive relationship between PPP governance and PPP outcome?  This step 
includes Model 3a, which tested the effect of PPP governance on the seven variables of PPP 
outcomes. In Model 3a, PPP governance is the exogenous variable and PPP outcome is the 
endogenous variable. PPP governance comprises two types of variables: the continuous 
variables composed of PPP preparation, PPP procurement, and contract management; and the 
binary variables composed of 34 binary variables. Thus, Model 3a is tested using the 
multivariate ordinal logistic regression.  
First, the effect of the three continuous variables on PPP outcome is tested (Model 3a) 
using the multivariate ordinal logistic regression. For Model 1, the assumptions of the 
multivariate ordinal logistic regression include the requirement that the dependent variable 
must be ordinal (i.e. Likert scale data). In addition, the assumption that the observations must 
be independent from one another was met because the observations were individual 
countries. The assumption that the exogenous variable must have no multicollinearity is also 
met as the exogenous variables (i.e. the three main variables) as shown earlier are not too 
highly correlated (r=0.4 to r=0.5). Another assumption is the use of large sample. The size of 
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the sample was discussed earlier as being acceptable even though a larger sample would be 
preferred.  
Second, the effect of the binary variables is tested. For the binary variables, three 
different models (Model 3b, Model 3c, and Model 3d) are tested. For Model 3b, Model 3c, 
and Model 3d, the assumptions of the multivariate ordinal logistic regression include the 
requirement that the dependent variable must be ordinal (i.e. Likert scale data). In addition, 
the assumption that the observations must be independent from one another was met because 
the observations were individual countries. The exogenous variable are the binary variables 
(i.e. 1=yes and 0=no). The size of the sample was discussed earlier as being acceptable even 
though a larger sample would be preferred. Considering the sample size, GSEM does not 
allow fitting more than 12 variables at a time in addition to the two control variables. 
Therefore, the binary subcategory variables have been divided into three groups. The first 
group constitutes the subcategories of the PPP preparation (Model 3b). The second group 
(Model 3c) constitutes the subcategories of the PPP procurement. The third group (Model 3d) 
constitutes the subcategories of the PPP contract management. The test of each model is 
further explained in the rest of the section. As in step 1 and step 2, the statistical significance 
in step 3 is determined using both the standard errors estimation and the robust estimation. 
The exponentiated results are reported in Table 20.  
Stages of PPP Governance on PPP Outcome 
With the standard errors estimation for the continuous variables (Model 3a), only 
procurement management (OR=0.97, 95% CI: 0.94-0.99, p=0.030) had a negative effect on 
quality at entry (See Table 19). Considering that an odd ratio of 1 is considered a neutral 
effect, the odd ratio of (0.97) means that the negative effect is negligible and translated to no 
effect. In other words, an increase in the scores of contract management does not influence 
the scores of the quality at entry. Thus, the hypothesis (H3a) that the three continuous of PPP 
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governance have a positive influence on PPP outcome is not supported. The results are 
surprising since countries that enforce the internationally recognized practices of the PPP 
governance should logically be able to improve their outcomes. GNI had a significant effect 
on achieved objectives, quality of supervision, Bank overall performance, government 






















       
PPP 
Preparation  
 0.9700303*   
(0.0135735) 
    
       
PPP 
Procurement 
      
       
PPP 
management  
      




Subcategories of PPP Preparation on PPP Outcome 
The standard errors estimation of the binary variables showed some statistical 
significance on the PPP outcome variables (See Table 21). The standardization of PPP model 
contracts or the development of transaction documents had a significant positive effect on 
achieved objectives (OR= 2.37, 95% CI: 1.02-5.52, p=0.044), quality at entry (OR=3.78, 
95% CI: 1.56-9.18, p=0.003), and Bank overall performance (OR=2.64, 95% CI: 1.10-6.34, 
p=0.029). This means that countries that standardized their PPP model contracts are more 
likely to increase the probability of satisfactory results on achieved objectives, quality at 
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entry, and Bank overall performance than those that do not. Countries that also assess their 
requests for proposals are more likely to increase the probability of satisfactory results on 
quality of supervision than those that do not. The robust estimation increased the list of 
expected results.  For instance, the effect of fiscal affordability assessment (OR=3.43, 95% 
CI: 1.01-11.61, p=0.048) on achieved objectives became significant and was positive, 
meaning that country that carry on fiscal assessment are more likely to reach satisfactory 
achieved objectives. In addition, when countries conduct environment impact assessment 
(OR=2.26, 95%CI: 0.99-5.13, p=0.051), the probability of satisfactory score on government 
performance increases more than when they do not. These significant results point to the 
expected direction. Therefore, Hypothesis 3a (H3b) is supported by the variables including 
standardization of PPP model contracts, assessment of request for proposals, fiscal 
affordability assessment, and environmental impact assessment via their significant positive 
effect on achieved objectives, quality at entry, Bank overall performance, quality of 
supervision and government performance. This means that countries that are eager to yield 
satisfactory outcomes on their PPP projects should focus on those variables.  
A few significant results point to the opposite direction. For example, countries that 
conduct risk identification are less likely to increase the probability of satisfactory results on 
quality at entry (OR=0.21, 95%CI: 0.05-0.78, p= 0.020), quality of supervision (OR=0.22, 
95% CI: 0.05-0.87, p=0.032), and government performance (OR=0.20, 95% CI: 0.06-0.71, 
p=0.013) (See Table 21). Countries are less likely to increase their satisfaction level in Bank 
performance (OR=0.30, 0.09-0.99, p=0.050) and implementing agency performance (OR= 
0.28, 95% CI: 0.08-0.98, p=0.048) when they focus on ensuring consistency between PPP 
prioritization and public investment prioritization than when they do not. In other words, risk 
identification, and prioritization of PPP do not support H3b because their effects are negative.
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Table 21: Results of Model 3b-Subcategories of PPP Preparation on PPP Outcome 
















Standard PPP model 2.37538*   
(1.022431) 
3.787213*    
(1.712424) 
 2.645445*    
(1.181227) 
 0.2069761*     
(0.131044) 
 
Fiscal assessment 3.429006+   
(2.133992) 
      
Risk identification  0.211594*    
(0.1417968) 
0.2202167*     
(0.154984) 
0.2798681*    
(0.1857631) 
   
Assessment of the RFPs   2.611134*    
(1.261898) 
    
PPP Prioritization     0.2999283*    
(0.1839219) 
0.2871034*    
(0.1808651) 
  









*indicates significant at the 95% confidence level. + indicates robust error significance.
   112 
 
Overall, the hypothesis (H3b) that the subcategories of PPP preparation have an 
influence on PPP outcome was supported. When countries enforce the internationally 
recognized practices, they are more likely to improve their performance in PPP projects both 
in terms of achieved objectives and improved effectiveness in the Bank’s and the recipient 
countries’ actions. While the standardization of PPP model contracts, the assessment of the 
request for proposals, the fiscal assessment, and the environment impact assessment 
contribute to the greater performance, it is surprising that risk identification had the opposite 
effect on PPP outcome. The risk identification is one of the practices that are recommended 
to be done before any partnership projects are implemented. It was surprising to note that the 
enforcement of practices such as the approval of the central budgetary authority, fiscal 
treatment of PPPs, financial viability assessment, and market sounding analysis did not have 
any influence on the outcome of PPPs. 
Subcategories of PPP Procurement on PPP Outcome 
The hypothesis (H3c) that the subcategories of PPP procurement had a positive 
influence on PPP outcome was supported. The results also showed that countries which bid 
documents detail the stages of the process (OR= 7.23, 95% CI: 0.98-53.00, p=0.052), those 
that provide clarification questions for procurement notice (OR=16.89, 95% CI:1.28    
221.32, p=0.031), and those that allow negotiations with the selected bidder before contract 
signing (OR=2.89, 95% CI:1.11-7.52, p=0.029) are more likely to reach better satisfaction in 
the objectives that they seek to achieve than those that do not. The overall performance of the 
borrowing countries are more likely to improve for countries with detailed bid documents 
(OR=11.20, 95% CI: 1.32-94.74, p=0.027) and those that provide clarifications (OR=18.50, 
95% CI: 0.98-349.16, p=0.052) (See Table 22). The performance of the implementing agency 
is more likely to improve for countries with detailed bid documents of the PPP process 
(OR=38.051, 95% CI: 1.72-838.96, p=0.021) (See Table 22). The robust test showed that 
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when foreign companies can participate in PPP bidding (OR=10.57, 95% CI: 2.15-51.89, 
p=0.004), the probability of satisfactory scores of Bank overall performance increases more 
than when they cannot.  
Again, Hypothesis 3c (H3c) is supported by the variables detailed bid documents, 
clarification of questions, negotiation before signature, permission for foreign companies in 
the bidding process via their positive effects on achieved objectives, borrowing country 
overall performance, Bank overall performance, and performance of the implementing 
agency. The results of the subcategories of the procurement are very important. In terms of 
practical significance, it means that countries interested in achieving their objectives and 
increasing their performance must ensure that they have bid documents that provide details 
on the PPP stages. They must be forthcoming in providing clarifications and information 
necessary to the procurement process, conducting negotiations with the selected bidders 
before signing the contract, and allowing foreign companies to participate in the bidding 
process.  
Some significant results in Model 3c were negative and did not support H3c. The 
results showed that countries that hold pre-bid conference were less likely to improve their 
scores on achieved objectives (OR=0.39, 95% CI: 0.15-0.99, p=0.048) and quality of 
supervision (OR= 0.32, 0.13-0.83, p=0.019) than those that do not. The publication of award 
notice had a negative effect on Bank overall performance (OR=0.21, 95% CI: 0.04-1.02, 
p=0.053) and the performance of the implementing agency (OR=0.10, 95% CI: 0.01-0.67, 
p=017). This means that countries that publish the award notice are less likely to improve the 
implementing agency performance than those that do not. The publication of award notice 
(OR= 0.10, 95% CI: 0.01- 1.01, p=0.052) also became significant but negatively affecting the 
quality of supervision, meaning that countries that consider the publication of award notice 
are less likely to increase the probability of satisfactory results on the quality of supervision. 
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Countries with qualified evaluation committee members (OR=0.32, 95% CI: 0.11-0.90, 
p=0.031) are less likely to improve their Bank overall performance scores than those without. 
Countries that issue public procurement notice of the PPP (OR=0.00, 0.00- 0.33, p=0.017) are 
less likely to improve their scores on achieved objectives than those that do not. The same 
was true for the effect of the issuance of the public procurement notice of the PPP (OR= 0.00, 
95% CI: 0.00-0.12, p=0.001) on the performance of the implementing agency and the 
performance of the borrowing country overall performance, meaning that countries that issue 
notice of PPP are less likely to improve the performance of their implementing agency and 
the borrowing country overall performance than those that do not.
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Table 22: Results of Model 3c-Subcategories of PPP Procurement on PPP Outcome 
























0.0024251*    
(0.0061087) 
   0.0055913+   
(0.0088911) 




7.231478*    
(7.349343) 
   38.05095*     
(60.0525) 




16.89311*    
(22.17455) 
     18.50418*     
(27.7336) 
Prebid conference 0.3937169*    
(0.1859948) 
 0.3287352+   
(0.1503359) 
    
Negotiations 2.894988*    
(1.410644) 




  10.5742+   
(8.582288) 
    
Publication of 
award notice 
  0.2004972+   
(0.1628486) 
0.2142171*    
(0.1706307) 





   0.320085*    
(0.1688632) 
   
*indicates significant at the 95% confidence level. + indicates robust error significance. 
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In other words, focusing on pre-bid conference, the publication of award notice, the 
evaluation of committee members’ qualifications, and issuance of procurement notice of PPP 
as a strategy for improving the outcomes of PPP projects produces the opposite effect. The 
fact that those practices have the opposite effect is surprising. The pre-bid conference is 
praised as an opportunity to share important information of the projects with potential 
bidders. The publication of award notice, the evaluation of committee members’ 
qualifications, and the issuance of procurement notice of PPP are designed to ensure 
transparency and fairness in the procurement process. When there is transparency, better 
outcome is expected as the contract is awarded to the best bidder chosen through a 
transparent process by a competent committee. The GNI per capita had a significant positive 
effect on quality of supervision.  
Subcategories of PPP Contract Management on PPP Outcome 
The hypothesis (H3d) that the subcategories of the PPP contract management had a 
positive influence on PPP outcome was supported by the variables including lender’s step-in 
rights, dispute resolution mechanisms, and permission to foreign companies to repatriate 
income due to their positive effect on quality of supervision, implementing agency 
performance, government performance, and quality at entry. For instance, countries that 
consider lender’s step-in rights were more likely to improve the level of satisfaction on the 
quality of supervision (OR=2.98, 95% CI: 1.19-7.42, p=0.019), implementing agency 
performance (OR=2.59, 95% CI: 1.05-6.36, p=0.038) and government performance 
(OR=2.48, 95% CI: 0.99-6.20, p=0.052 (See Table 23) than those that do not. Countries with 
dispute resolution mechanisms (OR=9.39, 95% CI: 1.50-58.41, p=0.016) become more likely 
to perform better in quality at entry than those without. When foreign companies are 
permitted to repatriate income (OR=3.56, 95% CI: 1.08-11.71, p=0.036), the probability of 
satisfactory on government performance increases more than when they are not.  
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Some significant results for H3d did not point to the expected direction. For instance, 
the system to manage implementation (OR=0.14, 95% CI: 0.03-0.62, p=0.010) had a 
significant effect on government performance, meaning that countries that had a system to 
manage implementation are less likely to increase the probability of satisfactory government 
performance than those that did not. The control variable GNI had a very minimal positive 
effect on quality of supervision, Bank overall performance, government performance, and 
borrower overall performance whereas democracy had a negative effect on achieved 
objectives and government effectiveness.
   118 
 
Table 23: Results of Model 3d-Subcategories of PPP Contract Management on PPP Outcome 
*indicates significant at the 95% confidence level. + indicates robust error significance. 
PPP contract 
management  

















 9.391285+   
(8.757745) 
     
        
Lender’s rights   2.985361*   
(1.388358) 
 2.592274*   
(1.188992) 
2.481761*   
(1.159887) 
 
        
System      0.1429818*    
(0.108141) 
 




     3.566231+   
(2.164699) 
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Overall, the practices at the contract management stage contribute to better outcomes 
in PPP projects. In terms of substantive significance, countries that give the right to lenders to 
intervene in project management when necessary, those that have mechanisms in place to 
settle disputes, and those that allow foreign companies to repatriate income from their work 
have a positive influence on the actions of both the World Bank performance and the 
performance of recipient countries’ government and of their implementing agency. A 
surprising finding is the fact that countries that had a system in place to manage the 
implementation of the PPP contract negatively impacted the performance of their 
governments.  It was surprising that practices such as tracking the progress and completion of 
construction works and monitoring and evaluation did not have any influence on the outcome 
of PPP projects.  
Summary of Results  
Table 24 summarized the results of the hypotheses that were supported and those 
that were not. The hypothesis (Hypothesis 1) that country governance had a positive 
influence on PPP outcome was supported considering the statistical significance of country 
governance variables on PPP outcome variables. Four of the six country governance factors 
including political stability, regulatory quality, voice and accountability, and government 
effectiveness had significant effects on the variables of PPP outcome including achieved 
objectives, quality at entry, quality of supervision, Bank overall performance, and borrower 
country overall performance. Of the six country governance variables, political stability is 
by far the most recurring influential variables because of its positive effect on six of the 
seven PPP outcome variables. Apart from political stability, only regulatory quality had a 
positive effect on achieved objectives.  
The hypothesis (Hypothesis 2a) that country governance had a positive influence on 
PPP governance was rejected for the main variables and supported for the subcategories. 
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The main hypothesis that country governance had a positive influence on the three 
continuous variables was not supported (see Table 24). None of the six country governance 
variables had a significant effect on the three main PPP governance variables.  
Second, the hypotheses that country governance had a significant effect on PPP 
governance via the subcategories were supported. The hypothesis (Hypothesis 2b) that 
country governance had a significant effect on the subcategories of PPP preparation was 
supported. Government effectiveness had a positive effect on PPP prioritization. Voice and 
accountability did not support Hypothesis 3a because of its negative effect on economic 
assessment and risk identification. The hypothesis (Hypothesis 2c) that the subcategories of 
PPP procurement had a positive effect on PPP outcome was supported. Government 
effectiveness and voice and accountability had a positive effect on the 60-day minimum 
period to submit bids and the issuance of procurement notice whereas political stability and 
regulatory quality had a negative effect on the same variables. The rule of law had a 
positive effect the issuance of procurement notice. 
The hypothesis (Hypothesis 2d) that the subcategories of PPP contract management 
had a positive effect on PPP outcome was supported. Political stability and rule of law had 
a positive effect on the permission of foreign companies to repatriate income whereas voice 
and accountability and control of corruption had a negative effect on the permission of 
foreign companies to repatriate income. Voice and accountability, government 
effectiveness, and rule of law had a positive effect on the dispute resolution mechanisms 
whereas political stability and regulatory quality had a negative effect on the same variable.  
The hypothesis (Hypothesis 3a) that PPP governance had a positive influence on 
PPP outcome was rejected for the main variables and supported for the subcategories. First, 
the main hypothesis that the three main PPP governance variables had a positive influence 
on PPP outcome was not supported (see Table 24). Only the contract management had a 
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negative effect on quality at entry. The hypotheses that the subcategories of PPP 
governance had a positive influence on PPP outcome were supported. The hypothesis 
(Hypothesis 3b) that the subcategories of PPP preparation had a positive influence on PPP 
outcome was supported. The standardization of PPP model contracts had a positive effect 
on achieved objectives, quality at entry, and Bank overall performance. Fiscal affordability 
assessment had a positive effect on achieved objectives. Environment impact assessment 
had a positive effect on government performance.  
The hypothesis (Hypothesis 3c) that the subcategories of PPP procurement had a 
positive influence on PPP outcome was supported. Bid documents with details of the stages 
of the process, the clarification of questions, the issuance of procurement notice, negotiation 
with the selected bidder before contract signing had a positive effect on achieved objectives. 
Bid documents with details of the stages of the process and clarifications of questions had a 
positive effect on borrowing country overall performance. Bid documents with details of the 
stages of the process had a positive effect on the implementing agency performance. The 
permission of foreign companies to participate in bidding had a positive effect on Bank 
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Table 24: Supported Hypotheses for Models 1, 2, & 3 
Hypotheses Results Comments 
H1: Country governance has a positive 
influence on PPP outcome.  
 
Supported There were both positive and 
negative statistical significance 
H2: Country governance has a positive 
influence on PPP governance 
  
• H2a Country governance has a positive 





• H2b) Country governance has a positive 
influence on PPP preparation 
Supported There were both positive and 
negative statistical significance 
• H2c) Country governance has a positive 
influence on PPP procurement 
Supported There were both positive and 
negative statistical significance 
• H2d) Country governance has a positive 
influence on contract management  
 
Supported There were both positive and 
negative statistical significance 
H3: PPP governance has a positive influence 
on PPP outcome.  
  
H3a: PPP governance has a positive influence 
on PPP outcome (3 main variables) 
Not 
supported 
The lone statistical significance 
was negative. 
• H3b) PPP preparation has a positive 
influence on PPP outcome. 
Supported There were both positive and 
negative statistical significance 
• H3c) PPP procurement has a positive 
influence on PPP outcome. 
Supported There were both positive and 
negative statistical significance 
• H3d) Contract management has a positive 
influence on PPP outcome.  
Supported There were both positive and 
negative statistical significance 
 
 
The hypothesis (Hypothesis 3d) that the subcategories of PPP contract management 
had a positive influence on PPP outcome was supported. Lender’s step-in rights had a 
positive effect on quality of supervision, implementing agency performance, government 
performance. Dispute resolution mechanisms had a positive effect on quality at entry. The 
permission for foreign companies to repatriate income had a positive effect on government 
performance. The system to manage implementation had a significant effect on government 
performance. 
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Analysis: The Mediating Role of PPP Governance 
Iacobucci (2008) argued that in mediation analysis, the effect of the exogenous 
variable (X) directly on the endogenous variable (Y) becomes significantly smaller in size 
relative to the effect size of the mediator on the endogenous variable. Put otherwise, the odd 
ratio of country governance on PPP outcome will be significantly smaller than the odd ratio 
of PPP governance on PPP outcome. Table 25 displayed the odd ratio of both models.  
It is time to examine whether the PPP governance mediates the relationship between country 
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Table 25: Summary of Mediation Results 
Variables On PPP outcome  














Voice and accountability 0.3748911    0.4310826+   
Political stability 2.460341 2.912011    2.064789    2.514281    2.900966    2.648148    2.648148 
Regulatory quality 0.1689821       
Government effectiveness 5.049964       
PPP management  0.9700303      
PPP Prioritization    0.2999283    0.2871034      
Fiscal assessment  3.429006+       
Risk identification      0.211594    0.2202167       0.2069761      
Financial viability      0.4842549+  
Environmental assessment             2.260709+  
Assessment of the RFP       2.611134     
Standard PPP model     2.37538    3.787213  2.645445       
Evaluation committee        0.320085       
Public procurement notice    0.0024251       0.0055913+  0.018771+ 
Foreign companies’ participation      10.5742+    
Tender documents     7.231478       38.05095  11.20348 
Clarification questions     16.89311         18.50418 
Prebid 0.3937169     0.3287352        
Publication of award notice      0.2004972+ 0.2142171 0.1061264   
Negotiation      2.894988          
System of implementation      0.1429818  
Foreign companies’ income         3.566231+  
Dispute resolution    9.391285 +       
Lender’s rights      2.985361  2.592274 2.481761  
*indicates significant at the 95% confidence level. + indicates robust error significance.
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 Looking at the odd ratios of country governance variables on achieved objectives on 
Table 25, the highest is 5.05. Any PPP governance variable with an odd ratio higher than 5.05 
will be considered a mediator. It appears that the odd ratios of bid documents of the PPP 
stages which is 7.23 and for clarifications of questions which is 16.9 are higher than 5.05. 
Therefore, bid documents of the PPP stages and clarifications of questions mediate the 
relationship between voice and accountability, political stability, regulatory quality, 
government effectiveness and achieved objectives. A more detail examination showed that 
negotiation with selected bidders with an odd ratio of 2.89 and fiscal analysis assessment 
with an odd ratio of 3.43 mediate the relationship between voice and accountability, political 
stability, regulatory quality, and achieved objectives. 
 For the odd ratios of country governance variables on quality at entry, the highest is 
2.91. Any PPP governance variable with an odd ratio higher than 2.91 will be considered a 
mediator. Standardized PPP model contracts with an odd ratio of 2.37 and dispute resolution 
mechanisms with an odd ratio of 9.39 are higher than 2.91. Therefore, standardized PPP 
model contracts and dispute resolution mechanisms mediate the relationship between political 
stability and quality at entry. For the odd ratios of country governance variables on quality of 
supervision, the highest is 2.06. Any PPP governance variable with an odd ratio higher than 
2.06 will be considered a mediator. The assessment of RFP with an odd ration of 2.61 and 
lender step-in rights with an odd ratio of 2.98 mediate the relationship between political 
stability and quality of supervision. For the odd ratios of country governance variables on 
Bank overall performance, the highest is 2.51. Any PPP governance variable with an odd 
ratio higher than 2.51 will be considered a mediator. It appears that the odd ratios of 
standardized PPP model contracts with an odd ratio of 2.64 and foreign company permission 
with an odd ratio of 10.572 are higher than 2.51. Therefore, standardized PPP model 
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contracts and foreign company permission mediate the relationship between political stability 
and Bank performance. 
 As far as the odd ratios of country governance variables on the implementing agency 
are concerned, the highest is 2.90 whereas the odd ratios of bid documents detailing the PPP 
stages are 38.05. Therefore, bid documents detailing the PPP stages mediate the relationship 
between political stability and implementing agency. The highest odd ratios of country 
governance variables on government performance are 2.65. Any PPP governance variable 
with an odd ratio higher than 2.65 will be considered a mediator. It appears that the odd ratios 
of foreign company income repatriation with an odd ratio of 3.56 is higher than 2.65. 
Therefore, foreign company income repatriation mediates the relationship between political 
stability and government performance. Looking at the odd ratios of country governance 
variables on borrower overall performance, the highest is 2.65. Any PPP governance variable 
with an odd ratio higher than 2.65 will be considered a mediator. The odd ratios of bid 
documents detailing the PPP stages with an odd ratio of 11.20 and clarification questions 
with an odd ratio of 18.50 are higher than 2.65. Therefore, bid documents detailing the PPP 
stages and clarification questions mediate the relationship between political stability and the 
borrower overall performance. 
The analysis showed that PPP governance factors mediate the relationship between 
country governance factors and PPP outcome factors. Each of the seven outcome variables 
one way or the other has been mediated by a PPP governance variable.  
Analysis: Results by Income Level 
The hypotheses used to analyze the research questions on the relationships between 
country governance, PPP governance, and PPP outcome are used for the income level 
analysis. In other words, the same hypotheses, H1, H2 (a, b, c, d), H3 (a, b, c, d) are tested for 
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each income level group. H4 could not be run for the income level analysis because of 
limited sub-samples.  
Model 1, Model 2 (a, b, c, d), and Model 3 (a, b, c, d) were run to assess the multiple 
influences between country governance, PPP governance, and PPP governance by including 
all the 100 countries in the same sample. The dissertation is also interested in those 
relationships within specific income levels. More specific models were run to understand the 
influence of country governance on PPP outcome by income level. Five models are used to 
test five different levels of income.  
The first model (Model I) included the low income countries with a sample of 23 
countries. It was shown earlier that the assumptions of the endogenous variables were met. 
There has been no change in the endogenous variables.  However, the normality test showed 
that four variables of country governance including government effectiveness, regulatory 
quality, rule of law, and control of corruption were not normally distributed. However, the 
distribution for government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of 
corruption were not severe. Therefore, no transformation of the data occurred. The main 
variables of PPP governance including PPP preparation, PPP procurement, and PPP contract 
management were all normally distributed (p>0.05). A correlation test of the exogenous 
variable (country governance) showed that there was no multicollinearity (r=0.45 to r=0.95). 
For the main PPP governance variables, the relationship was weak to moderate.  This was 
explained by the fact that the sample size is small.  
The second included the lower-middle income countries with a sample of 32 countries 
(Model II). The normality test showed that five of the six variables of country governance 
including voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory 
quality, rule of law, were normally distributed. Only the distribution for control of corruption 
was not normally distributed. No transformation of the variable occurred because the non-
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distribution was not severe (P=0.038). The two main variables of PPP governance including 
PPP preparation and PPP contract management were normally distributed (p>0.05). The PPP 
contract management variable was slightly non-normal (p=0.04). A correlation test of the 
exogenous variable (country governance) showed that the relationships were strong except 
the relationships between political stability; and government effectiveness; and rule of law; 
and control of corruption were moderate. Only the relationship between voice and 
accountability and political stability was weak (p=0.25). In addition, there was no 
multicollinearity. For the main PPP governance variables, the relationship was moderate to 
strong, which is acceptable for running the multivariate regression. 
The third constituted the upper-middle income level with a sample of 35 countries. It 
was shown earlier that the assumptions of the endogenous variables were met. There has been 
no change in the endogenous variables. The normality test showed that five of the six 
variables of country governance including voice and accountability, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption were normally 
distributed. Only the distribution for political stability was slightly not normally distributed 
(p=0.045). No transformation of the variable occurred because the non-distribution was not 
severe. The three main variables of PPP governance were normally distributed (p>0.05). A 
correlation test of the exogenous variable (country governance) showed that the relationships 
were moderate to strong. In addition, there was no multicollinearity. For the main PPP 
governance variables, the relationships were strong. 
 The fourth group included all the levels excluding high income countries with a 
sample of 90 countries. It was shown earlier that the assumptions of the endogenous variables 
were met. There has been no change in the endogenous variables.  However, the normality 
test showed that four variables of country governance including government effectiveness, 
regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption were not normally distributed. 
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Therefore, no transformation of the data occurred because the data was used in previous 
models. The purpose of income level analysis is to compare the results by income level. 
Therefore, transforming the data would be detrimental to the spirit of the analysis. The main 
variables of PPP governance including PPP preparation and PPP contract management were 
normally distributed (p>0.05) except the PPP procurement variable which was slightly non-
normal (p=0.044). A correlation test of the exogenous variable (country governance) showed 
that there was no multicollinearity (r=0.43 to r=0.90) and the variables were moderately and 
strongly correlated. For the main PPP governance variables, the relationships were moderate 
to strong. 
The fifth group concerned a sample of 32 Sub-Saharan African countries. Again, it 
the assumptions of the endogenous variables were met.  However, the normality test showed 
that four variables of country governance including government effectiveness, regulatory 
quality, rule of law, and control of corruption were not normally distributed. As in the 
previous income level, no transformation of the data occurred because the data was used in 
previous models. Again, the purpose of income level analysis is to compare the results by 
income level. Therefore, transforming the data would be detrimental to the spirit of the 
analysis. All the main variables of PPP governance were normally distributed (p>0.05). A 
correlation test of the exogenous variable (country governance) showed that there was no 
multicollinearity (r=0.43 to r=0.90) and the variables were strongly correlated. For the main 
PPP governance variables, the relationships were moderately correlated. 
 Four models including Model I, Model II, Model III, and Model IV were run to test 
hypothesis I (H I), hypothesis II (H 2), hypothesis III (H III), and hypothesis IV (H IV) (See 
Table 26 for models and hypotheses). The models and hypotheses were tested for each of the 
five income levels. The hypotheses were the same as in Model 1, Model 2, and Model 3 
except that the binary variables were not tested. The binary variables were not tested because 
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the samples at each level became too small for the large number of binary variables. It was 
also impossible to run the data in STATA and obtain results, hence the decision to remove 
the binary variables.  
 The exogenous variables and the endogenous variables for Model I, Model II, and 
Model III in Table 26 remained the same as in Model 1, Model 2, and Model 3. The change 
occurred with the endogenous mediator variable as the binary variables were left out. Thus, 
for the mediator endogenous variable, only the three continuous endogenous mediator 
variables were used. There was no change in the two control variables which included 
democracy and GNI. Model I and Model III were tested using the multivariate ordinal 
logistic regression (GSEM). Model II was tested using the multivariate multiple regression. 
Model IV summarized the results of the three other models to deduct the mediating role of 
PPP governance.
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Table 26: Models for Testing Hypotheses by Income Level  
 Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
Purpose  Influence of country governance 
on PPP outcomes 
Influence of country governance 
on PPP governance 
Influence of PPP governance 
on PPP outcome  
Mediating role of PPP governance 
Hypotheses H I H II H III H IV 
Endogenous 
variables  
- Achieved objectives 
- Quality at entry 
- Quality of supervision 
- Bank overall performance 
- Implementing agency 
performance  
- Government compliance   
- Borrowing government 
performance 
- PPP preparation  
- PPP procurement 
- PPP contract management 
 
- Achieved objectives 
- Quality at entry 
- Quality of supervision 
- Bank overall performance 
- Implementing agency 
performance 
- Government compliance  
- Borrowing government 
performance 
 
- PPP outcome and PPP governance 
(see Model I, II, and III) 
 
Mediating variables - NA - NA - NA - PPP governance 
Exogenous variables - Voice and accountability  
- Political stability  
- Government effectiveness  
- Regulatory quality  
- Rule of law 
- Control of corruption  
- Voice and accountability 
Political stability  
- Government effectiveness  
- Regulatory quality  
- Rule of law 
- Control of corruption 
- PPP preparation 
- PPP procurement 
- PPP contract management 
- Subcategories of PPP 
preparation 
 
- Country governance and PPP 
governance (see Model I, II, and 
III). 
 
Control variables  - Score of democracy - Score of democracy - Score of democracy - Score of democracy 
 - Gross National Income per 
capita (GNI) 
- Gross National Income per 
capita (GNI) 
- Gross National Income per 
capita (GNI) 
- Gross National Income per capita 
(GNI) 
Analysis method - Multivariate ordinal logistic 
regression (GSEM) 
- Multivariate multiple 
regression 
  
- Multivariate ordinal logistic 
regression (logit) 
- Multivariate multiple regression 
- Multivariate ordinal logistic 
regression (logit) 
Sample size  23, 32, 32, 35,90 23, 32, 32, 35,90 23, 32, 32, 35,90 23, 32, 32, 35,90 
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Low Income Countries 
The hypothesis (H I) that country governance had a positive influence on PPP 
outcome was tested for the sample of 23 low income countries. Political stability had a 
significant positive effect on the performance of the implementing agency (OR: 14.87, 95% 
CI: 1.05-209.03, p=0.045). This means for a 1-point increase in the score of political stability 
of low income countries, the probability of higher satisfaction in the performance of 
implementing agencies gets higher. Regulatory quality had a significant negative effect on 
the quality of supervision (OR: 0.00, 95% CI: 0.00-1.05, p= 0.052), meaning for an increase 
in the score of regulatory quality of low income countries, there is a lower probability that 
there are higher satisfactory results. The GNI per capita (OR: 0.03, 95% CI: 1.00-1.01) had a 
significant but a neutral effect on government performance. Thus, the hypothesis that country 
governance had a positive influence on PPP outcome for low income countries is supported 
by political stability via its effect on the implementing agency performance. Practically, for 
low-income countries, political stability contributes to better performance of recipient 
countries, especially the performance of the implementing agencies. The regulatory quality 
had a negative influence on the quality of supervision.  
For the influence of country governance on PPP governance (H II), only government 
effectiveness was significant with a negative effect on contract management (OR= -27.91, 
95%CI: -56.19- 0.36, p=0.053). This shows that a 1-point increase in the government 
effectiveness score lowers the score of contract management by 56.2%, controlling for the 
effect of all other variables. Thus, the hypothesis (H II) that country governance had a 
positive influence on PPP outcome for low income countries was not supported. Practically, 
focusing on government effectiveness will more likely lower the scores of PPP contract 
management.  
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As far as the influence of the PPP governance on PPP outcome (H III) was concerned, 
PPP preparation had a significant positive effect on the borrowing country overall 
performance (OR=1.108684, 95%CI: 1.00-1.22, p=0.046), meaning that an increase in the 
score of PPP preparation leads to higher probability of satisfactory performance of the 
borrower country.  PPP contract management had a significant effect on achieved objectives 
(OR= 0.89, 95%CI: 0.79-0.98, p=0.030), quality at entry (OR= 0.9099126, 95%CI: 0.83-
0.99, p=0.043), Bank overall performance (OR= 0.89, 95%CI: 0.81-0.989, p=0.028), 
government performance (OR=0.87, 95%CI: 0.78-0.96, p=0.011), and the borrowing country 
overall performance (OR= 0.83, 95%CI: 0.72-0.95, p=0.009). In other words, for a 1-point 
increase in the scores of contract management, the probability of satisfactory results gets 
lower for all these variables. However, it is important to note that these variables are not too 
far from being positive. If positive, these variables would have shown that contract 
management was important for achieving greater PPP outcomes. PPP procurement had a 
significant effect on Bank overall performance (OR= 0.9290738, 95%CI: 0.86-0.99, p=0.040) 
and the implementing agency performance (OR= 0.92, 95%CI: 0.86- 0.99, p=0.048). Thus, 
an increase in the score of PPP procurement reduces the probability that the implementing 
agency performance will be more satisfactory. However, the reduction of such probability is 
very small at about 8%.   
Thus, the hypothesis (H III) that PPP governance had a positive influence on PPP 
outcome was supported by PPP preparation via its effect on the borrowing country overall 
performance. The effects of PPP procurement and contract management do not support H III. 
However, their odd ratios are closer to 1. Practically, when low income countries increase 
their PPP preparation scores, they are more likely to perform better. While PPP procurement 
and contract management failed to be positively significant, in practice, they are very close to 
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having a positive influence on PPP outcome. In other words, they should not be discarded as 
being irrelevant for satisfactory outcomes.  
Lower-Middle Income Countries 
The influence of country governance on PPP outcome for the 32 lower-middle income 
countries was also tested, but there were no significant results. Only the control variable GNI 
1.00, 95% CI: 1.000-1.002, p=0.014) had a significant effect on the quality at entry. 
Therefore, the hypothesis (H I) that country governance had a positive influence on PPP 
outcome for lower-middle income countries was not supported. 
The test of the influence of country governance on PPP governance (H II) showed that 
government effectiveness had a significant positive effect on PPP preparation (OR=39.61, 
95%CI: -1.44-80.66, p=0.058). This means that a 1-point increase in the score of government 
effectiveness leads to an increase in the score of PPP preparation by 39.61%, controlling for 
the effect of all other variables. Control of corruption (OR= 35.14, 95%CI : 5.84-64.43, 
p=0.021) for the first time had a significant positive effect on PPP preparation. This means 
lower-middle income countries that increase their score in the control of corruption, the score 
of PPP preparation increases by 35.14%, controlling for the effect of all other variables. The 
effect of political stability (OR= -12.88, 95%CI: [-22.74667) - (-3.021258), p=0.013] on PPP 
procurement was significant and negative; which means that a 1-point increase in the score of 
political stability leads to 12.88% reduction in the score of PPP procurement, controlling for 
the effect of all other variables. Thus, the hypothesis (H II) that country governance had a 
positive influence on PPP governance for lower-income countries was supported by 
government effectiveness and control of corruption via their effects on PPP preparation. In 
terms of substantive significance, this means that when lower-income countries improve their 
score in government effectiveness and control of corruption, the scores of PPP preparation 
also increase; hence they should focus on those two variables. 
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The test of the influence of PPP governance on PPP outcome (H III) for lower-middle 
income countries showed that only PPP preparation had a significant negative impact on 
quality at entry (OR=0.94, 95%CI: .89-0.99, p=0.049). The probability of higher satisfactory 
results for quality at entry gets lower as the score of PPP preparation increases by 1 point. 
This means that the hypothesis (H III) that PPP governance had a positive influence on PPP 
outcome for lower-middle income countries was not supported. 
Upper-Middle Income Countries 
The influence of country governance on PPP outcome for upper-middle income 
countries was tested. Political stability had a significant positive effect on achieved objectives 
(OR: 25.3251, 95% CI: 4.64-138.08, p=0.000), quality of supervision (OR: 6.94, 95% CI: 
1.78-27.04, p=0.005), Bank overall performance (OR: 15.92, 95% CI: 3.21-78.98, p=0.001), 
performance of the implementing agency (OR: 5.51, 95% CI: 1.46-20.71, p= 0.012), 
government performance (OR: 4.65, 95% CI: 1.23-17.58, p=0.023), quality at entry (OR: 
20.74, 95% CI: 3.50-122.79, p=0.001), and the borrower government overall performance 
(OR: 7.98, 95% CI: 2.00-31.78, p=0.003). This means that for a 1-point increase in the score 
of political stability, the outcome for each of achieved objectives, the quality of supervision, 
the Bank overall performance, the performance of the implementing agency, and quality at 
entry is more likely to be satisfactory. It was also found that for the upper-middle income 
countries, a 1-point increase in the score of regulatory quality is more likely to lead to more 
satisfactory achieved objectives (OR: 658.15, 95% CI: 16.12-26871.1, p=0.001),  
performance of the implementing agency (OR18.29, 95% CI: 1.12-296.66, p=0.041), 
government performance (OR: 44.17, 95% CI: 2.08-936.30, p=0.015), and the overall 
performance of the borrowing country (OR: 16.99, 95% CI: 0.96-298.96, p=0.053). Control 
of corruption (OR: 20.60, 95% CI: 1.10-384.94, p=0.043) had a significant positive effect on 
achieved objectives. This means that for a 1-point increase in the score of control of 
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corruption, the probability of better satisfactory achieved objectives gets higher. Voice and 
accountability (OR: 5.857865, 95% CI: 1.11-30.84, p=0.037) had a significant positive effect 
on the Bank overall performance. 
Overall, the hypothesis (H I) that country governance had a positive influence on PPP 
outcome for upper-middle income countries was supported by political stability, control of 
corruption, and regulatory quality via their strong and extensive significant effect on the 
variables of PPP outcome. The practical significance is that upper-middle income countries 
should focus on improving political stability, control of corruption, and regulatory quality.  
Some significant effects were negative. Government effectiveness (OR: 0.01, 95% CI: 
0.00-0.36, p=0.010) and rule of law (OR: 0.00, 95% CI: 2.90e-06- 0.13, p=0.007) had a 
significant negative effect on achieved objectives. In other words, the probability of better 
achieved objectives gets lower for a 1-point increase in the score of government effectiveness 
and rule of law. As the score in the rule of law increases by 1 point,  the probability of 
satisfactory results for the quality at entry (OR: 0.0067783, 95% CI: 0.00-1.02, p=0.051), 
Bank overall performance (OR: 0.00, 95% CI: 0.00-0.61, p=0.031), performance of the 
implementing agency ( OR: 0.00, 95% CI: 0.00-0.24, p=0.012), government performance 
(OR: 0.01, 95% CI: 0.00-0.82, p=0.039) and the borrowing government overall performance 
(OR: 0.00, 95% CI: 0.00- 0.29, p=0.014) gets lower. The control variable, democracy (OR: 
0.92, 95% CI: 0.86-0.97, p=0.008) had a significant effect on the government performance. 
Thus, government effectiveness and rule of law did not support hypothesis I (H I). Upper-
middle income countries should exercise caution in their approach to government 
effectiveness and rule of law.     
When the test was run for the effect of country governance on PPP governance 
(Hypothesis II), it is found that upper-middle income countries which increase their score of 
regulatory quality (OR=29.0716, 95%CI: -0.69-58.83, p=0.055) by 1 point also increase their 
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score of PPP preparation by about 29.07%. When they increase their score in the rule of law 
(OR=-57.28, 95%CI: (-104.12)- (-10.43), p=0.018) by 1 point, their score in PPP preparation 
is significantly reduced by 57.28%, controlling for the effect of all other variables. Thus, the 
hypothesis (H II) that country governance had a positive influence on PPP outcome was 
supported by regulatory quality via its effect on PPP preparation.  
The test of the influence of PPP governance on PPP outcome (Hypothesis III) for 
upper-middle income countries showed that PPP procurement (OR=1.06, 95%CI: 1.00-1.12, 
p=0.040) had a significant positive effect on achieved objectives. This means that the 
increase in the probability of higher satisfactory outcomes from the increase in the score of 
PPP procurement is only 6%. Upper-middle income countries that increase their PPP 
procurement (OR: 1.08, 95%CI: 1.01-1.14, p=0.013) score by 1-point are expected to 
increase the probability of greater performance of the implementing agency by only 7%. 
When those countries increase their contract management (OR= 0.92, 95%CI: 0.86-0.99, 
p=0.03 score by 1-point, they are expected to have lower performance of their implementing 
agencies. Overall, the hypothesis (H III) that PPP governance had a positive influence on PPP 
outcome for upper-middle income countries was supported by PPP procurement via its 
effects on achieved objectives and implementing agency performance. This means that in 
practice, upper-middle income countries with high scores in PPP procurement achieved 
greater PPP outcomes.  
Low, Lower-Middle and Upper-Middle Income Countries 
For the influence of country governance on PPP outcome (H I), political stability had 
a significant positive effect on achieved objectives  (OR=2.69, 95% CI: 1.40-5.15, p=0.003), 
quality at entry (OR=3.49, 95% CI: 1.76-6.90, p=0.000), quality of supervision (OR=2.19, 
95% CI: 1.16-4.13, p=0.015), Bank overall performance (OR =2.96, 95% CI: 1.54-5.68, 
p=0.001), the performance of the implementing agency (OR=2.90, 95% CI: 1.50-5.59, 
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p=0.001), and the overall performance of the borrowing country (OR: OR=3.01, 95% CI: 
1.56-5.78, p=0.001). This means that for all these variables, an increase by 1 point in the 
score of political stability leads to higher satisfactory scores. When the score in the voice and 
accountability (OR: 0.37, 95% CI: 0.14-0.98, p=0.046) increases by 1 point, the probability 
of higher satisfactory outcomes gets lower. Overall, the hypothesis (H I) that country 
governance had a positive influence on PPP outcome is supported by political stability via its 
effects on quality at entry, quality of supervision, Bank overall performance, implementing 
agency performance, and borrowing country overall performance. In other words, political 
stability is important for greater performance in PPP projects.  
No significant effect was found when the test of the influence of country governance 
on PPP governance was run. This means that hypothesis II that country governance had a 
positive influence on PPP governance was not supported.  
For the influence of PPP governance on PPP outcome, it was found that the contract 
management (OR= 0.96, 95%CI: 0.93-0.99, p=0.023) had a significant negative effect on 
achieved objectives. The probability of greater satisfactory outcomes is lowered only by 4% 
for any 1-point increase in the score of PPP contract management. This means that hypothesis 
III was not supported.  
Sub-Saharan African Countries 
The hypothesis (H I) that country governance had a positive influence on PPP 
outcome for Sub-Saharan African countries was supported. In effect, political stability had a 
significant positive effect on the Bank overall performance (OR=3.34, 95% CI: 0.99-11.25, 
p=0.051), borrowing country overall performance (OR: 8.74, 95% CI: 1.71-44.64, p=0.009), 
and the performance of the implementing agency (Robust) (OR: 3.27, 95% CI: 1.06-10.02, 
p= 0.038]. This means there is a higher probability of an increase in the scores of the Bank 
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overall performance, borrowing country overall performance, and the performance of the 
implementing agency for a 1-point increase in the score of political stability. 
The test of the influence of country governance on PPP governance for Sub-Saharan 
African countries showed that when these countries increase their score in voice and 
accountability (OR= 10.85629, 95%CI: 2.79-18.91, p=0.010), their score in PPP procurement 
increases by almost 11%. When their score in political stability increases by 1 point, their 
score in PPP procurement [OR=-9.76, 95%CI: (-17.38) – (-2.14), p=0.014] lowers by almost 
10%. The hypothesis (H III) that country governance had a positive influence on PPP 
governance for Sub-Saharan African countries was supported by voice and accountability via 
its effect on PPP procurement.  For sub-Saharan African countries, no significance was found 
for the test of the influence of PPP governance on PPP outcome. In other words, hypothesis 
III was not supported.  
In short, the analysis provided the significant results on the relationships between 
country governance and PPP outcome, country governance and PPP governance, and PPP 
governance and PPP outcome as well as the mediating role of PPP governance in the 
relationship between country governance and PPP outcome. The analysis focused on the 
results for the sample of 100 countries and then broke down the countries by income level. 
The analysis of the results by income level were explained earlier. The significant results are 
discussed in Chapter V. 
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CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this study was to examine the relationships between country governance, PPP 
governance, and PPP outcome and determine whether PPP governance mediated the relationship 
between country governance and PPP outcome. To that regard, five research questions were 
posed and answered through the analysis of the results. This section discusses and concludes on 
the important findings.   
Concluding Points: Country Governance and PPP outcome  
To the first question on whether there was a relationship between country governance on PPP 
outcome, the study found that the hypothesis that country governance had a positive influence on 
PPP outcome was supported. The significant (positive and negative) results appear on Figure 6.  
The study found that countries that had political stability and were free of terrorism and ethnic 
divisions achieved the objectives of their PPP projects. Political stability was defined as the 
likelihood that the government will be destabilized by unconstitutional or politically motivated 
violence and terrorism (Kaufmann et al., 2010; WGI, 2018). Where there are political stability 
and no terrorism or ethnic division, the recipient countries are more likely to improve the 
performance of the implementing agencies as well as the overall performance of the recipient 
country in the PPP projects. Under the same circumstances, the World Bank performs better with 
regards to quality at entry, which entails identifying, facilitating the preparation of, and 
appraising the operation. The World Bank also performs more effectively with regards to its 
proactive supervisory role and addressing threats. Under politically stable conditions, the Bank 
claims higher overall performance. These findings are supported by scholars who found that the 
lack of political stability (Chou et al., 2012) or political instability (Eberhard and Gratwick, 
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2013), internal conflict (Lee et al., 2018), and political uncertainty (Osei-Kyei and Chan, 2017) 
had a negative effect on PPP investments. From a broader perspective, scholars also found that 
ethnic fragmentation (Karnane and Quinn, 2019), ethnic divisions and tensions (Houdhary and 
Reksulak, 2019), the lack of social cohesion (Easterly and Levine, 1997), and opportunistic 
politics (Easterly, Ritzen, and Woolcock, 2006) led to the degradation of the economic fabric of 
countries. When decisions on PPPs are made under these conditions, the impact is more likely to 
be negative on the performance of both the recipient countries and the World Bank. 
The study also found that the quality of regulations had a positive influence on the 
objectives of PPPs. The quality of regulations is defined as the ability of the government to 
formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development (Kaufmann et al., 2010; WGI 2018). Previous findings showed that PPP investment 
in infrastructure was highly sensitive to the quality of regulations (Moszoro et al., 2014; Moszoro 
et al., 2015) and that regulatory quality had a positive impact in attracting private investors 
(Pérez-D’Oleo et al., 2015; Baker, 2016) and the private bidders and the market competitiveness 
of the ports (Panayides et al., 2015). Wang et al. (2019) showed that regulatory quality in 
developing countries reduced the negative relationship between risk allocation and private 
investment. Even though these findings showed a positive direction of expected relationships, 
they differ from the finding in this research because this study went further to show that the 
specific impact of regulatory quality is on the objectives of PPPs.  
The surprising finding is the negative influence of voice and accountability on the 
performance of the implementing agency of recipient countries. “Voice and accountability” was 
defined as the participation of a country’s citizens in selecting their government as well as 
freedom of expression, freedom of association, and free media (Kaufmann et al., 2010, WGI, 
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2018). Pérez-D’Oleo et al. (2015) and Wang et al. (2019) found that countries that focused on 
voice and accountability could attract more investments and reduce risk. Their finding was not 
supported in this study. On the contrary, the study showed that greater accountability could have 
a negative influence on the performance of the implementing agencies. The reasons may be that 
accountability is sometimes a political process and the political influence on PPPs may be based 
on political interests that manipulate the decisions of the agencies.  
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findings. Figure 6 shows that for the influence of country governance on PPP outcome, seven 
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discussed earlier. Rule of law, control of corruption, and government performance have no lines 
because there were no significant results from or to those variables.
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Concluding Points: Country Governance and PPP Governance 
To the second research question whether there was any relationship between country 
governance and PPP governance, the study found no support for the hypothesis when a global 
score is assigned at the stage level of PPPs; that is, rating each of the preparation, 
procurement, and management out of 100. The lack of support may be related to the fact the 
details or the practices at each level are more important than the scores at the stage level. In 
effect, the study found support for the hypothesis that country governance had a positive 
influence on the practices of PPP preparation. The significant (positive and negative) results 
appear on Figure 7. The study found that government effectiveness had a strong positive 
influence on the prioritization of PPP. Government effectiveness was defined as the quality of 
public services or civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, 
the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s 
commitment to policies (Kaufmann et al, 2010). This finding is relevant in that an effective 
government is more likely to prioritize the PPPs to make them consistent with the investment 
priorities. Previous findings showed that higher government effectiveness in developing 
countries (Lee et al., 2018), bureaucratic efficiency and independence (Sabry, 2015; and 
Bota-Avram, 2014), and government positive attitude towards private sector investments 
(Osei-Kyei and Chan, 2017) led to higher level of investments.  
The study found that voice and accountability and political stability had a negative 
effect on the assessment of the RFPs and the environmental impact assessment, respectively. 
Perhaps the assessment of the RFPs and the environment impact are more effectively 
conducted when there is no political or media involvement in the decision making. In effect, 
in some countries, there are independent specialized units and agencies that are responsible 
for conducting such assessments. Political stability had a negative effect on PPP 
prioritization. That may mean that countries that are politically stable and safe have no 
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urgency in seeking consistency between prioritization of PPPs and the investments priorities 
as such measures may already exist.  
To the hypothesis that country governance had a positive influence on the practices of 
PPP procurement, the study found support. The study found that countries with greater 
freedom of expression and accountability are more likely to meet the 60-day minimum period 
to bidders to submit bids. This finding is meaningful since media may report on the delays in 
the contracts while bidders usually have the right to appeal. This makes the procurement 
authorities more likely to act diligently. Countries with greater government effectiveness tend 
to meet the minimum period of submission and tend to publish the public procurement notice 
of the PPPs. Countries that respect and enforce the rule of law tend to issue the public 
procurement notice as well. No previous studies have focused on the specific practices of 
PPP procurement. Therefore, it is impossible to discuss these results in light of the extant 
literature. Furthermore, the purpose of the study was to investigate these new practices.  
Unlike accountability and government effectiveness, countries with greater political 
stability and regulatory quality tend to neither meet the 60-day minimum period to submit nor 
publish the public procurement notice. Countries with greater political stability and voice and 
accountability fail to provide details of the PPP stages in bid documents and effectively treat 
sole proposals. Those with greater political stability tend to not publish the award notice.  
To the question on whether country governance had a positive influence on the 
practices of PPP contract management, the study found support. Political stability and rule of 
law had a positive influence on the permission of foreign companies to repatriate income 
whereas voice and accountability and control of corruption had the opposite influence. 
Previous studies supported that countries with greater political stability (Osei-Kyei and 
Chan., 2017; Chou et al., 2012) and the rule of law (Moszoro et al., 2014; Lee et al., 2018) 
attract investors and more investments. The finding is logical as the rule of law provides 
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some guarantee that government will act with justice, fairness, honesty, and openness for the 
benefit of all citizens (Salevao, 2005). However, it is also understandable that greater voice 
and accountability and control of corruption do not work in favor of foreign companies when 
they repatriate income. In fact, media reporting on the benefits made from projects may 
discredit the reputation of foreign companies and tag them as greedy. As for corruption, it has 
been often cited as the reason for capital flight from poor countries to developed countries. 
An effective control of corruption may therefore limit foreign companies’ capacity to 
repatriate income, especially through illegal means. Foreign companies often see such control 
as exaggerated and arbitrary. Another important finding is that countries with greater voice 
and accountability, government effectiveness, and rule of law tend to have the best dispute 
resolution mechanisms whereas those with greater political stability and regulatory quality 
tend to have the opposite influence. Solutions are easily found where people are accountable 
and express their positions freely; when the government has effective means in place; and 
when the rule of law is enforced. On the other hand, political stability and the regulatory 
quality may obstruct the process of dispute resolution because of cumbersome strict 
regulations. It was found that regulatory quality had a negative influence on monitoring and 
evaluation, which may again be explained by the fact that cumbersome regulations limit the 
possibilities of further evaluation of projects. The regulations themselves may not be well-
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Figure 7 is a summary of the positive and negative results for the influence of country 
governance on PPP governance. The solid lines show the positive findings whereas the dotted 
lines represent the negative findings. Figure 7 shows that for the influence of country 
governance on PPP governance, nine relationships were positive whereas 18 relationships 
were negative.  
Concluding Points: PPP Governance and PPP Outcome 
To the third research question that PPP governance had a positive influence on PPP 
outcome, the study found no support for the hypothesis when a global score is assigned at the 
stage level of PPP; that is, rating each of the preparation, procurement, and management out 
of 100. This means that it may not be reasonable to rate PPP at the stage level. Again, the 
lack of support may be related to the fact that the details or the practices at each level are 
more important than the scores at the stage level. Thus, the study found support for the 
hypothesis that the practices of PPP preparation had a positive influence on PPP outcome. 
The significant (positive and negative) results appear on Figure 8. The study found that 
countries with standardized PPP model contracts had higher satisfaction in terms of achieved 
objectives, quality at entry, and Bank overall performance. This confirms previous findings 
that standardized contract models are important for orientation to better and more efficient 
agreements (Kotze et al., 1999; The World Bank, 2018a). In particular, standardized models 
are important for achieving the objectives and for the World Bank to assume its roles of 
assisting in the preparation and supervision. It was found that fiscal affordability assessment 
contributes to greater achieved objectives, which was confirmed by the World Bank (2018a). 
When countries assess their requests for proposals, the World Bank is more likely to provide 
quality supervision; and when countries conduct environment impact assessment, they are 
more likely to increase their performance in terms of compliance. The surprising finding is 
that risk identification negatively influences the Bank’s assistance as well as the recipient 
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country government performance. Difficulties and complexities related to risk identification 
may slow down the progress of the World Bank and recipient countries. Perhaps seeking 
consistency between PPP prioritization and public investment prioritization becomes a 
burden for the Bank and the implementing agencies in recipient countries.  
The study found support for the hypothesis that the practices of PPP procurement had 
a positive influence on PPP outcome. Countries that had bid documents detailing the stages 
of the process, provided clarification questions, and allowed negotiations with the selected 
bidder before signing the contract had higher satisfactory achievement of objectives. This 
finding is supported by past studies which found that direct negotiation, presence of details of 
the procurement stages, prequalification criteria, and openness to clarification questions on 
RFPs were necessary for a successful PPP project (El-Sawalhi and Mansour, 2014; Liu et al., 
2015). Countries with details of the procurement stages and openness to clarifications 
improved their overall performance in projects (El-Sawalhi and Mansour, 2014; Liu et al., 
2015). Countries with details of the procurement stages could increase the performance of 
their implementing agencies. The World Bank could expect to increase its overall 
performance when foreign companies are allowed to participate in the bidding for PPP 
contracts. 
On the other hand, countries that hold a pre-bid conference could neither achieve their 
objectives nor improve the quality of supervision. The publication of award notice did not 
facilitate the supervisory role of the Bank either. These findings contradicted the previous 
literature that pre-bid conference and the publication of award notice were key to PPP success 
(El-Sawalhi and Mansour, 2014; Liu et al., 2015). It was not also clear why the publication of 
award notice would have a negative impact on the Bank overall performance as well as on the 
performance of the implementing agency. The qualifications of evaluation committee 
members reduced the Bank overall performance while issuing the public procurement notice 
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of the PPP led to less satisfactory achieved objectives, lower performance of the 
implementing agency, and of the borrowing country. This finding is contradictory to past 
studies that found qualifications of evaluation committee members to be a desired practice 
(Soomro and Zhang, 2015). 
The study found support for the hypothesis that the practices of contract management 
had a positive influence on PPP outcome. In effect, countries that guarantee the rights of 
lenders to intervene in the process, the dispute resolution mechanisms, and the permission for 
foreign companies to repatriate income had extensive influence on the performance of the 
Bank in terms of quality at entry and quality of supervision and on the recipient country in 
terms of the implementing agency performance and government compliance. This influence 
is understandable in that the World Bank needs those guarantees to prepare and sustain 
partnerships. One surprising finding is the negative influence on government performance 
when there is a system in place to manage the implementation of PPP projects. This negative 
influence may occur when the system is too strict or not related to the recipient country’s 
conditions or the recipient countries is unprepared to work effectively from the system 
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Figure 8 is a summary of the positive and negative results for the influence of PPP 
governance on PPP outcome. The solid lines show the positive findings whereas the dotted 
lines represent the negative findings. Figure 8 show that for the influence of PPP governance 
on PPP governance, 12 relationships were positive whereas 18 relationships were negative.  
Concluding Points: The Mediating Role of PPP Governance 
To the question whether PPP governance mediated the relationship between country 
governance and PPP outcome, the study found that the hypothesis was supported. The 
findings are new as no previous studies examined the mediating role of PPP governance. The 
significant results appear on Figure 9. The study found that countries with the bid documents 
that describe the PPP stages and are open to clarifications of questions mediated the 
relationship between each of the variables voice and accountability, political stability, 
regulatory quality, government effectiveness and the PPP outcome variable, achieved 
objectives. In other words, the influence of voice and accountability, political stability, 
regulatory quality, and government effectiveness on achieved objectives is indirect through 
having the bid documents. This also mean that countries with greater voice and 
accountability, political stability, regulatory quality, government effectiveness may still need 
to have bid documents if they want to achieve their objectives. It is understandable that the 
bid documents are important since they describe the stages of the PPP process for potential 
bidders. The presence of bid documents detailing the PPP stages was also found to mediate 
the relationship between political stability and the implementing agency performance. In fact, 
the bid documents are an important for the implementing agencies that need guidance and 
important details to do their work. The documents lay out the expectations and the 
requirements for the bidders. The study also found that the relationship between political 
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stability and the borrower overall performance is mediated by the bid documents detailing the 
PPP stages and openness to clarifications of questions. 
Also important is the finding that negotiation with selected bidders and the fiscal analysis 
assessment mediate the relationship between voice and accountability, political stability, 
regulatory quality, and achieved objectives. To achieve their objectives, countries will not 
only need to have greater voice and accountability, political stability, and regulatory quality, 
but more importantly ensure that they negotiate with the selected bidders on important terms 
as well as conduct fiscal assessment with regards to the term of the contracts. Standardized 
PPP model contracts and the dispute resolution mechanisms mediate the relationship between 
political stability and quality at entry. For the World Bank to perform well in quality at entry, 
countries will not only need greater political stability, but also ensure that they have 
standardized PPP model contracts and dispute resolution mechanisms in place and enforce 
them. While greater political stability may lead to high performance in quality at entry, the 
performance is higher when standardized PPP model contracts and dispute resolution 
mechanisms are enforced. Standardized PPP model contracts and foreign company 
participation in the bidding process mediate the relationship between political stability and 
Bank performance. When countries take measures to allow the participation of foreign 
companies in the PPP bidding process, this increases the overall performance of the Bank. 
The foreign company income repatriation mediates the relationship between political stability 
and government performance. This means that recipient countries in addition to political 
stability need to allow foreign companies to repatriate income generated from their operations 
in the recipient countries.  
The study also found that the inclusion of assessments in the RFPs and bid documents 
and lender step-in rights mediate the relationship between political stability and quality of 
supervision. In addition to a stable political situation, there is greater performance in the 
   154 
 
supervisory role when countries include their different assessments in the RFPs and allow the 
lenders to intervene in the process when necessary. That is because the documents provide 
important information to lenders, which more likely leads to effective decision-making. 
Allowing the lenders to intervene may also reduce the risks and threats as lenders contribute 
technical and financial assistance.  
Overall, the study found that three practices of the PPP preparation are mediators of the 
relationships between some variables of country governance and some PPP outcome 
variables. The practices are the inclusion of assessments in the RFPs, the fiscal analysis 
assessment, and the standardized PPP model contracts. For PPP procurement, the study found 
that four practices including bid documents detailing the PPP stages, openness to 
clarifications of questions, foreign companies’ participation in PPP bidding, and negotiations 
with the selected bidder were mediators of the relationships between country governance and 
PPP outcome. Three practices of the PPP contract management including the lender step-in 
rights, the foreign company income repatriation, and the dispute resolution mechanisms were 
mediators of the relationships between country governance and PPP outcome. The significant 
mediation relationships are summarized on Figure 9. Rule of law and control of corruption 
have no lines because there were no significant results.
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  Mediation of the relationship between the country governance indicators in blue and chieved objectives via the indicators  
  negotiations with the selected bidder fiscal affordability assessment, bid documents detailing the stages of the PPP process, and 
  clarification questions for procurement notice. 
  Mediation of the relationship between political stability and quality of supervision via the indicators assessments included in the 
  RFP and lender’s step-in rights. 
  Mediation of the relationship between political stability and quality at entry via the indicators standardized PPP models and dispute 
  resolution mechanisms.  
  Mediation of the relationship between political stability and overall bank performance via the indicators standardized PPP models 
  and foreign company permission.  
  Mediation of the relationship between political stability and implementing agency performance via tender documents detailing the 
  stages of the PPP process. 
       Mediation of the relationship between political stability and overall borrower performance via bid documents detailing the stages 
  of the PPP process, and clarification questions for procurement notice. 
   Mediation of the relationship between government effectiveness and government performance via foreign companies’ permission 
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To conclude, the answers to the five research questions led to a new framework for 
examining the relationships between good governance, PPP governance, and PPP outcome. 
The framework is shown on Figure 10. The arrows represent the individual relationships 
between the three concepts. The top longer arrow represents the finding that there is a 
relationship between good governance and PPP outcome. The short, left arrow represents the 
finding that there is a relationship between good governance and PPP governance. The short, 
right arrow represents the finding that there is a relationship between PPP governance and 
PPP outcome. The bottom arrow represents the finding that PPP governance mediates the 
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Figure 10: Framework for Understanding Public-Private Partnerships
Country Governance  
• Voice and accountability 
• Political stability 
• Government effectiveness 
• Regulatory quality 
• Rule of law 
• Control of corruption 
Mediator 
PPP Governance 
• Project preparation 
• Project procurement 
• Project management  
 
 
PPP Outcome  
• Achieved Objectives 
• Bank performance 
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Concluding Points: Income Level Discussion 
Low Income Countries 
Low income countries are countries which gross national income per capita is $1,025 
or less. To the hypothesis whether country governance had a positive influence on PPP 
outcome for low income countries, the study found that the hypothesis was supported. When 
these countries enjoy greater political stability, their implementing agencies are more likely 
to yield satisfactory performance. This finding is supported by Eberhard and Gratwick (2013) 
and Lee et al (2018) who found that political uncertainty and internal conflicts in developing 
countries had a negative impact while Chou et al. (2012) and Osei-Kyei and Chan (2017) 
found that political stability and the lack of terrorism had a positive impact on PPP outcome. 
Today, political stability and lack of terrorism are the major determinants of PPP success. 
The World Bank and its donors or investors believe that technical and financial assistance 
will be useful only to those countries that can control distracting social, political, and 
economic conditions. However, this approach may need deeper examination, and if 
necessary, some individual country level analysis. In other words, investing strategically may 
help these countries overcome their challenges whereas not investing could mean that these 
countries can keep sinking deeper into chaos. Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff (2011) for 
example argued that pre-existing institutional and governance shortcomings in developing 
countries impaired the ability of the partnership to produce desired outcomes. The study 
found that the regulatory quality did not lead to any satisfactory supervision of the World 
Bank for low-income country partnerships. In fact, when the quality of the regulations is 
enhanced, little supervision from the World Bank may be needed or the supervision level is 
reduced. 
The practices of PPP governance were not tested because of the small sample size. 
For the influence of country governance on PPP governance, the study found that greater 
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government effectiveness reduced the performance in contract management. This is contrary 
to past studies that found that good bureaucratic efficiency and independence increased PPP 
performance (Sabry, 2015; Bota-Avram, 2014).  
As far as the influence of the PPP governance on PPP outcome is concerned, the study 
found that countries with effective PPP preparation yielded an overall satisfactory 
performance. This is understandable as these countries are more likely to avoid risks and 
threats at later stages of the process because the preparation stage of PPPs includes risk, 
fiscal, economic, financial, environmental, and market assessments (Siemonsma et al., 2012; 
El-Sawalhi and Mansour, 2014; Jacob et al., 2014; Kashi, 2015; Soomro and Zhang, 2015; 
Opawole and Jagboro, 2017; The World Bank, 2018a; Lee et al, 2018; Osei-Kyei and Chan, 
2019). On the other hand, greater PPP contract management had a negative influence on 
achieved objectives, quality at entry, Bank overall performance, government performance, 
and the borrowing country overall performance. This means that assigning a global score to 
the contract management did not provide any useful information on how to improve the 
outcome of PPP projects including the objectives as well as the Bank’s and the recipient 
countries’ performance. However, the influence was close to being positive. Perhaps a closer 
examination of the composition of the rating will lead to a positive influence; thus, 
insinuating that more details on contract management rating would improve the PPP outcome 
for low income countries. Examining the effects of the practices of PPP contract management 
would have provided more detailed information. However, the practices were not tested 
because of the small sample size. The study made similar remarks for the influence of the 
PPP procurement on the Bank overall performance and the implementing agency 
performance.  
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Lower-Middle Income Countries 
Lower-middle income countries are countries which gross national income per capita 
ranges from $1,026 to $4,035. To the hypothesis that country governance had a positive 
influence on PPP outcome for the lower-middle income countries, the study found no 
significant results. This finding is contrary to past studies which found that good governance 
led to better PPP outcomes.    
To the hypothesis that country governance had a positive influence on PPP 
governance for lower-middle income countries, the study found that government 
effectiveness and control of corruption had a large positive influence on PPP preparation. If 
the governments of these countries are effective in their policies and their control of 
corruption, especially those towards PPPs, the preparation stage is more likely to be 
significantly improved. Government effectiveness may improve the preparation of PPPs as 
the government will have taken steps and measures for improving the preparation of PPPs. 
The same is true for control of corruption as this means that the government will have taken 
some measures to reduce or discourage corruption in PPPs. The study found that political 
stability had a negative influence on PPP procurement. The procurement stage is more 
concerned with transparency and fairness in the process. The requirement for transparency 
and fairness are dealt within the agencies and PPP units. Therefore, the decisions may have 
less to do with whether a country is politically stable. In other words, seeking political 
stability is a far-fetched condition that may compromise the pursuit of transparency and 
fairness.  
To the hypothesis that PPP governance had a positive influence on PPP outcome for 
lower-middle income countries, the study found that PPP preparation had negative influence 
on quality at entry. Countries that are already equipped to prepare their PPPs may not need 
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further assistance from the Bank. In other words, additional and overlapped requirements 
would produce the opposite effect.  
Upper-Middle Income Countries 
Upper-middle income countries are countries which gross national income per capita 
ranges from $4,036 to $12,475. This level includes Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, 
Azerbaijan, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Belarus, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Gabon, Georgia, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, 
Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Macedonia, FYR Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Montenegro, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia, Thailand, and Turkey (see Table 11).  
To the hypothesis that country governance had a positive influence on PPP outcome 
for upper-middle income countries, the study found that greater political stability was largely 
indicative of the outcome of PPPs. The study found that countries with greater political 
stability had a positive influence on all seven PPP outcome variables including achieved 
objectives, quality of supervision, Bank overall performance, performance of the 
implementing agency, government performance, quality at entry, and the borrower 
government overall performance. Chou et al. (2012) had found that political stability was 
important for attracting the private partners for infrastructure projects. Their findings fell 
short of discussing outcomes as is done in this study. The study also found that the regulatory 
quality had an extensive positive influence on achieved objectives, performance of the 
implementing agency, government performance, and the overall performance of the 
borrowing country. This finding stood out because it shows that upper-middle income level 
countries that have effective regulations not only achieve their objectives, but also improve 
the performance of their agencies. Sabry (2015) argued that regulatory quality was indicative 
of good performance. This study similarly found that control of corruption had a significant 
positive influence on achieved objectives, which means that the ability to control corruption 
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leads to more satisfactory results in terms of objectives (Galilea and Medda, 2009). Asongu 
(2013) argued that countries engaged in the fight against corruption through institutional 
reforms had positive results. 
Finally, the study found that voice and accountability had a significant positive 
influence on the Bank overall performance. This means that freedom of expression is more 
likely to provide useful information to the World Bank in its decision-making, and thus 
improving its performance. The study found that for upper-middle income countries, 
government effectiveness and rule of law reduced the likelihood of achieving the objectives. 
In effect, if those countries per their level of development already have strong institutions and 
measures with regards to their policies, seeking to reform those institutions may create 
confusion for the agencies, and therefore create the opposite effect. The study found that the 
rule of law had a negative influence on the performance both of the recipient countries and 
the Bank performance especially with regards to the quality at entry, Bank overall 
performance, performance of the implementing agency, government performance and the 
borrowing government overall performance. Upper-middle income countries already have 
strong legal systems. Seeking to reform these systems may create some overlap and 
confusion for implementing agencies. Therefore, the recipient countries and the World Bank 
need to carefully examine the intuitional conditions of upper-middle countries when 
recommending or requiring certain conditions to be met. In short, the finding implies that 
upper-middle countries already operate under acceptable conditions in the decision-making 
process.  
To the hypothesis that country governance had a positive influence on PPP 
governance, the study found that for upper-middle income countries, regulatory quality had a 
positive influence on PPP preparation by about 29.07%. That may be because the regulations 
provide some guidelines for risk identification, economic assessment, and environmental 
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impact assessment; and the government enforces those guidelines. Unlike regulatory quality, 
higher scores in the rule of law reduce the score in PPP preparation.  
To the hypothesis that PPP governance had a positive influence on PPP outcome for 
upper-middle income countries, the study found that PPP procurement had a positive 
influence on achieved objectives. Fairness, transparency, and competition in the PPP process 
increase the likelihood of satisfactory results as the bidder emerged from the process and is 
awarded the contract. The study also found that upper-middle income countries were more 
likely to increase their implementing agency performance when there were fairness, 
transparency, and competition. However, when those countries increase their contract 
management, they could not expect any change in the performance of their implementing 
agencies.  
Low, Lower-Middle, and Upper-Middle Income Countries 
The study then combined the three previous levels and left out the high income 
countries. To the hypothesis that country governance will have a positive influence on PPP 
outcome for all levels except high level income countries, the study found that political 
stability had a positive influence on achieved objectives, quality at entry, quality of 
supervision, Bank overall performance, the performance of the implementing agency, and the 
overall performance of the borrowing country. This finding was also supported for lower-
middle income countries and upper-middle income countries when they were analyzed 
individually. The negative influence of voice and accountability on achieved objectives is 
also confirmed for the three levels of income combined. The study found no significant 
results that country governance will have a positive influence on PPP governance. To the 
hypothesis that PPP governance will have positive influence on PPP outcome, it found that 
contract management had a significant negative influence on achieved objectives. In short, 
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the combination of the three levels does not provide detailed findings of the relationships 
between country governance, PPP governance, and PPP outcomes. 
Sub-Saharan African Countries 
The study particularly examined a total of 32 sub-Saharan African countries and 
found that the hypothesis that country governance had a positive influence on PPP outcome 
for Sub-Saharan African countries was supported. Ensuring political stability was important 
for Sub-Saharan African countries to improve their overall and implementing agency 
performance as well as the Bank overall performance. “Voice and accountability” was also 
important for them to increase their global scores in PPP procurement. Seeking greater 
political stability for improving PPP procurement was more likely to produce the opposite 
effect. The hypothesis that PPP governance had a positive influence on PPP outcome yielded 
no results. 
Beyond the Study: Implications for Coronavirus 2019-Covid-19 
 With the Covid-19 increasingly affecting the economies of countries, PPPs are 
experiencing delays in construction schedules and funding sources and disruptions of the 
operations of PPPs underway. The transportation PPPs are struggling to generate revenues 
(Baxter, 2020). As a result, the World Bank held sessions with governments to discuss 
solutions to distressed PPPs by emphasizing attention to best practices, good governance, 
transparency, and fiscal sustainability (Fakhoury, 2020). Countries needs to enhance their 
performance in the best practices of PPPs as well as in the good governance factors discussed 
in this study. In these unprecedented times, some practices of PPP governance such as 
negotiations and lender step-in rights will have to be used to cope with the financial losses 
resulting from the Covid-19. As Fakhoury (2020) explained, the World Bank is aware of the 
disruptions created by the pandemic and is playing its role of financial advice, technical 
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assistance, and expertise. Koala (2020) suggested that governments and the private partners 
engage in public-private stewardship to tackle the consequences of Covid-19.  
 The Covid-19 has also forced many employees to work from home. In other words, 
telecommuting though existing before the covid-19 now appears as the most copying strategy 
to the Covid-19. As such, it casts doubt on the future of physical transportation infrastructure 
facilities for connecting work and home. If the health of people continues to be threatened by 
the pandemic which is contracted by human contact, more industries and individuals will find 
it more beneficial and reliable to adopt telecommuting for the tasks that employees could 
perform from home. In countries with high internet speed, telecommuting can be the best 
alternative, especially in the short term. However, in developing countries where the formal 
economic market is smaller than the informal market, and where most industries and 
individuals could not access high speed internet, telecommuting may not be an effective 
solution. Those countries will face the dual task of concomitantly developing their 
transportation infrastructure and promoting access to high speed internet connection.  
Recommendations 
Political stability and the lack of terrorism and ethnic divisions appeared as the indicator 
that is the most conducive to better performance both when countries are considered globally 
and when they are considered by income level or geographically. Unstable political 
conditions with frequent attacks and arbitrary use of power on operations disturbed the fair, 
just, and transparent process as well as the implementation of the projects. Political instability 
leads to unexpected changes of courses of actions, personnel, contractors as well as poor and 
negligent execution of projects.  
The internationally recognized practices must be considered by the World Bank and 
recipient countries in two perspectives. First, they must be considered by how they are 
   167 
 
influenced by good governance indicators, and second by how they influence PPP outcomes. 
The practices should not be prescribed and isolated. The study recommends studying their 
relationship with good governance and PPP outcome in order to establish some coherence in 
the good governance-PPP governance-and PPP outcome chain. By doing so, recipient 
countries and the World Bank establish well-known and reliable paths towards effectiveness 
and efficiency in PPP projects. This study has explored, identified, and established those 
paths.  
The World Bank and recipient countries should understand that practices such as bid 
documents detailing the PPP stages and openness to clarification of questions mediate the 
relationship between voice and accountability and achieved objectives; between political 
stability and achieved objectives; between regulatory quality and achieved objectives; and 
between government effectiveness and achieved objectives. Bid documents detailing the PPP 
stages and openness to clarification of questions mediate the relationship between political 
stability and the borrower overall performance. The negotiation with selected bidders and the 
fiscal analysis assessment mediate the relationship between voice and accountability and 
achieved objectives; between political stability and achieved objectives; and between 
regulatory quality and achieved objectives. The permission of foreign company to repatriate 
income mediates the relationship between political stability and government performance. 
The standardized PPP model contracts and the dispute resolution mechanisms mediate the 
relationship between political stability and quality at entry. The standardized PPP model 
contracts and foreign company participation in the bidding process mediate the relationship 
between political stability and Bank performance. The inclusion of assessments in the RFPs, 
bid documents detailing the PPP stages, and lender step-in rights mediate the relationship 
between political stability and quality of supervision.  
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On the influence of good governance on the practices of PPP process, some practices 
need special consideration. Government effectiveness will increase the likelihood of practices 
such as the consistency between the PPP’s prioritization and public investment prioritization, 
the 60-day minimum period to submit bids, the publication of the public procurement notice 
of the PPPs, and the dispute resolution mechanisms. The rule of law will increase the 
likelihood that the publication of the public procurement notice will occur and that the 
dispute resolution mechanisms are enforced. Greater voice and accountability will increase 
the likelihood that the dispute resolution mechanisms are in place whereas the opposite is true 
for the assessment of the RFPs. Countries with greater political stability and rule of law 
enforce practices such as the permission of foreign companies to repatriate income whereas 
the opposite is true with voice and accountability and control of corruption. Political stability 
reduced the likelihood that there will be consistency between the PPP’s prioritization and 
public investment prioritization, the dispute resolution mechanisms, and the publication of 
award notice. Countries with greater political stability do not meet the 60-day minimum 
period to submit bids, do not publish the public procurement notice, and do not conduct the 
environmental impact assessment. Countries with greater regulatory quality do not enforce 
the dispute resolution mechanisms and do not complete monitoring and evaluation. 
Some consideration is also needed on the influence of PPP practices on PPP outcome. 
The standardized PPP model contracts, fiscal affordability assessment, bid documents 
detailing the stages of the process, clarification of questions, negotiations with the selected 
bidder before contract signing increase the likelihood of achieving the objectives whereas 
holding pre-bid conference and the publication of the public procurement notice of the PPP 
do not. The standardized PPP model contracts, consistency between PPP prioritization and 
public investment prioritization, participation of foreign companies in bidding increase the 
Bank overall performance whereas the publication of award notice and the qualifications of 
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evaluation committee members do not. The standardized PPP model contracts increase 
quality at entry whereas risk identification reduces it. Consistency between PPP 
prioritization, public investment prioritization, bid documents detailing the procurement 
stages, and openness to clarifications increase the likelihood of greater performance of the 
implementing agencies whereas the publication of the public procurement notice of the PPPs 
and of the award notice reduce its likelihood. Bid documents detailing the procurement stages 
and openness to clarifications increase the overall performance of recipient countries. The 
environment impact assessment increases the government performance whereas risk 
identification and the public procurement notice of the PPP do not. Assessment of the request 
for proposals increases the quality supervision whereas holding a pre-bid conference and the 
publication of award notice do not.  
 The study shows that using a global score at the stage level of PPPs is not indicative 
of the practices needed by countries to improve their performance. The World Bank and 
member countries must focus on the internationally recognized practices to make 
recommendations to recipient countries. The study also shows that depending on the income 
level (lower, lower-middle, upper-middle, and high), the governance conditions are different 
and so should the solutions proposed to improve their performance in PPPs be. Not all 
solutions are relevant for improving the performance at all the income levels. Not all good 
governance indicators contribute to better PPP outcomes for all countries. 
In terms of the influence of good governance on PPP outcomes, the study makes specific 
recommendations based on income level. For example, maintaining political stability is 
important for low income, upper-middle income, and sub-Saharan African groups whereas no 
significant results could be found for the lower-middle income group. For upper-middle 
income countries, regulatory quality, control of corruption, and voice and accountability are 
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important indicators of satisfactory outcome whereas government effectiveness and rule of 
law lead to negative results.  
Contribution 
To Practice 
The study presented important information that is relevant to the community of 
practitioners especially for the World Bank, its donors, and the recipient countries and their 
implementing agencies. The study explored four important relationships based on the major 
concepts of good governance, PPP governance and PPP outcomes and discussed the results. 
First, the influence of country governance on PPP outcome was explored. The results showed 
that focusing on good governance indicators such as political stability could contribute to 
higher satisfactory performance.  
Second, the influence of country governance on PPP governance was explored to 
understand whether countries with good governance scores could improve their preparation, 
procurement, and management score. The study found that when scores are assigned at the 
stage level of the PPP process, no results could be useful. On the other hand, countries with 
good governance scores could improve their internationally recognized practices or the 
practices of the preparation, procurement, and management stages.  
Third, the influence of PPP governance on PPP governance was explored to understand 
whether countries with high scores in the main stages and the recognized practices could 
improve their PPP outcomes. Assigning scores to the main stages is not useful to countries to 
understand areas that need improvement. On the other hand, the internationally recognized 
practices influence the outcome of PPP projects.  
Fourth, the study established that the internationally recognized practices for PPPs not 
only had an influence on PPP outcome, but also mediated the relationship between good 
governance indicators and PPP outcome indicators. The mediation means that instead of 
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countries focusing on good governance indicators alone to improve their performance, they 
could as well do so by improving the practices of the PPP process. In other words, it is less 
likely that countries will achieve their PPP objectives if they do not enforce these 
internationally recognized practices.  
Good governance was traditionally studied to understand its impact on the 
macroeconomic development and government programs and policies. There was less focus 
on the influence of good governance on arrangements such as PPPs. When good governance 
was studied in relation to PPPs, it consisted of examining the influence of good governance 
on the level of investments and attracting investors. This study conducted a deeper 
examination as it studied the relationship with the outcomes of PPP projects. The World 
Bank and the recipient countries must understand that the factors that attract investments may 
be different than those that improve outcomes. Furthermore, the focus on income level 
showed that the improvements needed by countries to improve their capacity and outcome 
depend on conditions that are specific to their income level. 
To Theory 
First, the study contributes to theory as it suggested the mediation role between good 
governance and PPP outcome. According to Ekundayo (2017), good governance mirrors an 
efficient public service, an independent judicial system and legal framework to enforce 
contracts, and responsible use of public funds. An implication of the need of good 
governance theory is that whenever good governance exists in a country, satisfactory results 
are expected. This study argued that PPP contracts led to better outcomes because established 
standards are enforced, which maximize the results of PPP projects. The influence of good 
governance on PPP outcome was too farfetched as the important role of internationally 
recognized practices had been omitted. 
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Second, the study contributes to theory because it fills the gap and corrects the 
mischaracterization of outcomes. Most studies examined the relationship between good 
governance and the level of investment or the attraction of investments and insinuated in their 
conclusions that the level of investment is an outcome. This study argued that the level of 
investment in PPPs could not be considered an outcome resulting from good governance. It is 
the performance of the recipient governments and their implementing agencies and the World 
Bank with regards to the PPP process that is more indicative of outcomes.  
Third, good governance had not been studied in relation to the internationally 
recognized practices. Previous studies did not examine the influence of good governance on 
the practices of PPPs. In other words, the idea that political stability, accountability, rule of 
law, etc. could lead to the enforcement or non-enforcement of those practices was not 
explored. This study focused extensively on the practices and the significant results were 
presented and discussed earlier.  
Fourth, the study conceived the internationally recognized practices under the concept 
of PPP governance; referring to how those practices are enforced and whether they are 
enforced by countries. In other words, the term “PPP governance” could barely be found in 
the literature. The successful enforcement of these practices entails governing units and 
committees in place. The governance starts from the preparation to the implementation and 
concerned monitoring of progress, changes, integration, and closing of PPP contracts.  
Limitations 
The sample of100 countries used constitute a smaller sample compared to number of 
parameters generated during the analyses. The small size of the sample made it impossible to 
enter all variables at once. That is why the practices of the three stages were run separately. 
When the analyses were run by income level, the subcategories which had from 10 to 12 
variables could not be analyzed. Therefore, even though the study was able to examine the 
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subcategories for 100 countries, it could not do the same when they were broken down into 
smaller sample from 23 to 35 countries. Another limitation is that for the PPP outcome data, 
certain projects for certain countries were not updated. Updated projects would allow not 
only the use of current scores but also the use of scores over time. The same issue was 
noticed with the internationally recognized practices because data are available for only 135 
countries in 2017. The previous years 2015 and 2016 were limited to ten countries and 82 
countries respectively, which would further limit the sample of the study if they were to be 
considered in the analysis. Despite the limitations, the study remains strong for exploring 
multiple and new relationships. 
Generalizability 
The study used a sample of 100 countries out of possible 200 or more countries or 
entities. The sample is a mix of low, middle, and high income countries. That sample is 
representative of the population of countries. The measurement validity including convergent 
validity and discriminant validity as well as content validity of the exogenous, endogenous, 
and control variables were discussed earlier in the dissertation. The measurement validity 
showed that there was validity and reliability in the data, hence the argument that external 
validity to a greater extent is achieved. However, it could not be stated that countries are 
equally represented in terms of their influence on the overall results, hence this study could 
not defend the achievement of internal validity. To account for that issue, the study 
approached countries based on their income level characterized by the size of the national 
gross income per capita, which more likely led to strong internal validity except that the use 
of the GNI to classify the country remained debatable. In the income-based analysis, the 
results of one level could not be generalized to another. 
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Future Studies and Publication 
 This study explores the multiple possible relationships between good governance, PPP 
governance, and PPP outcome. These relationships can be more deeply examined in future 
studies. The availability of updated data will make those studies relevant for understanding 
the factors that influence the outcomes of PPP projects. The role of PPP governance for 
achieving such outcomes should be particularly researched. The findings in this study can 
serve as a basis for conducting specific studies based on regions or groups of countries as all 
regions and countries are not covered in this study for lack of data. They can also pick and 
study the internationally recognized practices by focusing on one or on all three PPP stages. 
The main concern in previous studies was the problematic definition of PPP outcome. As 
scholars conduct more studies, they need to be specific about whether it is PPP output or 
outcome that is being studied. Finally, scholars should aim at fitting the framework provided 
with new findings either based on income, geographical, or other considerations.  
 Future studies can also use the conceptual framework examine PPPs at the miso/ 
micro level of governments. Local governments also enter PPP contracts for the construction 
of infrastructure. For these governments, good governance and good practices are necessary. 
Therefore, the framework can be applied to the PPP projects at the local level. The studies at 
the local level may be focus on transportation PPPs as well as PPPs in departments where 
contracts are frequently used such as the Department of Defense.  
 The next step is to publish the results of this research in peer-review journals and 
eventually put together a book. The results of this research will be presented at conferences 
and practitioners’ forums. The hope is that this research will open the door to grant 
opportunities for further research for the World Bank and its stakeholders. Furthermore, the 
skills developed throughout this process can contribute to the World Bank through 
consulting. Considering a career in the general field of public administration and policy, 
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pursuing the study of PPPs in relation to good governance and good practices is of special 
interest.    
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